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Abstract
The thesis includes four chapters highlighting different aspects of the link 
between international competition and the efficiency of firms.
Chapter I analyses how inefficiencies in technology choice due to 
asymmetric information between firm owners and managers are affected by 
international competition. Both the level and the cost responsiveness of profit 
influence the optimal contract. The effect of trade policies on technology choice 
is analysed for a number of oligopoly trade models. Conditions are derived under 
which more exposure to foreign competition increases the incentives to choose 
the socially efficient technology.
Chapter II develops a framework to analyse industry restructuring in 
response to trade liberalisation. It uses a free entry oligopoly model featuring firm 
heterogeneity and sunk entry costs. Trade liberalisation is shown to eliminate 
high cost firms by both exit and mergers. All private merger activity is 
constrained welfare improving. Because entry investments are sunk, the post­
liberalisation equilibrium depends on initial conditions. Finally, the model allows 
to make predictions about merger motives and participants over the restructuring 
process.
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Chapter HI analyses how trade policy affects firms’ incentives to cut costs 
depending on owners’ control of management. It focuses on two ambiguous roles 
of profits, being both a resource for investments and a cushion for survival. 
Protection can create windfall profits detrimental to performance: if managers are 
only partially controlled by owners integrating a market leads to the convergence 
of firms’ performance levels; if, however, managers’ actions are fully controlled 
an initial disadvantage leads to divergence.
Chapter IV links trade liberalisation to the rise in wage differentials. It 
proposes a free entry model of technology choice adding two features: first, it 
relates labour market developments to intra-industry competition. Second, it links 
the transmission channels technology and trade. A rise in international 
competition due to trade liberalisation encourages firms to switch technologies. 
This increases the wage differential between high- and low-skilled workers.
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Marcet sine adversario virtus 
(Seneca)
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Introduction
Economists are convinced that trade liberalisation brings many economic 
advantages to countries. Increased trade allows economies to exploit differences 
of factor endowments as well as economies of scale due to an increased division 
of labour. These arguments have been forcefully made both in the old and new 
trade theory. The main focus of this literature is on the question of what is done 
within a country.
Economists are also convinced that trade liberalisation brings additional 
advantages by enforcing performance improvements within firms. Increased trade 
raises the degree of international competition and thus drives out inefficient firms 
or activities within firms. This argument is the topic of advances in both the 
contract theory and new industrial organisation literature. The main focus of this 
analyses is on the question of how things are done within a country. This second 
line of thinking is the point of departure for the four chapters in this thesis.
A prominent example is the discussion about the expected gains of 
implementing the European Union’s Common Market Project. In its own 
assessment1 the Commission concludes that
“...the new competitive pressures brought about by completion o f the 
internal market can be expected to lead to rationalization within European 
enterprises and thus produce appreciable gains in internal efficiency. It is clear 
that the mechanisms referred to here [...] constitute much o f what can be called 
the dynamic effects o f the internal market. ”
In this thesis we investigate the basis for the Commission’s claim. We 
extend the theoretical framework to capture more of the positive effects 
associated with competition. The existing trade literature incorporates these 
competition effects only partially because even though the new trade theory has 
introduced imperfectly competitive market structures it applies the same model of 
the firm as the old trade theory. In the old trade theory this classical model of the 
firm is appropriate: assumptions about the internal contractual structure of the 
firm and about the heterogeneity of firms are of limited importance if the product 
market is perfectly competitive. In the new trade theory, however, the product 
market is imperfectly competitive and there is more scope for different 
assumptions on firm structure. So far, the new trade literature concentrates on 
exploring the effects of an imperfect market structure in an international context. 
We add to this perspective by analysing the effects of different assumptions on 
firm structures in imperfectly competitive markets.
1 European Economy (1988), p . 126. Also quoted inHORNETAL. (1995).
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The positive link between competition and the internal efficiency of firms 
is sometimes taken to be obvious but both theorists and econometricians have 
argued for caution. Co r d e n  (1974, p. 231) concludes his theoretical discussion 
by stating that "... it must be stressed that the efficiency effects o f protection can 
go either way. Quite specific assumptions have to be made to lead to the result 
that tariffs reduce efficiency." He reaches this conclusion within a framework 
where no inefficiency can exist and a change in a specific input, management’s 
effort, is treated as an indicator of efficiency. But 20 years later contract theorists 
like H e r m a u n  (1992) using incomplete information models with endogenous 
inefficiencies came to a similar conclusion: "All... effects [of competition] have 
ambiguous signs indicating that there is no definitive relationship between the 
level o f competition and [the efficiency of] executive behaviour."
The positive link between trade liberalisation and the efficiency of firms 
finds stronger support from econometric work. Appendix I.A provides a list of 
these contributions that all find a positive link between fewer barriers to trade and 
the growth rate of total factor productivity. At the end of his extensive survey 
R odrik  (1995), however, points out measurement and causality problems. In 
RODRIK (1992, p. 172) he even states: “WarningI Trade liberalization cannot be 
shown to enhance technical efficiency; nor has it been empirically demonstrated 
to do so." In the later survey he qualifies this position but remains sceptical. In 
our view at least some of the criticised ambiguities in the empirical work are a 
consequence of gaps in the underlying theoretical models. The present thesis 
closes a number of these gaps and should thus help to inform future empirical 
work.
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The chapters collected in this thesis highlight different aspects of the link 
between international competition and the efficiency of firms. In the first chapter, 
we examine the internal efficiency of firms and the effect of different types of 
trade liberalisation. In the second chapter, we investigate the elimination of 
underperforming firms by exit, merger, and internal restructuring in response to 
multilateral trade liberalisation. The third chapter analyses the interaction of 
market structure and owner information on firms’ incentives to invest in cost 
cutting and applies this model to the formation of a free trade area. The final 
chapter builds on the previous results to shed light on the link between 
liberalisation of intra-industry trade and the observed increase in wage 
differentials between skill groups. The results of the four papers clarify the 
positive impact of international competition on the efficiency of firms and put 
ambiguities in the literature into perspective. This can help to devise better 
empirical tests of the impact of competition on efficiency and to select policies 
that avoid potential problems.
International competition and the internal efficiency of firms
The first chapter “International competition and the internal efficiency of 
firms” examines the link between trade liberalisation and performance incentives 
given to managers. We find that all trade policies that result in a reduction of firm 
profit lead to private decisions on firm structure that increase welfare. Trade 
polices that increase firm output lead to private decisions on firm structure that 
reduce marginal cost. The private decisions in response to output changes are, 
however, welfare neutral in a certain sense and are not driven by the underlying 
incentive problem.
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The existing literature on international competition and internal efficiency 
of firms suffers from two pitfalls. First, the results of this literature are driven by 
effects unrelated to the central incentive problem. Second, this literature applies a 
misleading indicator to evaluate the welfare effects of the change in performance 
incentives in response to trade liberalisation. We address both these pitfalls.
First, we introduce an effect of competition that is directly linked to the 
incentive problem through the profit level. Competition reduces the cost of 
implementing better performance and thus reduces the scale of the underlying 
incentive problem. We show that the results in the existing literature are driven by 
the change in the output level. Performance incentives are a fixed cost to reduce 
the marginal cost of production. If competition reduces the output level a fixed 
investment on marginal cost reduction is less profitable.
Second, we restrict the social planner to operate under the same 
informational constraints as the private firm owner and neglect consumer surplus. 
Under this assumption competition affects welfare only if it has an impact on the 
informational problem. A change in the profit level has an impact on the 
informational problem while a change in the output level has not. The existing 
literature has either used a full information benchmark or included consumer 
surplus. We deviate from both these assumptions in order to single out the effect 
of competition on an incentive problem internal to the firm.
The chapter consists of two parts to analyse the model of the firm and 
undertake the trade policy experiments. In the first half, we develop a model of 
technology choice with informational asymmetry. Owners choose between either 
a traditional technology with known cost parameters or a sophisticated new 
technology with uncertain cost parameters that can be influenced by unobservable
management actions. In the second half, we implement the model of the firm in 
different imperfectly competitive trade models. We analyse quota and tariff 
protection, price and quantity market games, unilateral and multilateral 
liberalisation, and the integration of segmented markets.
Trade liberalisation affects technology choice through two separate 
channels: the change in the level of profit and the change in the cost 
responsiveness of profit. Trade policies that lead to a profit reduction reduce the 
cost to implement an unobservable management action because the expected 
informational rent to the manager falls. Firms are thus more willing to use the 
sophisticated technology. Trade policies that increase the output level push up the 
cost responsiveness of profit. Firms are more willing to use the sophisticated 
technology because the advantage of lower marginal cost compared to the 
traditional technology is increased. The same argument, however, applies to a 
social planner running the firm such that this output level effect has no impact on 
the welfare indicator.
Trade liberalisation as facilitating merger
The second chapter ‘Trade liberalisation as facilitating merger” analyses 
merger, exit, and internal restructuring as part of an industry restructuring process 
in response to trade liberalisation and is motivated by the merger wave in the 
European Union in the run-up to the completion of the Single Market in 1992. 
We find that trade liberalisation eliminates high cost firms through exit and 
merger. Multinationals are particularly active in the process, both in the merger 
market and in restructuring their operations to become domestic firms. The whole
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industry restructuring, including all privately profitable mergers, is constrained 
welfare improving.
We develop an industry model with heterogeneous firms, sunk entry costs, 
and cost-cutting mergers. We describe the industry equilibrium by the number of 
active firms and the cost level of the worst performer. The industry has to satisfy 
three conditions in steady-state equilibrium: first, no active firm looses money 
{exit condition)., second, no active firm can be bought up profitably {merger 
condition); and third, no outside firm has an incentive to enter the industry {entry 
condition). In a final section equilibrium further requires firms to be indifferent 
between having a domestic or multinational production structure {type choice 
condition). We look at two equilibria that satisfy these steady-state equilibrium 
conditions but result from different initial industry conditions, i.e., numbers of 
firms. In the first equilibrium, which we call initial equilibrium, both the entry 
and the merger condition bind while the exit condition may be slack. In the 
second equilibrium, which we call post-liberalisation equilibrium because it is 
the result of a trade liberalisation experiment, only the merger condition binds 
while both the exit and entry conditions may be slack.
We analyse the effect of trade liberalisation on an initial equilibrium. On 
the way to the post-liberalisation equilibrium the industry restructures by 
eliminating high cost firms in a process of exit, merger, and internal restructuring 
(i.e., type change). Multinational firms (only active for intermediate trade costs) 
are very active in these areas such that their relative and absolute number in the 
economy falls.
The existing trade literature has focused on the role of exit in response to
trade liberalisation. Our model adds to the literature in allowing for merger and
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firm heterogeneity. The firm heterogeneity assumption allows us to identify firms 
that exit and firms that merge. High cost firms are eliminated because they find it 
hard to survive alone and because they promise high gains from cost reductions as 
merger partners. The merger policy literature has sometimes neglected the role of 
the private incentives to merge and the implications of assuming free entry. Our 
model adds both these perspectives within an international context. We show that 
all mergers triggered by trade liberalisation are welfare improving. Trade 
liberalisation facilitates a practice, i.e., merger, that is often considered to be anti­
competitive but turns out to be socially beneficial.
A note on the effect of trade policy on the speed of cost-cutting
The third chapter “A note on the effect of trade policy on the speed of 
cost-cutting” analyses how trade policy affects firms’ incentives to cut costs 
under different assumptions about firm owners’ control of management actions. 
We find that trade liberalisation in a small open economy with heterogeneous 
firms leads to further divergence in performance if owners have full control over 
their management. If, however, owners have only limited control over managers 
through a fixed dividend target firms with an initial disadvantage manage to 
catch-up.
The existing literature on trade liberalisation and cost cutting assumes full
control by firm owners leading to profit maximisation. In these models, an
increase in competitive pressure on the product market as a result of trade
liberalisation often reduces the incentives to invest in cost-cutting. The literature
on trade and growth derives positive growth effects from trade liberalisation only
by introducing external effects or by liberalising the market for R&D (i.e.,
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blueprints for cost-cutting). These negative theoretical predictions on the effects 
of competition are at odds with empirical results on trade liberalisation and 
growth (see appendix I.A).
The first part of the chapter develops a model of infrequent cost-cutting by 
costly restructuring financed from accumulated profit. We identify the properties 
of the restructuring strategies and attached cost dynamics for each of the two 
assumptions about control within the firm. First, we look at the case of owners 
with full control interested in a maximum dividend and firm survival. Second, we 
look at the case of owners with limited control setting a dividend target for 
managers that delay restructuring as long as the survival of the firm and thus 
managers’ jobs are not in danger. The second part undertakes trade policy 
experiments. In the first experiment we analyse the comparative statics of the 
cost-cutting behaviour with respect to an unilateral increase in protection. We 
show that different rates of protection lead to cost differences between firms. 
These results are then applied to study the effects of the formation of a free trade 
area. We show that depending on owners’ control the creation of a custom union 
can lead either to the divergence (owner control) or the convergence (manager 
control) of heterogeneous firms.
The two different assumptions on owners’ information allow us to 
highlight two different roles of profit. Profit is used as a resource to finance 
further performance improvements (i.e., cost-cutting) and dividends if firm 
owners have full information about market conditions. Profit is used as a cushion 
to secure survival without investing in further performance improvement if firm 
owners control managers imperfectly by setting a dividend target. Thus depending
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on the assumption made about owners’ control of management a policy that 
changes the level of profit has opposite effects.
Some observers, like B ailey /G er sba c h  (1995), claim that German firms 
delayed productivity improvements because they received windfall profit from 
German unification and easier access to other European markets. We show that 
their claim is consistent with our theoretical model for the case of manager 
control.
Trade liberalisation and within-firm incentive contracts: 
An application to the labour market
The final chapter ‘Trade liberalisation and within-firm incentive 
contracts: An application to the labour market” builds on the previous chapters to 
address the effects of a trade induced change in technology on wage differentials. 
International competition has an effect on the relative wages for different skill 
groups that is independent of general-equilibrium factor price effects because it 
forces more firms to switch to a technology with higher wages for high-skill 
labour.
The previous literature on the link between trade and wages assumes 
technology to be isolated from trade flows. Changes in relative wages that can not 
be accounted for by the change in factor supply incorporated in traded goods or 
trade induced price change have been attributed to exogenous technological 
change and by implication trade between countries of identical relative factor 
endowments has no effect on relative wages. This perspective neglects the 
importance of international competition on technology change. In our model 
firms react to tougher international competition by switching to a technology with
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higher wage levels for high-skill labour. Empirical studies that do not take the 
effect of international competition on technology choice into account thus 
underestimate the role of trade in the recent rise of wage differentials.
In the chapter we first solve a free entry industry model embedded in a 
labour market for the number of firms of different types, and for the wages paid 
to two types of labour. In the second part we analyse exit and a shift in technology 
choice as a response to trade liberalisation. More firms opt for a technology 
where high-skilled labour is paid a rent for reducing per-unit low-skilled labour 
input requirements. Thus the change in technology increases the difference 
between the average wage for high-skill and low-skill labour. The free entry 
assumption magnifies the effect of trade liberalisation on technology choice and 
wage differentials further.
The four chapters of this thesis have a common theoretical point of 
departure. The new trade theory has integrated imperfectly competitive market 
structures into the realm of international economics but it continues to use a 
model of the firm that was most appropriate for perfectly competitive markets. In 
this classical model of the firm internal structure, inefficiency and heterogeneity 
play only a very limited role. In imperfectly competitive markets these aspects of 
the firm are potentially important. Hence within the new trade theory it is useful 
to adopt a more detailed model of the firm to allow for these additional aspects. 
Only such a detailed model of the firm is able to analyse the full impact of 
increasing competitive pressure in international markets on firms and economies. 
The chapters in this thesis investigate some of the questions in this research 
program.
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Chapter I
International competition 
and the efficient choice of technology
1. INTRODUCTION
It is almost a folk theorem in economics that competitive pressure is 
beneficial because it reduces "slack1 in firms. In political discussions this line of 
thinking is often used as an additional argument to engage in liberalisation and 
deregulation efforts. Empirical work, some of which is listed in appendix I.A, 
gives substance to this claim although the results are not always unambiguous. 
Theoretical work produces even less straightforward answers but recent advances 
in contract theory and industrial organisation help to better understand the forces 
involved.
In this chapter we develop a framework to look at the effect of 
international competition on the internal efficiency of firms. The aim is to gain a 
better understanding of the forces linking competition and efficiency, and 
eventually design trade policies with these links in mind. Central to our approach 
is the analysis of the private choice between technologies differing in their 
degrees of informational asymmetry within the firm. This set-up is meant to be 
indicative of similar models with imperfections due to matching or bargaining 
mechanisms.
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First, we identify two forces that link the degree of competition to the 
technology choice: the level and the cost responsiveness of profit. These two 
forces allow us to explain some of the ambiguity in earlier results. Second, we 
show that, under the assumption that the social planner acts under the same 
informational constraints as the private owner, private technology choice is 
inefficient. With this informational assumption we avoid judging a constrained- 
optimal allocation by comparing it to an infeasible benchmark. The picture that 
emerges underlines the positive link between trade liberalisation and sharpened 
incentives to use a socially preferable technology. It also highlights the 
relationship between trade policy induced output changes and the direction of 
technology choice that is independent of welfare. Making the roles of both size 
and profit level effects explicit proves to be crucial in understanding contradictory 
results from previous theoretical as well as empirical work.
The complete contract literature studying the link between competition 
and the internal efficiency of firms has been initiated by H a r t  (1983). His 
analytical tool is the theory of contracts under asymmetric information where a 
change in the market structure leads to modifications of the optimal contract. We 
group the literature according to the channels linking competition and the optimal 
contract. In H a r t  (1983) and S charfstein  (1988) increased competition 
provides additional information.1 With very restrictive assumptions on the 
manager’s utility function this leads to a more efficient effort choice but the result 
does not generally hold. In W ellig (1987), M a r tin  (1993), and P a n u n z i (1994) a 
change in the market structure affects the impact of the unobserved action on
1 See also the literature on tournaments and yardstick competition, which is not reviewed.
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profit.2 The sign of the change depends on the specific market model applied. 
AGfflON et al. (1995, 1997), Hermalin (1992), Kameke (1993), and Schmidt 
(1997) focus on the absolute level of profit. The specific reasoning differs but in 
all models lower profit increases the effort level. Horn et al. (1994) analyse 
different types of market games and show how moving from monopoly to 
quantity and then to price competition changes effort incentives non- 
continuously. Finally, Nickell (1995) gives a broad perspective on the literature.
In parallel, international economists have studied the effects of trade 
liberalisation on the internal efficiency of firms. General-equilibrium effects play 
a dominate role in the early literature. Corden (1974) was first to analyse the 
question in a full-information perfect-competition framework. Less protection 
might increase the effort level by managers in the industry concerned but neither 
the economy-wide effects nor the welfare implications are clear cut. Martin 
(1978) extended the analysis using a specific-factor model. These attempts have 
been rather unconvincing because they lack any kind of inefficiency internal to 
the firm. The economy moves from one first best allocation to another.
Horn e t  a l .  (1995, 1990) fundamentally change the theoretical 
framework of the analysis. First, they model the market as being imperfectly 
competitive. This clarifies the meaning of competitive pressure. Second, they 
adopt a principal-agent model of the firm. This allows an informational 
asymmetry to create a deviation from the first-best allocation. Increased 
international competition affects the contract between the principal and the agent. 
Their results, however, turn out to be ambiguous: effort is increased because as a
2 S t e n n e k  (1994) and G al-Or (1992) are related, even though they analyse different settings.
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consequence of the general equilibrium structure wages rise; hence cutting down 
on labour input becomes more valuable. The distance to the full information 
benchmark, however, is increased; the fully informed social planner would cut 
labour input even more. V o u sd e n /C a m pell  (1995) use a similar model of the 
firm but implement it in a perfectly competitive market to study the effects of an 
export subsidy.3 Welfare increases if the informational rents paid to managers 
increase. This is a result well known from the literature on gains from trade in a 
distorted economy: gains from trade are assured if output in the distorted sector 
increases with trade liberalisation. In D a s  (1996) firms face an internal moral 
hazard problem. An increase in protection reduces welfare as a consequence of 
free trade being the optimal policy in this type of model. The moral hazard 
problem has no independent influence on the result.
We combine these approaches from the contract and trade literature. In 
section 2 the technology choice model is presented and analysed. Section 2.1 
solves for the optimal incentive contract, and Section 2.2 specifies the technology 
choice condition. The profit responsiveness and profit level effects are analysed 
in subsections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 respectively. Section 2.3 investigates the welfare 
implications of the private technology choice. In section 3 the international 
market games are presented. Sections 3.1 to 3.4 analyse the effects of competition 
in output vs. price, of unilateral vs. multilateral trade policy and of different types 
of trade barriers (quotas, tariffs, and market segmentation). Section 3.5 gives a 
summary of the results. Section 4 concludes.
3 Other papers using contract theory in trade models are H o r s t m a n n /M a r k u s e n  (1996) on F D I 
and D in o po u l u s  e t  a l . (1995), C o m b e s  e t  a l . (1995), and B r a in a r d /M a r t im o r t  (1996) on 
trade policy, i.e., principal-agent relationships between governments and firms.
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2. THE TECHNOLOGY CHOICE MODEL
The model proceeds in three stages with the full timing of moves in 
appendix I.B. In the first stage, the firm owner has to choose to implement one 
out of two available technologies/production functions. One technology is 
traditional; all parameters of its cost function are well known and not liable to 
shocks or changes. The other technology is more sophisticated; the parameters of 
its cost function can be improved by appropriate management actions but are 
subject to adverse shocks. Shocks are observable to the manager but not to the 
owner. In the second stage, owners offer managers an incentive contract given the 
earlier technology choice. Shocks occur and firms’ costs are determined in 
interaction with management action. In the final stage, firms compete in the 
international product market given their production cost. Owners have to weight 
the additional cost of hiring managers to take some discretionary action against 
the advantage to have them implement a lower cost level and thus boost profit.
The structure of the market game affects both the cost of hiring the 
manager and the advantage of competing with a lower production cost. Changes 
in trade policy can shift the balance from one technology to another. We proceed 
backwards taking the reduced-form profit function as given. The derivation of the 
profit function in international market games follows in section 3. In section 2 the 
outcome of the final stage is given as a closed-form representation of profit II 
depending on own cost c and trade costs t. Section 2.1 sets t constant to look at 
technology choice; section 2.2 varies t to identify the role of competition.
(i) n(c,t)
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2.1 The Incentive Contract
In this section we analyse the contract between the firm owner and the 
manager at the second stage where technology is given and labelled z. Owners are 
endowed with an investment project and have the capital to finance it. They aim 
to maximise profit given by (1) net of transfers to managers. Managers have zero 
wealth but possess human capital essential for the project to generate any returns. 
As in LaffontATirole  (1986) a firm's cost function is perfectly observable and c 
is an argument of this function. The variable c is determined by a random shock s , 
for example a machine break-down, and an action a taken by the manager. Both a 
and s are unobservable to the owner, while the manager chooses a knowing the 
value of s.
(2 ) c(a,s) = s — a
The technology choice z determines the possible values of actions and 
shocks. If the owner has chosen a technology with a higher z, he has access to a 
wider set of possible cost parameters. The variables a and s are elements from the 
sets A  and S defined by z according to
(3) A = [0,z]; S = [c°,c° + z]; A ,S c R + ;  c °> z>  0
Within S the distribution of the shock is given by the distribution function 
f(s) and the cumulative density function F(s). We assume f[s) to be uniform for
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computational ease but the results do not depend on this assumption. The size of 
both A and S is increasing in z 4
Owners cannot choose managers’ actions directly because the action a is 
unobservable. They can, however, offer managers an incentive contract to induce 
them to reveal the shock s. From these reports actions can be perfectly discerned 
with the observation of c using the technological relationship in (2 ).
Consider a risk-neutral manager with a utility function U separable and 
linear in both income tr  and an action a  with a constant marginal disutility of v. If 
the manager reports a shock of size s the owner orders him to take an action a(s). 
The manager gets a monetary reward tr(s,a(s)) if he complies with the owner’s 
cost and action target.5 The owner checks compliance using (2).
(4) U = tr(s ,a (s))-  va(s)
The separability assumption is made to abstract from income effects that 
played a prominent role in the early literature (M a r t in  (1978)). The linearity 
assumption is made to rule out a standard source of inefficiency. Appendix I.C 
uses a convex disutility of action function v(a) and shows that our results remain 
valid under some additional conditions standard in the literature.
4 In this specification the higher indexed technology not only suffers from more severe 
informational asymmetry but also a worse distribution of shocks. At first sight, a symmetric 
expansion of the set S with the index seems more appropriate. But with risk-neutral agents and a 
profit function convex in marginal costs an extended set S(i) would be preferred to a set S(j) 
whenever i > j. This is an uninteresting effect and thus we rule it out by expanding the set S 
asymmetrically with z .
5 We assume that it is infeasible to base the contract on any other outside information like market 
price or competitor behaviour such that yardstick competition or tournaments can not be used.
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When offering a contract, the owner has to take account of three 
constraints: first, the manager has to be offered an utility equal or above his 
outside opportunity (normalised to zero) for every value of s (individual 
rationality constraint (IR)) because he takes his action only after learning the 
value of the shock.
(5) tr(s,a(s)) -  va(s) > 0Vs e  S
Second, the manager has to be induced to report the value of the shock s
truthfully {incentive compatibility constraint (IC)). This is a direct application of 
the revelation principle: a truth-telling mechanism is at least as good as any other 
contract. Let the manager’s report be s ’ while the true value of the shock is s. 
Then for truth telling to be optimal the manager’s utility is maximised by a report 
s ’ equal to s:
(6 ) s' arg max U = tr(s' , a(y)) -  va(.sU') and s -  s'
where a(^s') = s -  s'+a(s') is needed to mimic the outcome c(a(s’),s’)
Finally, for some values of the shock it may be unprofitable to run the 
firm altogether. For this subset of S both the manager and the owner receive only 
their outside utility of zero; no informational rent is paid to the manager for his 
truthful report. Hence ex ante the owner has an incentive to overstate the region S 
for which no payments are made. Ex post, however, he can offer the manager 
some positive utility and commence production. The manager understands these 
incentives for the owner, so he will accept contracts only when there is no
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advantage for the owner to renege on the cut-off point s* above which no 
production takes place {renegotiation proofness constraint (RP)). This point is 
reached where profit is insufficient to pay for the disutility of the manager.
(7) n(c(.s, a(^))) -  va(^) < OVs > s *
The owner’s optimisation problem can then be written as
(8) J {n(c(s, a(s))) -  /r(s, a(s))}/ (s)ds
a{s) , t r { s j i ) , s*J s  L  '  '  ' '  v  '  J
s. t. rr(j, a(s)) -  va(s) > OVs e S  IR constraint
s' arg max U = tr(s' , <2(5 ')) -  v a ^ s ') ; s = s * IC constraint
n(c(j,a(s))) -  va(s) < Q\/s >s*  RP constraint
The IC constraint is applied by differentiating utility (4) and imposing the 
first-order condition required by (6). This expression is then evaluated at the 
truth-telling point resulting in the dynamic constraint (9) to the problem.
(9) W  =  ^ £ 0 _ v
ds'
da(d[s') da(s|.s') 
ds ds'
= -v
Substituting out the transfer tr by use of (4), the action a by use of (2), and 
using manager’s utility U as the state variable the problem can be solved by 
defining the free-endpoint Hamiltonian H  (10), where A(s) is the shadow value of
the dynamic constraint on U. The IR and RP constraints are introduced later.
(10) H  s  [ll(c(.s,a(,s))) -  U(s,a{s)) -  v[^ -  c(s,«(.?))]]/(s) -  A(s)v
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Before maximising the Hamiltonian by choice of c(s) = c(.s, a(s)) the
shape of H  has to be checked. We find that for a linear utility function and a profit 
function convex in own cost the Hamiltonian is convex and the standard first- 
order condition describes a minimum. Both conditions are present in our contract 
model and all market games studied later. To obtain the maximum, we check the 
boundaries of the sets A  and C. Let upper bars define the upper bound of a set. 
We make the following simplifying but not essential assumption: 6
Assumption 1: n(c(,s,a)) -  v a -U (s ,a )  > Il(c(.s,0))v.s < s*
The assumption implies that for all states in which the firm is active, 
inducing effort is the optimal decision. Figure 1.1 gives a graphical representation. 
For this assumption to hold the effect of cost changes on profit has to be 
relatively large compared to the disutility of action for a manager. Under 
assumption 1 the relationship between cost levels and shocks is particularly 
simple (11). The remaining optimality conditions are (12) and (13).
(1 1 ) c(s) = s - a
(12) - J ^  = A(s) = /(s )
(13) M s ) = ~ v = 0 [ s ]
6 In the absence of assumption 1 there exists a second cut-off point s**<s*.  Below s** maximum 
effort is induced and informational rents are paid. Between s** and s* production takes place but 
transfers, actions, and informational rents are zero, s** is implicitly defined by
n (c(s  * *, a)) - v a =  Fl(c(.s * *,0 )).
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Using the RP constraint and the optimal cost target (11) we can identify 
the cut-off point s*. If profits are everywhere higher than the manager’s disutility, 
production takes place in all states and s* = s . Otherwise s* is defined as the 
state s at which profit is equal to manager’s disutility.
(14) n (c (  s *)) = v[s * - c ( j  *)] = va
From (13) the manager’s utility is decreasing in s for all active states. 
Utility is decreasing in s because otherwise the manager would have an incentive 
to over-report s and thus cut back on action. Incentive compatibility is achieved 
by giving the manager an informational rent in better states. Using the IR 
constraint the transfer in the worst active state is just sufficient to pay for the 
manager’s disutility.
(15) fr(,s *) = va
We solve for the manager’s utility by integrating (13) and using the 
transfer at the cut-off point s* (15) to determine the constant term. Applying (4) 
we write the utility U and the transfer tr as a function of the state s only.
(16) U(s) = v[.s*-s] V s< s*
(17) tr(s) = v[ ^ * - 5  + a] V ^< 5 *
The manager’s utility and the transfer are linear functions of the state, 
where the linearity follows from the assumptions on the manager’s utility 
function. The manager’s utility U(s) is, together with the action a(s) and cost level
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c(s), shown in figure 1.2. The transfer has two parts: first, it includes a fixed sum 
for the manager’s disutility of taking a costly state-independent action from 
assumption 1. Second, it provides the manager with an informational rent to give 
the incentive for truthful reporting of states. The informational rent is a profit 
sharing device between owner and manager. The transfer tr(s) is, together with 
the profit level n(c(s'))and the managers’ disutility of action va(s), drawn in 
figure 1.3.
2.2 The Choice of Technology
This section defines the technology choice condition at the first stage. We 
restrict attention to two technologies but the set-up can be extended to allow for a 
continuum of technologies. The owner chooses between a technology where z is 
equal to zero (this technology is called 0) and a technology where z is strictly 
positive (this technology we continue to call z). It is not essential who chooses the 
technology, only that the choice is perfectly observable. The technology choice 
condition (18) describes the trade-off: the left hand side gives the expected profit 
gain from switching to technology z, while the right hand side gives the expected 
transfer cost. Superscripts are used to link cost targets to technologies: c° is 
exogenously given by (3); cz(s) is endogenously given by (11). To look at the 
effect of changing trade costs we explicitly introduce t in the profit functions. In 
the next two sections we derive conditions upon the profit function n(c, t) that 
have to hold in order for a change in competition to affect technology choice in a 
certain direction.
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The owner chooses technology 0 if
(18) - n(c° ,t) < (‘Vw/M*
In figure 1.4 we reduce the set S of possible states to two and can thus use 
a state-space diagram to represent the technology choice condition graphically. 
The example given corresponds to the case where the technology choice 
condition (18) holds and the private owner chooses technology 0 .
2.2.1 The profit responsiveness effect
The first channel linking trade costs t to technology choice works through 
the gains of switching the technology. The advantage of having a low production 
cost c can differ with the level of trade barriers and hence the degree of 
international competition. To analyse this effect, the transfer expense tr(s) of the z 
technology is held constant by assuming that the RP constraint is nowhere 
binding in S\ thus the cut-off point is constant at s* = s before and after the 
change in trade costs. Differentiate the technology choice condition (18) with 
respect to t to obtain
If expression (19) is negative, less competition due to higher trade costs 
favours the choice of technology 0 instead of technology z. In terms of the 
technology choice condition the left hand side of (18) is decreased and thus the
(19)
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inequality more likely to hold. Proposition 1 states this result that is similar to 
fixed technology models with effort choice.7
Proposition 1
More intense international competition favours the choice o f the asymmetric
d2nlc(s), t)
information technology z i f ---------------- > 0 . This condition is fulfilled i f  profit
dcdt
becomes more responsive to cost with lower trade costs.
Proof:
The condition of proposition 1 implies a negative sign for expression (19) 
because from the optimal cost schedule (1 1 ) and the definition of the state and 
action space (3) it follows that cz(.s) < c°Vs with a strict inequality for s < s .
Proposition 1 is a condition upon the effect of competition on the relative 
levels of profit as function of cost. A positive cross-product of profit with respect 
to own cost c and trade cost t implies that higher-cost firms lose more profit for a 
given fall in protection; this is the case if lower trade costs increase output. In 
section 3 of the chapter we establish some trade policy experiments for which this 
condition holds. In figure 1.5 we analyse the profit responsiveness effect in the 
state-space diagram under the condition that proposition 1 holds.
7 S ee  S c h m id t  (1997) an d  H e r m a u n  (1992).
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2.2.2 The profit level effect
The second channel linking trade costs t to technology choice works 
through the transfer expenses of the technologies. For different levels of 
protection the expected cost of hiring the manager for the z technology can differ. 
Casual observation suggests that the absolute level of profit should have an 
impact upon the optimal contract between the principal and the agent. If a firm’s 
exit becomes more likely, it might be easier to induce the manager to work harder 
or provide information to prevent bankruptcy. By applying an idea suggested by 
Schmidt (1997) in a slightly different model8 we now introduce such a profit 
level-effect.
Trade liberalisation affects the level of profit for any technology. For the z 
technology the subset of states S for which production is profitable is altered. Any 
change in the cut-off state s* affects the size of the expected transfer to the 
manager through the IR constraint. Lower trade costs affect s* as given by (20) 
using the implicit function theorem on the definition of the cut-off state s* (14).
(20) ds* _  dn(c‘(s),t)/dt
dt dn(cz (s), t)/dc -  v[l -  c(j)]
The relationship between protection levels and the cut-off state (20) is 
positive if profit is both decreasing in production cost and increasing in trade cost 
because c ( j )  = 1. Under these two conditions lower trade costs have the effect 
that the owner shuts down the firm for more realisations of the shock. Ignoring
8 Schmidt uses the limited liability model by In nes (1990), where in contrast to the present 
setting the agent chooses his action before learning about the value of the shock. He 
exogenously assumes the probability of default to be increasing with competition.
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the change in relative profit covered by proposition 1 we analyse the effect of 
changes in the cut-off state s* on the additional cost of technology z by 
differentiating the technology choice condition (18) with respect to the trade costs 
t by applying Leibnitz’s Rule.
From (20) and (21), higher trade costs increase the expected additional 
cost of the z  technology if profit is increasing in protection: less competition 
favours the choice of the 0 instead of the z  technology. The right hand side of the 
technology choice condition (18) increases and thus the inequality is more likely 
to hold. In figure 1.6 we analyse this profit level effect in the state-space diagram.
Proposition 2
(a) I f  profit is increasing in protection t more intense international competition 
favours the choice o f the asymmetric information technology z.
(b) Drawing these proposition 1 and 2(a) together, inequality (22) is a necessary 
condition fo r  trade liberalisation to lead to the adoption o f the z technology.
(a) From (20) and (21) the condition implies increasing additional costs for the z 
technology with higher trade costs t. Hence lower values for t imply lower 
additional costs and thus make it less likely that the technology choice 
condition (18) holds.
(21) — 7—  vF{s *) > 0
dt
Proof:
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(b) Inequality (22) is the derivative of the technology choice condition (18) with 
respect to trade costs. If the combined effect is such that the inequality holds, 
higher (lower) values of t make it more (less) likely that (18) holds. The 
condition is necessary but not sufficient because the effect has to go not only 
in the right direction but also to be strong enough to change (18).
2.3 Welfare analysis
In the welfare analysis we abstract from the industry-wide allocational 
impact of competition on social welfare. For the imperfectly competitive trade 
models of section 3 the literature provides a set of established welfare theorems 
on this part of the problem.9 The new issue at stake is the welfare effect of the 
technology choice within the firm.
For technology z the social planner solves a problem similar to the private 
owner without having any informational advantage.10 Also, the social planner has 
to respect a balanced-budget constraint (BB): transfers have to be smaller or equal 
to profit. The social planner is interested in the joint utility of owner and manager, 
not in the distribution between them . 11 Hence the social planner has to respect the 
same constraints but maximises a different objective function. His problem is 
given by (23) together with the constraints familiar from the private contract 
problem.
9 See W o n g  (1995), pp. 389 - 430 for a summary of these results.
10 See H o l m s t r Om /M y e r s o n  (1983) on the appropriate assumptions on the information structure 
of the social planner in a private information framework.
1 including consumer surplus would obviously bias the social planner’s choice towards using the 
lower marginal cost technology even further.
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(23) max W = f [n(c(j,a(s)),f)-va(s)]/(j)£fc
a[s)jr (s ,a ) ,s*  £  *■ '  J
s. t. tr(s,a(s)) -  va(s) > OVs e S  IR  constraint
s 'argm axU = tr(s',a(s’)) -  va^ls'); s = s ’ IC constraint
n(c(.s,a(.s))) -  va(.s) < OVs > s * BB constraint
Substituting out the transfer tr by use of (4), the action a by use of (2), and 
using manager’s utility U as the state variable the problem can be solved by 
defining the free-endpoint Hamiltonian H  (24), where A(s) is the shadow value of 
the dynamic constraint on U. The IR and BB constraints are introduced later.
(24) H  = [ n ^ s ) ) ^  U{s) -  tr(s j\f(s)ds-A (s)v
Maximising (24) by choice of c(s) = c(s, a(s)) with state variable U gives
the optimality conditions below, where again the convexity of H  in conjunction 
with assumption 1 determines a boundary solution for (25).
(25) c(s) = s -  a
(26) - ^  = A(s) = - f ( s )
m  m - ^ mm
Equation (25) is equivalent to (11); both induce the same cost targets 
replicating the well-known result that the private contract gives the first best if the 
agent is risk-neutral.12 Introducing limited liability usually makes the first-best 
solution infeasible but this is not the case here because the agent’s utility function
12S ee  H a r r is /R a v iv  (1979).
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is linear in the action. The first-best action is implemented, even though an 
informational rent is paid to the agent. 13
Equation (27) is equivalent to equation (13); both owner and social 
planner face the same constraint on manager’s utility. With the BB constraint 
equivalent to the RP constraint the cut-off point s* is identical; at this point s* the 
informational rent is zero and thus private and social objectives coincide. From
(26) X(s) < OVs the state-dependent IC constraint never binds because the social 
planner’s objective is indifferent to payments to the manager. This does not result 
in higher actions because action choice was already at the upper limit of A.
For the social planner to prefer technology 0 over technology z the 
technology choice condition (28) has to hold, where again the left hand side gives 
the gain and the right hand side the cost of switching to technology z .
(28) J''n(c‘ U ),t)fU )ds  -  n ( c \ t )  < j% a(s)f(s)d s
The two technology choice conditions for the social planner and the 
private owner differ only in the right hand side term: the social planner takes into 
account the disutility of the manager, while the private owner also includes the 
informational rents in the assessment. Thus the social planners’ technology choice 
condition (28) is more stringent in the sense of less competition being sufficient 
to induce a switch to technology z.
13More precisely, S a p p in g t o n ’s (1983) properties 3 and 4 are not given in the present model. 
Equation (1.2) in the proof of his theorem 1 shows that the term biasing the output choice away 
from the optimal one is therefor zero for all shocks s.
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Proposition 3
(a) I f  the inequality in proposition 2 (b) is satisfied and the firm is active in more 
than one state, the social planner chooses the z technology for lower trade 
barriers t than the private owner.
(b) I f  profit is increasing in protection t, i.e., proposition 2 (a) holds every 
reduction in trade costs reduces the differences in technology choice between 
a private owner and the social planner. Then more exposure to international 
competition gives extra welfare gains on top o f the standard allocational 
advantages.
For the social planner only manager’s disutility is costly in terms of the 
objective function (2 2 ); the informational rent shifts utility without affecting 
welfare. Hence the social cost of switching to the z technology is strictly lower 
than the private transfer for any positive weight given to managers’ utility. This 
wedge creates the inefficiency in technology choice.
Our result relates directly to E sfahani/M ookherjee (1995) and the 
inefficiency in their model of contract choice. Note that this is similar to problems 
studied in the incomplete contract literature (Gr o ssm a n /H a r t  (1986), H art/  
M oore  (1990)). They analyse incentive problems due to sharing rules of the 
surplus tied to the ownership structure. In the present model contracts are 
complete but the informational asymmetry induces a lower bound to the profit 
share for the manager and thus distorts the private incentives for the owner.
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3. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION
We are now in a position to use the results of the preceding sections to 
analyse the effect of trade policy in the final stage. It is a common theme in both 
the Industrial Organisation literature on imperfectly competitive markets and in 
its applications in the New Trade Theory that results depend critically on the 
specific assumptions made about market structure. Here we give a broader view 
on the set of market games instead of picking one by random or taste.
We find that protectionist trade policies creating windfall profits for firms 
have a welfare cost in terms of a socially inefficient technology choice on top of 
the well-understood allocational distortions. Because there are two different 
channels through which trade policy changes affect technology choice, we are 
also able to shed light on some contradictory results in the literature.
Starting from a simple market game we add additional features using the 
most common imperfectly competitive trade models. Section 3.1 starts with a 
home monopoly protected from a competitive fringe of foreign firms by either a 
tariff or a quota. Section 3.2 introduces international duopolists competing in 
either quantities or prices. Section 3.3 compares unilateral to multilateral trade 
policies. Section 3.4 studies the move from a segmented to an integrated market. 
Finally, section 3.5 puts the results in context. Throughout section 3 cost 
functions are given by (3.0) with output q and a vector of technology parameters 
c = {F,b,e}. Parameter c used in section 2 is an element of vector c .
(3.0) K {q ) =F + b q + ^ q 2
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3.1 Different types of protection: Tariff vs. Quota
From the work by B h a g w a h  (1965) it is known that tariffs and quotas 
limiting imports to the same level can have very different consequences for home 
firm behaviour. C a b r a l  et  a l . (1996) and Reitzes (1991) look at the incentives 
for cost reduction under oligopolistic price competition and a quota. Ca b r a l  et 
a l . (1996) find the home firm’s cost reduction decreasing in quota protection and 
explain this by the elimination of strategic considerations. In the present analysis 
only the home monopolist has a technology choice, i.e., there is no strategic 
interaction, and it faces a competitive fringe of foreign firms supplying at the 
world market price p w. Protection takes the form of either a tariff t or a quota m. 
The home firm has a cost function K(q) as given by (3.0) with e>0. Demand is 
given by D(p)t with the home market price p. Home firm profit is given by
(3.10) n  = max jp g  -  *(«)}
Tariff
For tariff protection, the first-order condition to (3.10) is
The top row gives the optimality condition for the region of home firm 
output, where the price is determined by the world market price plus the tariff. 
The bottom row gives the optimal output for the region where foreign firms find
(3.11) p w + t - b - e q > 0
p - b - e q  + dp/dqq = 0
V 0 < q < q ]
V q > q l where p (g7) = p w + 1
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it unprofitable to serve the home market. We make the restriction that the 
monopoly output is below q such that this segment never applies. 14
The effects of a higher tariff level on technology choice are then given by
(3.12) = q = ——— — — > 0 Profit level effect
dt e
(3.13) - ^  = —  = - —<0  Profit responsiveness effect
dtdb db e
Quota
For quota protection, the first-order condition to (3.10) is
(3.14) p(q + m ) - b - e q  + dp(q + m )/dqq = 0 VO<q < q2; p(q2+rn) = p w
p(q2 + m ) - b - e q  = 0  Vq2 < q < q 2 \ p{q3) = p"
p(q) — b — eq + dp{q)/dq q = 0 V4 3 < q
The top row gives the optimality condition for the region of home firm 
output, where the home firm deducts the import quota m to act as a monopolist 
facing the residual demand function D(p)-m.15 The middle row gives the segment
14 This follows from the kinked shape of the home firm’s marginal revenue (MR) 
curve: MR = p + t \ / 0 < q < q l and MR = p  + p'q  V# > q l . Hence at q the MR 
curve has a discontinuity. If the marginal cost curve cuts at this point, the home 
firm will maximise profits by moving up to the price p w+t. If it cuts in the 
decreasing segment of the MR curve, foreign competition poses no threat.
15 From the twice kinked shape of the home firm’s marginal revenue curve:
MR = p(q + m) + dp/dq (<q + m)q VO < q < q 2, MR = p[q2 + rnj Vq2 <q<q*
and MR = p(q) +dp/dq(q)q  V4 3 <q.  At q and q the MR curve has a
discontinuity. If marginal cost cuts MR at these points, the firm chooses between 
an aggressive (q = q3) or timid strategy (q < q) .  See Helpm a n /K r u g m a n  
(1992), p. 32. In the third segment foreign competition poses no threat.
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where the home price is equal to the world market price and the home firm and 
the foreign fringe divide the fixed market demand D(pw) between them. The 
bottom row gives the optimal output for the region where foreign firms find it 
unprofitable to import. From the above restriction that the monopoly output is
1 1 3smaller than q , this last segment never applies since q < q . In figure 1.7 we 
draw the twice-kinked marginal revenue function and discuss the optimal output 
choice.
Neglecting second-order effects on prices a smaller quota affects 
technology choice by
(3.15) -  = - q  > 0 Profit level effect
dm dm
„ d 2n  dq _(3.16 ) ---------- = —— Profit responsiveness effect
dmdb dm
The profit level effect (3.15) is positive for all parameter values. The 
profit responsiveness effect (3.16), however, is negative as long as output is 
adjusted only within one of the regions defined by q2 and q but becomes positive 
if the optimal output choice moves from a binding to a non-binding quota for the 
foreign firms.
Comparison
In (3.17) we first define a quota m to be as restrictive as a tariff t if both 
allow the same level of imports where q(t) is the equilibrium value of q given t.
(3.17) m = D( p w + t ) - q ( t )
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Profit under a tariff (a) and a quota (b) for a given level of imports is
(3.18a) n(f) = [pw + -  K{q(t))
(3.18b) n(m) = p(q{m) + m)q(m) -  K(q(mj)
The profit responsiveness to changes in own marginal cost is given by
(3.19a) ^ - Q  = - q ( t ) < 0  
db
(3.19b)— = -q(m) < 0 db
Proposition 4
(a) Comparison of tariff and quota protection
Assume p'+p" q < 0 and e > 0, let the manager control the marginal cost 
parameter b, and let the autarky monopoly price pa be larger than the world 
market price plus tariff: p a > p w + t . Then for all m such that (3.17) holds it is 
true that
d) n « < n (m )
(«) q(t)>q(m)
db‘ db1
The inequalities are strong for  VO < q < q 2 given that p a > p w + t. Because for  
tariff protection profit is lower (i) and the cost responsiveness o f profit is higher 
(iii), it follows from proposition 1 and 2 that switching to a quota reduces the 
incentives to use the socially beneficial technology z.
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(b) Change in protection for a given policy instrument
For both policy instruments profit is decreasing in trade liberalisation; hence 
proposition 2(b) applies and lower trade barriers favour the choice o f the 
socially efficient technology. Because the cost responsiveness o f profit falls with 
trade liberalisation fo r  both policies, the direction o f technology change is 
ambiguous. For lower t (higher m) the z technology has a lower transfer cost but 
also a lower profit gain compared to the 0 technology.
Proofs are given in appendix I.D. Part (b) of the proposition extends 
sentence two of proposition 1 in C a b r a l  et  a l . (1996) to tariffs levels above 
zero. A worked example of the Cournot case is provided in appendix I.F.
3.2 Different types of market interaction: Cournot vs. Bertrand
Suppose two firms located in home and foreign produce good x. They 
have constant marginal cost [e = 0 ] and supply both the home and the foreign 
markets. 16 Markets have an identical linear inverse demand function. The foreign 
firm is an incumbent with an installed technology and thus given cost function.
Cournot Quantity Competition
Home firm f  s profit is given b y 17
(3.20) IT = [p„ - bt ]*,, + [pf  - b,
16The model is due to B r a n d e r /K r u g m a n  (1983).
17The first subscript indicates the location of production, the second one the location of sales. The 
index on the trade costs gives cost of supplying the indexed market.
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The first-order conditions on output choice are given by
home market 
foreign market
(3.21) Pk - b , + ^ q lh=0
dpf
(3.22) qm =
At the equilibrium of this market game output and prices are given by
A f  + cf  - 2 [b‘ + t f ]A h + c f  + t h - 2 bl
A j + c f  +bl + t j
Qif =
Pj =
We first analyse the effects of variations in home market protection th. 
Higher protection increases the level (3.23) and the cost responsiveness of home 
firm profit (3.24).
n  , , 1  d n ‘ dp" dqm r , 1 2  „
(3.24) +
dtidbi dtt dbt
dp1
~db~
- 1
dt;
2 _ 2  
9 9
- - < 0
9
Secondly, we analyse the effect of higher protection tf on the export 
market (lower export subsidies by the domestic government, for example as part 
of a strategic trade policy, are equivalent policy instruments) the level (3.25) as 
well as the cost responsiveness of profit decreases (3.26).
(3.25)
(3.26)
dlT  
d tr
dpf
~dt~
- 1
d 2n ‘ dpj -1 dpl 1
dtjdbi dt.
j
db, dbt
dqv 4 4 8
dt.
— — I—  — — > 0  
9 9 9
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It has been argued that export subsidies as part of a strategic trade policy 
have detrimental effects on the efficiency of the exporting industry. 18 In our 
model, this will be the case if the profit level effect (3.25) outweighs the profit 
responsiveness effect (3.26), i.e., proposition 2 (b) holds. Under the same 
condition non-participation in trade liberalisation efforts by trading partners will 
incur extra costs in terms of a socially inefficient technology choice.
Bertrand Price Competition
In equilibrium firms charge a price just below the sum of the foreign 
firm’s cost plus trade costs if this price is below the monopoly price. No trade 
occurs and profit is
(3.27) IT = \pj -  bt -  F  for both countries h, f
where p, = bj + f and qa = Z)(p.) with D as the demand function.
Higher import barriers (f,-) raise the level (3.28) and the cost 
responsiveness (3.29) of profit. Lowering export barriers (tj) or higher export 
subsidies have no effect on home firm technology choice. Proposition 5 collects 
these results.
(3 ,28) d p "  =  9 “ + [p ' ~ b^ d L = q “ +  “  b< M p ) > 0
dtidbi
18This relates to results by B r a in a r d /M a r t im o r t  (1992).
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The positive sign of the profit level effect (3.28) follows from a revealed 
preference argument. The positive profit responsiveness effect (3.29) follows 
from the downward sloping shape of the demand function.
Proposition 5
(a) Cournot Quantity Competition
Lower import tariffs, lower export subsidies, and participation in multilateral 
trade liberalisation reduce profit and increase the efficiency o f technology 
choice. Lower import tariffs, lower export subsidies, and participation in trade 
liberalisation by others reduce the responsiveness o f profit to cost. Hence the 
combined effect on technology choice cannot be signed unambiguously.
(b) Bertrand Price Competition
Lower import tariffs reduce profit and increase the efficiency o f technology 
choice. Lower import tariffs increase the responsiveness o f profit to cost, so the 
combined effect favours the z technology. Export policy has no effect.
3.3 Unilateral vs. multilateral trade liberalisation
In the previous section we looked at the effects of a unilateral change in 
trade policy by one country. Many practical examples are of a different kind: both 
within the European Union and WTO the focus is on multilateral liberalisation. 
Using the results from section 3.2 and setting dt, = dtj we get the profit level
(3.31) and the profit responsiveness effect (3.32).
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dW dp r l dqih r „ 1 2  4
dt d t lAin 1,JA dt L' w 3 " "  3
(3.32) d2n ‘ U - - i \ /
<hu
dtdbi dt dbt > dt
4  8  4  n—------1—  — — > 0
9 9 9
Lower trade costs unambiguously increase the responsiveness of profit to 
own costs (3.32). Lower trade costs only decrease profit if home markets are 
sufficiently more important to firms than foreign markets: in (3.31) the term in 
the first brackets, the change in the price level times output, is positive; the term 
in the second brackets, the change in sales times price-cost margins, however, is 
only positive for home sales twice as large as exports; the final term is negative 
and captures the direct cost effect of the tariff on export sales. Appendix I.G 
provides a worked example of this case where both the profit level and profit 
responsiveness effect are positive.
Proposition 6
Multilateral trade liberalisation increases the incentives to choose the efficient 
technology z from both the profit responsiveness and the profit level effect if  
home markets are sufficiently more important to firms than foreign markets.
Proposition 5 and 6  differ in their perspective: proposition 5 evaluates a 
country’s policy given that other countries liberalise independently while 
proposition 6  evaluates a joint policy given that otherwise the status quo prevails. 
Governments have to assess their influence on other countries policies before they 
can evaluate the effect of their trade policies.
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3.4 Integrated vs. segmented markets in duopoly
Trade theory has pointed out the importance of linkages between pricing 
strategies on different markets. In the context of the European Union’s 1992 
project these contributions have also entered the political discussion. 19 With 
market integration firms loose the option to charge different producer prices in 
different markets. Using the model by M arkusen/V enables (1988) we analyse 
the properties of a one-time switch from segmentation to integration. Firms 
compete in two symmetric markets by supplying differentiated products where P 
measures the closeness of the products. In each country there is one firm and 
exports incur trade costs t. Let the combined market size be one with the home 
market of size s and define B = \ l p  + m  + 1]. Then the segmented market 
equilibrium is characterised by
(3.41) I I s = 2^s(pn -  bx ) 2 + (l -  s)(p12 ~ bx )21 -  F  profit of home firm
(3.42) Pu(b  + P + 1) -  p jtP - b tB = a + Pt producer prices
p il[B + P + l ) - p uP - b i B = a - { l  + p)t {i, j }  = {1,2};i * j
The integrated market equilibrium in comparison is characterised by
(3.43) FI7 = b {p x -  bJ  -  F  profit of home firm
(3.44) p x(b  + P + l) -  p2P - b xB = a + stP - (l + p)( 1 -  s)t producer prices 
p 2 (b  + P  + 1) -  p $  -  b2B = a + P(l -  s)t -  (l + P)st
19 E m erson  e t  a l .  (1988), pp. 145ff.
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We can solve for the equilibrium prices in the integrated and the 
segmented market case. With segmented markets firms have an additional degree 
of freedom in setting their prices and use this freedom by in(de)creasing their 
price-cost mark-up on markets where they have more (less) market power. 
Because firms were free to choose the integrated market price vector solving
(3.44) already in the segmented market case, from revealed preference profit is 
equal or lower after markets have been integrated (3.45).
(3.45) n ' - n 5 <o
The profit responsiveness effect is given by (3.46). The effect is zero 
because the producer price under market integration is equal to the producer 
prices under segmentation weighted by market size. In this class of models the 
linear demand function implies that producer price cost margins are proportional 
to sales. Hence market integration changes the distribution of sales over markets 
but leaves total output/sales constant.
^  d[V dTls f dp
(3.46)    = 2B —
1 * db db db - 1
Proposition 7
Market integration increases the private incentives to choose the socially efficient 
technology because the profit level is reduced. Market integration unambiguously 
favours technology z because the profit responsiveness effect is zero.
Proof: See appendix I.E
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3.5 Imperfect competition models and the effects of trade policy on
technology choice: Some general remarks
The preceding sections have analysed the effect of trade policies in 
different market environments. Two forces, the profit level and the profit 
responsiveness effect, are shown to drive the results. From propositions 2 and 3 
the first force, the new profit level effect, is the only one affecting welfare 
because in contrast to the profit responsiveness effect it tackles the informational 
asymmetry. It is “as if* information is cheaper to obtain with lower profits. With 
one qualification20 in all trade policy experiment less (lower import tariffs or 
export subsidies) or more market-friendly (tariff instead of quota) intervention is 
linked to higher incentives to choose the socially preferred technology. Market 
integration has the same positive effect.
The previous literature has focused almost exclusively on the second 
force, the profit responsiveness effect. Propositions 1 and 3 show that this effect 
has no independent welfare implications even though it has an impact on the 
direction of technology change. The sign of the effect turns out to be sensitive to 
the market structure. The ambiguity is a result of the incentive payment to the 
manager being a fixed cost; hence when choosing a technology owners effectively 
choose among different pairs of fixed and marginal costs. When output falls, 
lowering fixed cost becomes more important than lowering marginal cost: the 
change in profit responsiveness is determined by the change in output (sections
3.1 to 3.3). If output is constant (section 3.4), the effect disappears.21 Only the 
profit level effect is present if managers control fixed cost.
20 When firms sell a large share of their output abroad, they receive a windfall profit from 
multilateral trade liberalisation.
21 In a related model this has been noted by BERTOUETn/POLETTl (1995,1997).
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4. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter analyses the effects of increased competition on the efficient 
choice of technology by a firm owner with incomplete information about the 
actions taken by a hired manager. The informational asymmetry is indicative of a 
more general link between competition in the sense of international trade barriers 
and deviations from the intra-firm structure of a firm as caused by other 
imperfections like bargaining or matching. Both would create extra gains/costs 
for a lower production cost technology improving the agents’ bargaining position 
or necessitating it to find an agent with specific characteristics. Both the cost 
responsiveness of profit and the level of profit are linked to this trade-off.
First, we show that competition provides additional welfare gains on top 
of the standard allocational benefits if increased competition reduces profit 
because competition has a beneficial effect on technology choice. The chosen 
technology has a lower production cost, if in a more competitive environment the 
advantage of being able to compete with lower cost outweighs the disadvantage 
of paying an informational rent to the manager. This is the case, whenever 
competition increases firm output. Note that the paper uses a metric different 
from the one sometimes applied in asymmetric information problems: the focus is 
on the inefficiency in technology choice, not the inefficiency in cost targets for a 
given technology. Private agents choose the “wrong” technology even when the 
first-best action for any asymmetric information technology can be implemented 
(section 2.2). On the contrary, it is sometimes socially beneficial to move to a 
technology with a stronger distortion of the action (appendix I.C).
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Second, we apply this framework to a number of international trade 
settings. This contributes to an ongoing discussion about the internal efficiency of 
firms and international competition, where the level of trade protection gives a 
natural interpretation of competitive pressure. Some trade costs are a policy 
parameter, while this is not obvious for many other parameters used in the 1 0  
literature. The trade models analysed incorporate both effects described in the 
contract model.
The first, the profit level effect, gives the expected positive link between 
international competition and internal efficiency. More specifically, it points out 
extra welfare gains from import liberalisation, while it adds to the costs of 
engaging in strategic export subsidy policies and of not participating in 
liberalisation of trading partners. The profit level effect is present in all 
specification; it is the only effect if the manager controls the level of fixed cost or 
markets move from being segmented to being integrated. It represents what might 
be called the “Darwinian” element of competition. The empirical evidence 
provided in appendix I.A strongly supports this prediction.
The second, the profit responsiveness effect, is present in all other cases. 
Contrary to what one might expect profit is less responsive to cost in most models 
if import tariffs are reduced or export costs go up. This result parallels the 
“Schumpeterian” insight on the link between market structure and the incentives 
to undertake R&D and has appeared in may previous models in the literature. The 
link is driven by the fixed cost character of management compensation: any 
policy increasing the output per firm favours the choice of a lower marginal cost 
technology. Note that this result is not driven by the informational friction and
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has no independent welfare effects. This would change with a broader measure of 
welfare including consumer utility.
The structure of the model can be extended to include simultaneous 
technology choice, allow for a continuum of technologies, feature free entry, or 
introduce other more complex interactions between firms. Especially the free 
entry assumption is interesting because it has implications for firm size and thus 
output levels. In our model we capture the degree of competition through the 
trade cost parameter t. For other applications the number of firms, a parameter 
describing demand behaviour, or the cost of entering the industry could be the 
appropriate parameter to vary.
The model has some obvious applications outside the field of international 
trade. Deregulation through its effect on entry costs and the number of 
competitors is one example. Privatisation through its effect on the budget 
constraint (here assumed to be hard for both the private and the social planner 
firm) is another. For these applications other models for the internal structure of 
the firm, for example incomplete contract approaches, might be more useful than 
the complete contract view adopted here.
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Figure L I
Profit
Assumption 1:
AB > DO for all s
tris)
*■ c(s)
maximum a
Figure 1.1: Effort choice
Figure 1.2
U tility, cost, 
action
va
U ( s )
c(s)
Figure 1.2: The optim al incentive contract A
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Figure 1.3
Profit
va
>  state s
Figure 1.3: The optim al incentive contract B
The shaded area corresponds to the net profit remaining for the firm owner after 
the transfer to the manager has been paid.
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Good state:
5 = 0
Figure 1.4
a
c
Bad state: 
5 = 1
Figure 1.4: The technology choice condition
We reduce the state space S to (0; 1) with equal probability. On the 
horizontal line we draw the bad state (s = 1) and on the vertical line the good state 
(s = 0). The 0 technology has a state-independent cost parameter c and its profit 
is thus on the 45°-line at point (c;c). We normalise the figure such that the 0 
technology profit does not move with changes in competition. The pay-off for the 
z technology requires some more steps: first, the state-dependent profit is above 
the 45°-line indicating higher profit (lower cost) in the good state. In the bad state 
both technologies have the same cost. Second, we deduct the state-independent 
payment va to the manager covering the disutility of effort. Third, in the good 
state an additional informational rent v is paid to the manager. The sum of these 
two payments is the transfer tr(s) indicated by the arrow. After these steps we find 
the pay-off for the z technology at point (a,a).
By comparing (a,a) to (c,c) we can find the preferred technology. The 
solid line through (c,c) with slope minus unity (the slope depends on the 
probabilities of the two states) gives the combination of pay-offs equivalent to the 
safe return. Any point to the right (left) of this line is preferred (worse) to the save 
return. Hence for the example drawn the owner chooses the 0 technology.
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G ood state: F ig u re  15
IT(s, t high)
Bad state:
Figure 1.5: The profit responsiveness effect
The profit responsiveness effect is a condition on profit 
differences as a function of cost differences. As drawn here the profit 
difference increases when t is decreased. At a high t, i.e., low competition, an 
owner prefers technology 0 because the pay-off for the z technology at point 
(a,a) is below the solid decreasing line indicating all pairs of returns equivalent 
to the safe return at (c,c). At a low t , however, i.e.,high competition, an owner 
prefers technology z because the pay-off for this technology at point (a,b) is 
above the solid line and thus the expected return from technology z is larger 
than the save return.
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^ j 4. 4. Figure 1.6G ood state:
s = 0
va
Bad state:
Figure 1.6: The profit level effect
The profit level effect works through the influence of competition on 
the size of the expected transfer payment tr(s). To isolate the effect we set the 
profit differencebecause of the cost difference to be identical for both levels of t. 
A firm using the 0 technology produces in both states and receives a pay-off at 
point (c,c) independently of t. A firm using the z technology produces in both 
states only for low competition, i.e., a high t. In this case the owner has to pay the 
manager a transfer tr(s) including an informational rent v and receives a total pay­
off given at point (a,a). This point is below the solid line and thus the owner 
prefers technology 0.
For high competition, i.e., a low t, the firm using the z technology 
produces only in the good state. In the bad state no profit is made but also no 
transfer has to be paid. In the good state the firm makes a profit and reimburses 
the manager for his disutility but pays no informational rent. The total pay-off for 
high competition is given at point (b,0). This point is above the solid line and thus 
the owner prefers technology z.
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Figure 1.7
Price
D(q-m) D(q)
K(q)
MR(q-m)
quota m
MR(q)
>  Output
qa(m) q2 qb(m) q3
Figure 1.7: H om e m onopoly protected by a quota
In this figure we present the twice-kinked marginal revenue 
function, represented by the dashed line, for a home monopolist protected 
by a quota. In the left segment the home firm acts as a monopolist on the 
residual demand deducting the quota from total market demand. In the 
middle segment the home firm shares the demand at the world price p w 
with the foreign firms. In the right segment the home firm acts as a 
monopolist and no imports occur. Potentially optimal output choices are 
given at the intersection of the marginal revenue function with the 
increasing and convex marginal cost function.
In the case drawn the two lines cross twice: the optimal output 
is either qa(m) or qb(m). For output qa(m) the quota is binding and the price 
level high; for output qb(m) the price level is lower and home and foreign 
firms divide the market between them. To find the optimal output level 
q(m) the absolute profit levels have to be compared.
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Appendix I.A 
Empirical Evidence
A. OECD countries
Author Countries Result
McKinsey Global 
Institute (1993)
United States, Japan, 
Germany
TFP positively correlated 
with “globalisation index”
Australian Economic 
Planning Advisory 
Commission (1996)
OECD countries
Strong lagged impact of 
trade liberalisation on 
growth rates
Irene Bertschek (1995) Germany
Higher imports and FDI 
correlated with more 
product/process innovation
James M. MacDonald 
(1994)
USA
Rise in Import Share 
positively correlated with 
labour productivity growth 
in concentrated industries
B. Developing Countries
Authors Country Result
GHANl/J AY AR AJ AH (1995) seven developing countries
negative link between 
labour productivity and 
tariff level
H a n d o u ssa /N ish im iz u /  
P a g e  (1986)
Egypt positive link between 
output growth and TFP 
after trade liberalisation
H a r r is o n  (1994) Cote d’Ivoire
positive link between 
world market exposure and 
firm efficiency
L e v in sh o n  (1993) Turkey
negative link between 
imports and price-cost 
margins
N ishim izu /R o b in so n
(1984) Korea, Turkey, Yugoslavia
TFP growth in(de)creasing 
in larger export (import 
competing) industry output
N ish im izu /P a g e  (1991) cross-country positive link between 
exports and TFP growth
T y b o u t /d e  M e lo /  
C o r b o  (1991)
Chile positive link between trade 
liberalisation and TFP
T y bo u tAVe stb r o o k
(1995)
Mexico positive link between trade 
liberalisation and TFP
TFP - Total Factor Productivity
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A ppendix I.B.
Timing of moves
v w v v v v w
stage 1 stage 2 stage 3
stage 1 
stage 2
Owner chooses technology z or 0
contract with cost c(s) and transfer tr(s) 
schedules as functions of the shock s is 
signed with symmetric information F(.y)
nature revealsthe shock s to the manager
manager reports the shock s to the owner
manager takes action a(s) at disutiliy v(a)
technology determines c(s, a(s))
stage 3 market game is played
profit I1W accrues to the owner
manager gets paid tr(s) if the cost target 
has been met
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Appendix I.C
In this appendix the optimal incentive contract for technology z is solved 
for a more complex convex disutility of effort function, a specification that is 
standard in contract models. We establish that all the main findings of the paper 
remain true for this modification. The utility function from (1) is now given by
(Al) U(s, a) = tr(s, a) -  v(a) with v > 0; v > 0
Applying the same procedures as in the main text the problem is one of
maximising the following free-end-point Hamiltonian:
(A2) H  = [n(c(s)) -  U(s) -  v(s -  c(s))]/(s) -  A.(s)v(s -  c(s))
The Hamiltonian yields the following optimality conditions:
(A3) ~ f r x w = / ( i )
so X(s) = F(s) by the IR condition U(s) > 0  —> X(s) = 0
dH d n (C(S)) ■, / -I , \\ F ( i)  „(A4) -----= ------    +  vis -  c(s)) + VI S  -  c(j))—7 T = 0
dc dc v w ;  v y ” f { s )
dH
(A5) = - v ( ,  -  c( j)) = U(s)
Equation (A4) defines the optimal cost target c(s). For this solution to be a 
maximum the SOC in (A6 ) has to hold. Note that this was not the case in the 
main text and therefore we had to look for comer solutions.
(A6 ) d -  v (s- c(s))-  » ( * - c(s))y^j- < 0
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In addition, the second-order condition on truth-telling has to be checked. 
This condition requires the cost target c(s) to be non-decreasing in the shock. In 
the main text this was not a problem as there c(s) = 1 ; a result which was used 
later. Here we take the derivative of condition (A4) to obtain
. .  _  , [1 + d{F(s)/f(s))/ds] + v [F (s)//(i)] ^
C[S>~  ■■ + v{F(s)/f(s)J-J>n(c(s))/<ic’ ~
A sufficient condition for the numerator to be positive is that the
monotone likelihood condition d(F{s)/f(s))/ds  > 0 is fulfilled and v > 0. Both
assumptions are standard in this type of contract problems and are assumed to 
hold. The denominator is positive by the SOC (A6 ). Equation (A4) determines 
c(s)as the solution to dn{c(sj}/dc + -  c(s)) = 0 .  Note that this implies the
absence of distortions in the cost schedule for the best shock (“at the top”).
Finally, we establish the cut-off point s* for production to take place. For 
any shock larger than s* production is unprofitable. Note that the cut-off point 
does not affect the shape of the cost target schedule, only its domain.
(A8) n(c(.s *)) = v(a( s *))
Using the above results the utility and the transfer can be written as
(A9) U(s) = J v(.s -  c(s))ds -  J v(j -  c{s))ds
(A10) tr(s) = J v(^ -  c(s))ds -  J v(s -  c(s))ds + v(j -  c(s))
Having solved for the optimal contract for technology z the choice 
condition for technology 0 is written as (A ll), where the left hand side gives the 
gain and the right hand side the cost of switching to technology z.
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(A ll) J n ( c ! (^ ) ) /W < fa -n (c ° )< /[v ( i-c J( i ) ) + i7 ( j ) l / - ( ^
Changes in competitive pressure as represented by the trade costs t affect 
the optimal trajectory of cost targets according to:
a i 2 >  d 2n(c(s))/dcdt_______
dt v(s -  c ( j ))  + v (s -  c(s))[F(j)/ f(s)\ -  d 2n(c(s))/dc2
The denominator is positive under the standard assumptions discussed 
with (A7). The numerator is positive, if proposition 2 from the main text holds. 
Then cost targets go up with higher trade costs, i.e., protection.
Like in the main text we proceed in two stages: first, the cost of changing 
technology is hold constant by fixing s*. Differentiate equation (A ll) under this 
assumption with respect to t and apply the envelope theorem to obtain
(A 13) £  n , ( c z( j) ) / ( s )d s -n ,(c ° )  + J* n c(cz( s ) ) ^ J ^ - f ( s ) d s
Increased competition leads to the choice of technology z instead of 
technology 0 if expression (A13) is positive because the inequality in (A ll) 
changes its sign. n ct> 0  is a sufficient condition for (A 13) to be positive if the 
expected cost of the z technology (denoted by a tilde) is below the cost of the 0  
technology: c z (s) < c® . This assures the third term in (A 13) to be not too large. 
Equation (A6 ) already imposed a condition in this direction. Hence the profit 
responsiveness pointed out in Proposition 1 continues to hold.
Second, we turn to the profit level effect focusing on the transfer cost side 
of the choice decision keeping the benefit of changing technology fixed. Recall 
that the owner only implements cost targets that generate a positive profit (A8 ). 
Using this condition we find the effect of an increase in trade costs on the cut-off 
point s *:
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(A14) —  = _______________dn(c(s*),t)/dt_______________
dt v(.s * -c(s *)) -  c(s)[dTl(c(s *), t)/dc + v(s* -c(s  *))]
If profit is increasing in trade costs then the cut-off point is increasing in 
protection and expression (A 14) is positive as in the main text. This follows from 
(A7) and (A4), where the latter assures that the term in brackets is negative. 
Hence with protection generating windfall profits, firms start producing in states 
with more adverse shocks.
The profit responsiveness effect is ruled out by setting d 2 JJ/dcdt -  0 . 
Now differentiating the inequality (A ll)  with respect to the competition 
parameter t by applying Leibnitz’s Rule gives (A 15).
ds  ^
(A15) —— v(s * -c (s  *))f(s *)>0  
dt
From (A 14) this expression is positive and the profit level effect in 
proposition 2 continues to hold. More active states increase the expected size of 
the informational rent to be paid to the manager and thus increase the costs of 
switching to the lower production cost technology.
Finally we can turn to the social planner’s problem. First the optimal 
contract for technology z has to be found. The social planner is assumed to have 
no informational advantage and has to respect a balanced-budget constraint: 
transfers have to be smaller or equal to profit. This implies that the social planner 
will implement the same cut-off point s* as the private owner. The social planner, 
however, maximises a different objective function. He cares about the joint utility 
of owner and manager, not the distribution between them. As a consequence, only 
the disutility of effort to the manager is deducted from the firm’s profit. The 
Hamiltonian of this problem is given by (A16) with the relevant optimality 
conditions in (A 17) and (A 18).
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(A 16) H  = [n(c(s)) + f/(s) -  fr(.s)]/(.s) -  A(^)v(^ -  c)
The IC constraint never binds, even though the social planner has no 
informational advantage because the social planner values manager’s utility equal 
to profit. Lambda is equal to zero throughout and hence X(.s) = 0 \/s e  S .
Turning to the technology choice the expected welfare indicator EW  is
Compare this to condition (A ll). Condition (A20) is more stringent and 
thus the first part of Proposition 3 continues to hold. The convex disutility 
function only imposes a second distortion upon the private owner. The less 
favourable cost schedule makes it even harder for the z technology to be optimal 
from his perspective.
(A19)
Technology 0 is preferred over technology z condition if
(A20) J U(cz(s ) , t ) f (s )d s -n(c°,r) < J v ( j - cz(s))f(s)ds
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Appendix I.D: Proof of Proposition 4
The proposition holds in its equality form Vg2 < q Comparing (3.11) with (3.13) 
we find identical first-order conditions describing optimal output choices 
independently of the policy instrument. Hence the rest of the proof looks at the 
strong inequality for VO < q * < q 2.
(a) U(t) < U(m)
Suppose the home firm under a quota m sets the optimal output q(t) it would set 
under a tariff. Then it would have the same profit in both situations. Plug output 
in the first row of the first-order condition (3.14) and evaluate at q(t) using (3.17):
(Dl) p w+ t - b - e q  +dp(q + m)/dq <0
While q(t) solves (3.11), it is not optimal given the negative p ’-term in (Dl). 
Profits can be increased by moving to q(m).
(b) q(t) > q(m)
From (a) we know that the first-order condition under a quota evaluated at the 
optimal output given a tariff is negative. The second-order condition is
(D2) 2 dp/dq + d 2p j  dq2 q - e  <0  by assumption
(D2) implies that the first-order condition under the quota will hold for a lower q. 
dYV (t) dn'(m)
(c)
dYV (m) dYV(t) r / \ / \i
(D3) follows directly from (b).
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Appendix I.E: Proof of Proposition 7
We start by solving the system of equations in (3.42) and (3.44) for the 
equilibrium producer prices. The relevant prices are given by
[fi + 0  + iTb&, + a + t{2s0 - 1 + s -  >3}1- $Bb2 + a + t{p -  2sfi -  i } ]
^  p '  = -------------------------------------r------^— t2 77-------------------------------------[B + /3 + l] -  P2 
[B + /I + l][BB| + a  + — /?[b6, + a - ( | i  +
P" ~  [B + j8+ l]2 - /3 J
[b + P + iJb*, + a - r { l + /?}]- /?[b*2 + a + </j]
P l 2 ~ [B + iS + l f - ^ 2
dp, dpn dp,2 [b  + I3 + l] 1 1
so we can wnte X  = ——  = ——  = ——  = 7-----------^ --------> 0 with — > X >—
db, <», [ s + /} + ! ] -  p 2 2 3
Also note that p n > p x > p n  with strict inequalities for t > 0 and 0 < s < 1.
Using this result and the profit expressions (3.41) and (3.43) we get (E2) 
proving (3.46) in the main text. The producer price in the integrated market case 
is equal to the market size weighted producer price in the segmented market case.
(E2) p x =spn + [ l - s \ p l2
The profit difference can be written as (E3). (E3) follows from the 
quadratic and thus convex transformation of the individual prices in (E2). 
Normalising the integrated market producer price to unity, the inequality in (E3) 
holds in its strict form if trade costs are positive and both markets exist: 0 < s < 
1. If one of these two conditions is violated, (E3) holds as an equality.
(E3) p \ <spxl +[1 - s \ p X2
This proves (3.45) and proposition 7.
Appendix I.F
In appendices I.F. and I.G we provide two worked examples. The market 
models have inverse linear demand with unit slope. Parameter values are given 
below. The state space is reduced to two with equal probability. The values for 
own costs give marginal costs in each state. The base transfer equals the disutility 
of effort for maximum action.
Home Monopoly: The profit level effect
4.50 
w 4.00 
£  3.50 
2 3.00
2.50
• V  -1.50
1.00
0.50
\ -
 z technology (net)
 0 technology
 transfer
 z technology (gross)
trad e c o s t s
World market price 4; own cost b in good (bad) state: 2 (4.3), e = 1, 
base transfer: 1.75, informational rent: 1.75
The home monopoly case shows the profit level effect. When trade costs 
fall below 3, production in the bad state is unprofitable. All informational rents 
disappear and the z technology is chosen even though production takes place only 
50% of the time. The social planner chooses technology z for all trade cost values 
shown.
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Appendix I.G
International Duopoly
6.00
5.00
4.00o
L _
Q- 3.00 
Q.
2  200
1.00
O) in co O)omc\i coc\i f-dCM
 z technology (net)
 0 technology
----------- transfer
— - — - z technology (gross)
trade costs
Market size: 10(10); own cost: 3.5(5), competitor’s costs: 3, base transfer: 1.65.
The international duopoly case shows the profit responsiveness effect. 
When trade costs fall below 1.8, the advantage of lower marginal costs for the z 
technology dominates the transfer payment. The social planner chooses the z 
technology for all trade costs shown.
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Chapter II
Trade liberalisation as facilitating merger
1. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we develop a framework to analyse the link between trade 
liberalisation and industry restructuring. Our model analyses how entry, exit, and 
merger determine the number and cost distribution of firms. We show that trade 
liberalisation facilitates merger, exit, and internal restructuring to eliminate high 
cost firms from the industry and that multinational firms respond particularly 
strongly in response to the reduction of trade barriers. The whole restructuring 
process, including all privately profitable mergers, is welfare improving.
Our work is motivated by the increase in take-over and merger activity 
through out the European Union in the early 1990s. This merger activity is 
viewed as part of the restructuring process European industry is going through in 
response to the Single European Market. Many observers welcome this process 
because they argue that restructuring is a necessary condition for the productivity 
improvements expected from the Single Market. This perspective represents a 
remarkable shift away from the usual, more critical view of mergers focusing on 
market power effects.
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Before outlining the model and reviewing the related literature we 
establish some stylised facts about the merger activity in the EU based on 
appendix H.A. The time period covered stretches from the early 1980s to the 
completion of the Single European Market in 1992:1
(1) The number of mergers rose sharply until 1990 but decreased afterwards.
(2) The share of cross-border mergers rose towards the peak of the merger wave
(3) Merger motives shifted from cost reduction to increases in market share.
To analyse these facts we build upon a standard new trade theory model 
with free entry adding two new elements: first, firms face ex-ante uncertainty 
about their own type and are ex-post heterogeneous. Second, incumbent firms can 
merge at any time to reduce cost and potentially increase market power. We 
describe the industry by the number of active firms and the highest fixed cost of 
any active firm. In steady-state equilibrium the industry satisfies the following 
conditions: first, no active firm looses money (exit condition),, second, no active 
firm can be bought up profitably (merger condition); and third, no outside firm 
has an incentive to try and enter the industry (entry condition). In a final section 
equilibrium further requires firms to be indifferent between having a domestic or 
a multinational production structure (type choice condition).
While the first condition is standard we concentrate on the second and 
third condition in a framework of heterogeneous firms. We find that the merger 
condition has a discontinuity at the number of firms where the entry condition 
binds. Below that critical number of firms mergers only reduce cost while above
1 The data applies to all mergers while the model is restricted to horizontal mergers; in 1992 this 
group accounted for 47% of all mergers observed at the three-digit industry level.
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that number they also increase market power. Finally, we give an interpretation of 
the type choice condition slightly different from the previous literature.
We look at two equilibria that both satisfy the steady-state equilibrium 
conditions but arise from different initial industry conditions, i.e., numbers of 
firms. In the first equilibrium, which we call initial equilibrium , both the entry 
and the merger condition bind while the exit condition may be slack. We think of 
this initial equilibrium as the outcome of an entry and merger process starting 
from a number of firms below the steady-state equilibrium level. In the second 
equilibrium, which we call post-liberalisation equilibrium  because it is the result 
of a trade liberalisation experiment, only the merger condition binds while both 
the exit and entry conditions may be slack. We think of this post-liberalisation 
equilibrium as the outcome of an exit and merger process starting from a number 
of firms above the steady-state equilibrium level. The existence of two types of 
equilibrium, a simple form of history dependence, follows from the sunk 
character of entry cost. Potential entrants compare expected future profit to the 
sunk entry cost while incumbent firms only calculate future profit neglecting the 
sunk entry cost.
We draw on different strands of the industrial organisation and new trade 
theory literature. From the industrial organisation literature S a l a n t  et  a l . (1983) 
provide the background for the merger analysis. They sum up their results on the 
private incentives for horizontal mergers in the “merger-for-market-power 
paradox”: in the absence of sizeable cost reductions a merger to increase market 
power is not privately profitable, unless the merging firms already dominate the 
market. Subsequent work by D a v id so n /D eneck ere  (1985), Per r y /P orter
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(1985), D u t z  (1989), WnxiG (1991), and Fa u lI-Oller  (1997) shows how this 
effect can be weakened, or even eliminated as in Reitzes/L e v y  (1995), by 
making diverging assumptions on market and cost structures. D inz (1989) and 
V a n  W e g b e r g  (1994) look at the comparative statics of the model in response to 
price and demand shocks. We analyse the implications of the “merger-for-market- 
power-paradox” in the context of international trade liberalisation.
Ross (1988), Ordo v er /W illig (1986), V a n  Lo n g /V o u s d e n  (1995), and 
recently H o r n /P e r s so n  (1996) analyse mergers in an international context. 
Merger policy is analysed in Farell/S h a pir o  (1990), M cA fee/W illiams 
(1992), and extended to an international setting by B a r r o s/C a b r a l  (1994). 
Except for H o r n /P e r s so n  (1996), who use a co-operative bargaining approach, 
all these papers take the private profitability of a merger as given and focus on the 
residual effects on competitors and consumers. V a r ia n  (1995) and V ickers 
(1995) show that the welfare results of this literature change when free entry of 
firms is assumed. We analyse welfare for an endogenously determined number of 
firms and the restriction that all mergers have to be privately profitable.
From the international trade literature B r a n d e r /K r u g m a n  (1983), 
V e n a b l e s  (1985), and H o r stm a n n /M a r k u se n  (1986) provide the background 
of the market structure analysis. The two latter papers characterise the 
comparative statics of trade liberalisation in the context of free entry and 
homogenous firms, while we add merger as an adjustment mechanism and allow 
for heterogeneous firms. M ercenier/S c h m o t  (1996) provide an entry model 
where all fixed costs are assumed to be sunk. This assumption reduces the welfare
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gains of trade liberalisation and may even lead to welfare losses. We introduce a 
sunk entry cost but assume that all future fixed costs can be recovered.
M a r k u se n /V en a bl es  (1995), M a r k u se n  (1995), B r a in a r d  (1993), and 
H o r st m a n n /M a r k u se n  (1992) analyse multinational firms which in our model 
can arise endogenously as a consequence of cross-border merger. In contrast to 
their general-equilibrium setting with a focus on factor costs we restrict the 
analysis to partial-equilibrium and concentrate on the effects of competition.
The idea of competition as a selection mechanism to eliminate 
underperforming firms parallels work by C aba ller o /H a m m o u r  (1994) and 
A ghion /H ow itt  (1992) on the cleansing effects of recessions. Sjostrom /  
W eit z m a n  (1996) use an evolutionary model of type survival but provide no 
specified market structure. We introduce firm heterogeneity as in 
L ippm a n /R u m e l t  (1982) to analyse the characteristics of surviving firms after 
trade liberalisation.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 sets out 
the underlying product market game. Section 3 analyses autarky. In section 3.1 
we derive the initial equilibrium  in autarky. In section 3.2 we characterise the 
welfare properties of this equilibrium. Section 4 looks at the effect of trade 
liberalisation. Section 4.1 analyses the adjustment process to the free trade post- 
liberalisation equilibrium. Section 4.2 characterises the welfare implications of 
the adjustment to this equilibrium. Section 4.3 studies intermediate trade costs 
and multinational firms. Section 5 concludes.
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2. TH E MODEL OF THE INDUSTRY
We analyse the partial equilibrium effects of trade liberalisation in an 
industry model with entry, exit, and merger. The industry produces a homogenous 
good and firms engage in N a sh -C o u r n o t  quantity competition in two countries 
called home h and foreign /. Production and consumption take place in both 
countries. Let the output of a representative firm be cfk where superscript j  
indicates the location of production and k the market where the product is sold. 
Trade between two countries incurs a per-unit trade cost t.
Demand is given by a downward sloping inverse demand function D with 
limited convexity to assure the second-order conditions of the firms’ problems to 
hold and firm output to be decreasing in the number of firms.
(1) P* =£>(X<J;‘ ) with dD/dq + q*  d 2D /dq2 < 0
Firms have cost functions C  with a constant marginal cost c equal for all 
firms and a firm-specific fixed cost F*.
(2) C‘(q ,F ‘) = cq + F ‘ where F ‘ s  [F ;? ]
When entering the market, firms draw a fixed cost parameter F* from a 
given and known cumulative distribution G(F). If a firm stays in the market, it 
keeps this fixed cost draw in all time periods thereafter. Differences in marginal 
cost would allow more insights into the characteristics of the buyer in the merger 
process.2 They come, however, at the cost of additional state variables in the
2 V ic k e r s  (1 9 9 5 ) uses a  he terogeneous m arg inal co st m odel to  look  a t the  w elfare  p rob lem s 
an a ly sed  in  sec tion  3.2.
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system. On balance, we choose the heterogeneous fixed cost model because it 
allows us to address the main questions in a tractable framework.
Firms’ optimal output choices satisfy the first-order conditions (3) and the 
attached second-order conditions.
(3) P k -  c - 1 + q jkdPk/d q Jk = 0 with t = 0 for domestic sales
The operating profit n  of a firm located in country j  is given by
(4) n> = Y \ P k
k=h,f
The operating profit n  evaluated at the NASH-equilibrium of the market 
game (i.e., at the output vector solving (3) simultaneously for all firms) depends 
on the number of active firms N  = N h + N f  and the level of trade costs t. It is 
identical for all active firms because all firms compete with the same level of 
marginal cost. The level of profit IT is linear in the operating profit n  and a 
firm’s own fixed cost F*. Other firms’ fixed cost draws do not influence own 
profit.
(5) n l(Nh, N l , t ,Fi) = n (N l' , N r , t ) - F ‘
In appendix n.B we further establish that operating profit is decreasing 
and convex in the number of firms N  in the industry
3. AUTARKY
In this section we analyse the industry equilibrium in autarky: no trade 
takes place and both country superscripts and trade costs can be dropped from the 
notation. The industry is described by the number of home firms N  and the 
maximum of an ordering F(i) over the fixed costs of active firms. We restrict the 
analysis to the steady-state equilibrium values defined by N* and the maximum of 
F(i) such that no further changes occur. At a steady-state equilibrium three 
conditions have to hold: first, no active firm finds it profitable to leave the 
industry {exit condition); second, no firm outside the industry finds it profitable 
to enter the industry {entry condition); and third, no pair of active firms finds it 
optimal to merge {merger condition). These three conditions are analysed in turn.
First we define two types of steady-state equilibrium depending on the 
initial number of firms active in the industry. In the remainder of section 3, we 
analyse the initial equilibrium where entry and merger determine the 
characteristics of the industry. In section 4, we analyse a post-liberalisation 
equilibrium where exit and merger are crucial.
Definition
We define the steady-state equilibrium o f an industry by a number o f firms 
N* and the maximum Fz = F(N*) o f an ordering F(i) over the fixed costs o f all 
active firms such that no further entry, exit, or merger occurs. I f  the steady-state 
is approached from a number o f firms N  < N* we call it an initial equilibrium. I f  
the steady-state is approached from a number o f firms N  > N* we instead call it a 
post-liberalisation equilibrium.
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3.1 Initial industry equilibrium
We describe the steady-state equilibrium by three conditions: one for 
entry, one for merger, and one for exit. It turns out that in the initial equilibrium 
the entry condition describes the number of active firms N  in the industry while 
the merger condition describes the maximum of the fixed cost ordering F(i). The 
exit condition determines the behaviour of firms after entry.
The exit condition for firms already in the industry is standard: firms stay 
in the industry if the operating profit is larger than the fixed cost. The function 
F(i) sorts all active firms by their type-specific fixed cost level F* in increasing 
order. Due to the heterogeneity of firms the exit condition can at most bind for the 
firm(s) at the top of the fixed cost ordering F(i).
(7) n ( N ) Z F ‘ Vi
The entry condition for firms outside the industry takes account of the ex- 
ante uncertainty of a firm’s fixed cost type after entry. Firms draw their fixed cost
type F* from the distribution G(F) with domain [F ;F] and a marginal density
function g(F). This fixed cost draw is costly: a firm has to pay an amount E  to 
learn its type, i.e., its fixed cost level. A firm stays in the market if it is able to 
generate a positive profit given the firm-specific level of fixed cost. Otherwise it 
pays E  and never actively enters the industry.
Potential entrants calculate the expected return of entry in two steps: first, 
they find the discounted sum of profit for any given fixed cost type between the 
date of entry and the projected exit date for this type. Second, they sum up all 
expected profit weighted by the probability of such a fixed cost draw. Let the
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discount rate be r and the time path for the number of firms in the industry N(t ) . 
From the definition of the initial equilibrium N(t ) is here weakly increasing over 
time. Entry attempts occur as long as the expected future profit is larger than the 
entry cost E. While the entry cost is given exogenously, the expected future profit 
depends on future market conditions. We assume that potential entrants view the 
time path N( r)  to be independent of their own action. Comparing expected 
future profit to the entry cost an entry attempt is profitable if
(8 )  ^  |/z ; (7 V ( t)  +  l )  -  s}e rTdr  >  E
where the exit date is given by T(s) =
T i f  M oxti(n (t ) + l) < s
7i ( n ( r) + l) = s otherwise
oo i f  Min7t(N(  t)  + l) > s
The left hand side of the entry condition (8 ) gives the discounted value of 
profit for a firm with a fixed cost draw sufficiently low to survive in the industry 
for some time. The exit date is given by T(s) when operating profit equals the 
fixed cost. Exit occurs immediately if the fixed cost draw is above the operating 
profit. Exit occurs never if the fixed cost draw is below the operating profit at all 
dates. The discounted value of profit is multiplied by the likelihood of the 
particular fixed cost draw. The right hand side of the entry condition (8 ) gives the 
cost of entering the market. The exogenous entry cost is given by E , the price of 
finding out about one own’s fixed cost type.
Figure n .l  shows the entry condition determining the number of firms in 
the industry. The expected discounted future profit is convex and declining in N
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from the characteristics of the product market equilibrium (6 ) while the entry cost 
E  is constant and exogenous. The intersection of both lines determines the 
equilibrium number of firms N*. The steady-state equilibrium N* is stable 
because the profit function intersects the entry cost line from above and thus entry 
is profitable only for N  < N*.
Two assumptions are embedded in the entry condition (8 ): first, entrants 
forecast the time path of N(r)  correctly. This expectation gives medium 
incentives to enter the industry because entrants include the expected profit of 
fixed cost draws that allow them to stay in the industry for a limited time. 
Alternatively, entrants could expect the number of firms to be stable after entry. 
This expectation gives the upper bound of the incentives to enter because entrants 
expect to get the next period profit for the indefinite future. Finally, entrants 
could expect the number of firms to reach the equilibrium value instantaneously. 
This assumption gives the lower bound of the incentives to enter because firms 
expect next periods profit to be eroded very quickly. In equilibrium no further 
entry occurs and the three beliefs converge to be all identical and correct.
Second, entrants to be bought up later assume they will receive the 
discounted value of their profit as the take-over price. Off-equilibrium this is a 
lower bound and depends on the bargaining process over the merger gains. In 
equilibrium merger gains go to zero and the belief is correct for the marginal firm.
The merger condition applies to firms already active in the industry. 
Mergers have two potential effects: first, the merging firms can reduce their fixed 
cost level; second, the merging firms might enjoy increased market power. A 
reduction of fixed cost is possible by exploiting the increasing returns character of
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the technology. Suppose the merger of two firms results in the reduction of 
combined fixed costs by F ‘ + a . F* is the fixed cost of the merger target while a 
positive value for a indicates a fixed cost level for the merged entity below the 
fixed cost of the lower-cost pre-merger firm. One can think of this process as two 
firms joining the functions where they have a particular advantage and thus are 
able to achieve some “best practice” after merger. The cost reduction a is non­
negative because firms always have the option to shut down the merger target.
An increase in market power can reduce a merger’s opportunity cost of 
closing one of the merging firms and thus losing its potential profit. Market 
power is increased only if the merger is successful in reducing the number of 
firms in the industry, i.e., if after the merger entry by new firms is not profitable 
from (8 ). Below this threshold N* new entry immediately restores the pre-merger 
number of firms and thus the level of market power enjoyed by any firm. Above 
the threshold N* no entry occurs and merger raises market power. At the 
threshold N* the merger condition thus has a discontinuity because the 
profitability of a merger jumps if N  > AT*; this increase is denoted by the term b.
A merger is profitable if over the life time of the firms the cost reduction 
and the increase in market power generate a pay-off in excess of the opportunity 
cost of closing one operation. Let firm i have higher fixed cost than firm 
j: Fl > F j and let V be firm f  s exit date without merger. A merger is profitable if
(9) F
r r
b = 0 i f  N - K N *
where b = dn{N(r))/dN i f  N - 1 > N *
and N* is the number of firms below which entry is profitable.
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The left hand side of the merger condition (9) gives the merger gain; the 
discounted value of the cost reduction over the projected life time of a firm in the 
absence of merger. The right hand side of (9) gives the merger cost; the 
discounted opportunity cost of eliminating one firm adjusted by the market power 
effect b if the number of firms after the merger is above the threshold N*.
The profitability of the merger varies with the fixed cost of the take-over 
target. Buyers face a trade-off between the opportunity cost (decreasing in F*) and 
the cost and market power gain (concave in F*). In equilibrium all active firms 
correctly anticipate to survive indefinitely such that the highest fixed cost firm is 
the most profitable merger target.
Proposition 1
The initial equilibrium is the outcome o f an entry process where the equilibrium 
number o f firms is approached from below. In the initial equilibrium the unique 
number o f active firms N* solves
(10) J *  \n (N  *) -  s\e~n dtg{s)ds = Ew p
The highest fixed cost o f any firm in the initial equilibrium is given by
(11) F z{a) = n ( N * ) - a
Proof:
In equilibrium, entrants anticipate to either exit immediately, 
F ‘ > ji(N*)  , or never, F l <n( N  *), and the expected future profit of an entrant 
is equal to the entry cost. With indifference about entry we assume firms to stay 
out. Condition (8 ) can be rewritten as (10).
No firm exits the industry and any merger would trigger entry, i.e., b = 0:
(9) reduces to (11).
88
The steady-state equilibrium has a number of interesting features. First, 
even though there is entry all active firms make a profit. This is a result of both 
the sunk entry cost and the heterogeneity of firms. Second, the size of the cost 
saving a influences only the shape and upper limit of F(i) but not the equilibrium 
number of firms. Large efficiency gains through merger eliminate high fixed cost 
firms but also trigger entry. Third, proposition 1 implies the merger-for-market- 
paradox by Salant et al. (1983): attempts to increase prices and thus mark-ups 
by reducing industry output through mergers are futile. New entrants push the 
industry output back to the pre-merger level and appropriate the positive merger 
externality. Mergers are only profitable when they reduce costs sufficiently.
Figure n.2 identifies the marginal firm in equilibrium. The function F(i) 
orders firms by their fixed cost level with dF(i)/di> 0 and F(N*) = F Z. 
Suppose firm i has a fixed cost level 7t(N) > F(i) > n(N) -  a . Then the cost of a 
merger is equal to the profit of firm i, i.e., n( N) -  F(i) , but brings a gain of a. 
The net gain is positive, hence all firms with fixed cost above n ( N ) - a  are 
valuable merger targets. The merger process stops at the equilibrium defined by 
proposition 1 when for the marginal firm F(i) = n(N) -  a .
3.2 Social welfare analysis
We assume that the government is unable to regulate firm output but can 
influence entry barriers and merger.3 Under this policy restriction it is a well- 
known result4 that the number of firms N* in a free-entry equilibrium might be
3 Otherwise the social planner would trivially choose one firm to sell at marginal cost and finance 
the losses by lump-sum taxation.
4 This section draws upon V arian (1 9 9 5 ), and VICKERS (1995) who build upon on an earlier 
literature especially on Mankiw/W hinston  (1986).
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too large from a social welfare perspective. We show that this result carries over 
to the present model.
Social welfare Was a function of the number of firms is given by
Differentiating W(N) with respect to the number of firms and evaluating at 
the industry equilibrium, i.e., at equilibrium such that (1 1 ) holds, we get
The final term in (13) is given by the difference between the increase in 
consumer surplus and the profit lost by all incumbent firms; this difference is 
neglected in the private entry decision. The neglect of the effect of entry on 
incumbents’ profit is called “business stealing”. From the equilibrium of the 
market game we show in appendix II.B that output per firm is decreasing in the 
number of firms N. Hence (13) has a negative sign; the number of firms at the 
private equilibrium is too large from a social planner’s perspective.
Subsidising merger, i.e., increasing a, is an ineffective policy because it 
triggers additional entry. From (11) in proposition 1 the increase in a reduces the 
fixed cost of the marginal firm by an equal amount. This cost reduction, however, 
has no effect on the change in welfare because it only transforms public resources 
into a lower private cost one-to-one. An increase in entry cost E  is the constrained 
optimal intervention.
(12) where U is consumer utility
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Proposition 2
A social planner constrained to choose entry cost sets them higher than given by 
technology at E. The increase in entry cost reduces the equilibrium number o f 
firms to N**.
(14) N * * < N *
The fixed cost o f the marginal firm F* in the social planner equilibrium is 
increased compared to the private equilibrium.
(15) F s(a) = n ( N  * *) -  a > F z(a)
Proof:
First apply the implicit function theorem on (10) to get d N/ dE<0  from the 
negative relationship between profit and the number of firms (6 ) implying (14). 
Second evaluate the equilibrium condition (11) at the lower number of firms 
N**cN* to get (15) again using the properties of the profit function (6 ).
The proposition strengthens a result by Horstmann/Markusen (1986) 
on inefficient entry in an international trade model. They point out that in a free 
entry model a policy of strategic export subsidies invites additional producers to 
the domestic industry and thus increases industry wide average cost. In the 
context of autarky an entry subsidy is a policy experiment with equivalent 
implications to an export subsidy in a trade model. From proposition 2 even zero 
entry (export) subsidies generate too many firms in the industry.
Figure H.3 graphs the entry decision. The social gains of entry are always 
smaller than the private gains by the sum of lost competitors’ profit minus 
additional consumer surplus, i.e., (13), while both face the same entry cost E. A 
social planner favours a smaller number of active firms in the economy.
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4. TRADE LIBERALISATION, EXIT, AND MERGER:
THE POST-LIBERALISATION EQUILIBRIUM
In this section we analyse the second type of equilibrium defined at the 
beginning of section 3, the post-liberalisation equilibrium. In contrast to the 
initial equilibrium of the previous section the industry approaches the steady-state 
from a given population of N > N* active firms again described by a fixed cost 
ordering F(i) where N* is the number of firms that would arise in an initial 
equilibrium given the market environment after the trade policy experiment. In 
contrast to the previous section now exit instead of entry complements merger to 
dominate the adjustment process to the steady-state equilibrium.
Suppose the industries in countries home h and foreign /  are both in an 
initial steady-state equilibrium characterised by proposition 1. We analyse the 
comparative statics of this equilibrium with respect to a change in trade costs t. In 
section 4.1 we remove all trade barriers between countries and set t = 0. Taking 
the initial number of firms and their fixed cost distribution as the starting point 
we analyse the adjustment process to the post-liberalisation equilibrium.
In section 4.2 we introduce intermediate values for trade costs t. A new 
type of firm, called multinational M, with production facilities in both markets 
appears in the industry and in steady-state a new type choice condition applies 
assuring that firms do not want to change their type. A multinational firm has the 
advantage of serving both markets without incurring trade costs but faces an extra 
fixed cost H. From the OLI-framework5 only locational factors in the sense of 
“tariff-hopping” are included.
5 OLI stands for Ownership, Location, and Internalisation. See M ark usen  (1995).
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4.1 Moving to free trade
In this section we analyse the effect of moving from autarky to free trade 
on the steady-state equilibrium. To account for the effect of trade costs we write
operating profit 7i(Nh, N f  ,tj and profit 77' (N h, N f , t, F l) as functions of t. For
simplicity we consider symmetric countries: country indices can be dropped.6 In 
each country the steady-state equilibrium before trade liberalisation is described
by a pair {TV * (r), F z (a,f)} for the number of active firms in the industry and the 
fixed cost level of the marginal firm satisfying proposition 1. The autarky 
equilibrium with t = is drawn for one of the two countries in figure n.4: the 
industry is described by the ordering F(i) with the maximum at 
F(N * (°°)) = F z (a) . N*(°°) is given by the intersection of the entry cost and the
autarky profit and Fz(a) is equal to the entry cost E  minus the cost reduction a.
Suppose governments in both countries agree to eliminate all trade 
barriers between the two markets. This increases market size ( t —> 0) but also 
raises competitive pressure (N  —»2N ) . V enables (1985) shows that the 
competitive effect dominates and thus firm profit falls for a constant number of 
firms. In figure n.4 this fall in profit is indicated by shifting the profit function 
downward to its free trade level.
(16) n '(2W,0, F ' ) - n ' ( w , ~ , F ' )<0
6 Mark usen /V enables (1995) explicitly analyse country asymmetries.
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Industrial restructuring occurs in two steps: first, firms unable to generate 
a profit leave the industry, i.e., the exit condition binds. Second, surviving firms 
reorganise through a process of merger, i.e., the merger condition binds. The 
resulting equilibrium differs from the initial equilibrium characterised in 
proposition 1 because we approach it from a given distribution of incumbent 
firms F(i). We analyse the two restructuring steps in turn.
Immediately after the (unexpected) change in trade policy some firms may 
exit the market. Recall that the profit of the marginal firm is a function of the 
potential cost reduction a through merger (10). Exit occurs if the fall in profit is 
larger than the profit of the marginal firm in the initial equilibrium.
(17) 7i{N *(oo),o°) — 7t{2N *(°°),o) > a
From (17) exit is more likely if the cost reduction through merger is low. 
Exit continues until firm k breaks even and K  firms produce in each location. In 
figure n.4 this firm is determined at the intersection of the free trade profit 
function with the function F(i) of active firms in the industry.
(18) n(2K,0) = F(k)
Apart from exit the industry also adjusts through merger. The cost and the 
gain from a merger depend on the number of firms N  and the distribution of 
incumbent firms F(i). A merger occurs when the cost reduction is larger than the 
lost profit adjusted by the increase in market power.
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(19) F(i) + a>n(2i,0) + b; b =
dn/dN  for i> N  * (0) 
0 for i = N  * (O)
In figure n.4 the merger condition for free trade is drawn as a dashed line 
below the free trade profit line. At N*(t), i.e., at the number of firms where entry 
becomes profitable, the merger condition has a discontinuity. The steady-state 
equilibrium is given at the intersection of the merger condition with the function 
F(i) of active firms in the industry. As drawn the two functions intersect at a 
number of firms L(0) and a fixed cost level F(l(0)) of the marginal firm /. The 
intersections is drawn to the right of the discontinuity; if F(i) runs instead through 
the discontinuity, the steady-state is given by N*(0) and F(N*(0)).
Proposition 3
(a) Post-liberalisation equilibrium
Suppose two countries in initial equilibrium characterised by proposition 1 move 
from autarky to free trade. The post-liberalisation equilibrium is given by the
pair {/, F l} that satisfies
(b) Comparison of initial and post-liberalisation equilibrium
The number o f firms in the post-liberalisation equilibrium lies between the 
number o f firms in the initial equilibrium fo r free trade and autarky.
(21) N*(0)<L(0)<N*(oo)
Let the marginal firm avoiding exit be denoted k. The fixed cost o f the marginal 
active firm I in the post-liberalisation equilibrium is lower than the fixed cost o f 
firm  k and the fixed cost o f the marginal firm z in the initial equilibrium.
(20) F l = F(l) = n(2L,0) -  a + 
F l = F(l)
dn(2L,0)
if L = N * (  0)
(22) F l (0, a) < F k (0) < F z («,, a) = F z (0, a)
Proof: see appendix n. C
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Expression (20) gives the intersection of the merger condition with the 
fixed-cost ordering F(i) describing the population of incumbents. If F(i) intersect 
the merger condition at the discontinuity, the pair {/, F*} is given by F(i) 
evaluated at N*. The first inequality in (22) is strict if all merger targets have 
identical fixed costs, i.e., the upper tail of F(z) is flat before liberalisation. The 
second inequality is strict if no exit occurs. The final equality implies that the 
fixed cost level of the marginal firm z in an initial equilibrium is independent of 
trade costs.
Trade liberalisation affects an industry’s cost distribution in two ways: 
first, exit and merger reduce the number of firms by eliminating the upper tail of 
F(i). Second, the merger process shifts down remaining elements of F(i) through 
cost reductions a (not drawn in figure n.4). Because the new equilibrium is 
approached from N >  N* all mergers increase market power, i.e., b is negative.
The post-liberalisation equilibrium depends on initial conditions because 
incumbent firms face no uncertainty about their fixed cost types. Entry would not 
have been profitable for some of them at the post-liberalisation level of trade 
costs but with these entry costs already sunk they stay in the industry, depress 
profit levels, and reduce the profitability of entry for new firms. Without the 
threat of immediate entry merger can increase market power and is thus more 
profitable. Merger is a more important adjustment mechanism for an established 
industry than for a new and still growing industry.
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4.2 Welfare implications
In this section we compare the welfare properties of the post-liberalisation 
equilibrium to the initial equilibrium. Recall that the inefficiency in the private 
merger and entry decision stems partly from the “business stealing”-extemality: 
private firms do not consider the impact of their entry or merger decision on the 
profit level of their competitors. The threat of “excessive entry” denies socially 
beneficial mergers to go ahead. We find that by moving to free trade (in general: 
an increase in market size) the entry threat can be reduced and thus the 
profitability of welfare increasing mergers can be increased. Differentiating 
W(N) with respect to the number of firms and evaluating at the industry 
equilibrium we get
(23) —  = [ ^ N ) - c f 9  + — J v l - P ' - a  = ^ - N [ P ( N ) - c ] -  —  <0
dN 1 K \  dN } dN 1 v ’ 1 dN
The difference between (23) and the same expression evaluated at the 
initial equilibrium (13) is given by the last term capturing the market power effect 
of a merger. Due to the entry threat this term was absent in the initial equilibrium 
and hence the social planner is willing to raise entry costs. Trade liberalisation 
allows for a reduction in the number of firms without any additional intervention 
because potential profit falls relative to the size of the entry cost.
Note that from proposition 2 the social planner would like to induce even 
more mergers. The lower bound of active firms after liberalisation is given by 
N*(0) since any additional merger would trigger immediate entry. Even without 
this endogenous restriction on the number of firms private owners would not
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necessarily want to engage in too many mergers (see appendix HD). This result 
corresponds to proposition 5 in Farrell/Shapiro (1990). Fauli-Oller (1997) 
analyses how the shape of the demand function affects this result.
Proposition 4
Trade liberalisation reduces the threat o f entry and allows additional mergers to 
go ahead. All mergers privately profitable after trade liberalisation are 
constrained welfare increasing.
Proof:
Proposition 2 shows that mergers are constrained welfare improving at the 
number of firms N* where entry is triggered. The number of firms after trade 
liberalisation is weakly larger than N* and thus proposition 2 applies here as well.
The result is a consequence of combining the merger process with either 
firm heterogeneity or positive cost reductions a. Suppose merger brings no 
additional cost saving (a = 0). If firms are homogenous, i.e., F(i) is a horizontal 
line, the entry and exit conditions bind at the same level of firms N*(t) for any t. 
After trade liberalisation has triggered exit no further mergers are privately 
profitable because no increase in market power is possible. If firms are 
heterogeneous, i.e., F(i) is increasing, the entry condition binds for N*(t) while 
the exit condition binds for K(t) where N * ( t ) <  K( t ) . For N  between these 
bounds merger is not only socially but also privately profitable because market 
power can be increased. A positive cost saving a > 0 has the same effect of 
separating the entry and exit condition after trade liberalisation.
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4.3 M ultinational firms, gradual trade liberalisation, and the choice
between domestic and cross-border mergers
In this section we analyse how the presence of multinational firms in the 
industry affects the adjustment process to the post-liberalisation equilibrium. 
Multinational firms have production facilities in both markets avoiding trade 
costs but are subject to an extra fixed cost H  of running a two-plant operation. 
We first develop a type choice condition in addition to the exit, entry, and merger 
conditions of the previous sections to characterise the steady-state equilibrium 
and then analyse the effect of trade liberalisation.
The initial equilibrium before trade liberalisation is described by 
proposition 1 extended to two types of firms: multinationals and domestic firms. 
The three entry conditions for home (24), foreign (25), and multinational (26) 
firms determine the number of firms for each type in steady-state equilibrium.
(24) J” {) j ~ { n h( N h, N f  , M , t ) - s } e ~ r'dzg(s)ds= E
(25) \ ^ ()\ ~ { n r ( N h, N ‘ , M , t ) ~  s}e~r’dzg(s)ds = E
(26) J” ()\ ~ { n m{ N h, N J , M , t ) - s - H } e - " d T g ( s ) d s = E
The merger conditions for domestic (27) and multinational (28) firms 
determine the fixed cost level for the marginal firm in steady-state equilibrium. 
Note that the marginal multinational firm has a fixed cost equal to the fixed cost 
of the marginal domestic firm minus the extra cost H.
1 We think o f H as plant-specific and F* - H as firm specific fixed cost. This assumption is 
standard in the literature on multinational firms; see Markusen (1995) and 
M arkusen /V enables (1995). In contrast to these papers we do not consider general 
equilibrium effects.
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(27) F H a )  = n i - a ;  j e { h j }
(28) F 2” (a) = w " - a  = F 5' ( a ) - H
These six conditions fully describe the equilibrium values for the number 
of firms of each of the three types and the highest fixed cost level of each of the 
three types. It is, however, not immediately obvious that such an equilibrium 
exist, i.e., that there is a triplet [ N f * , N h*, M  *} simultaneously solving the
entry conditions (24-26). We develop a type choice condition to show that such 
an equilibrium does indeed exist.
The type choice condition follows from the fact that each firm can freely 
choose its production structure in order to maximise profit; in equilibrium no firm 
wants to switch its type. For a large number of firms this implies that a firm with 
a given fixed cost F* is indifferent between types: the extra fixed cost H  for a 
multinational firm is equal to the difference between the profit of a domestic and 
a foreign firm at a given location. In the notation we split up profit according to 
the market where the profit is generated. Hence superscript jk  indicates a country j  
firm’s profit on market k. If only one superscript is used this describes the sum of 
profit for a representative firm located in the indicated country. The two type 
choice conditions thus are
(29) H  = n M{ N f  j  *  * ,{;,*} e { h j }
The two type choice conditions (29) for home and foreign firms determine 
the relative number of firms of each type, while one of the free entry conditions
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ties down the absolute levels. For tractability we introduce country symmetry, i.e., 
the number of domestic firms in home and foreign is identical: N  = 2N h = 2N f  . 
In appendix H E we show that the right hand side of the type choice condition
(29) is increasing in the share of domestic firms in the industry, i.e., (30) is 
positive. Note that the total number of firms N+M in the industry is held constant.
(30) ~w  m  >
Expression (3) and figure n.5 show that the equilibrium values for N  and 
M  are stable because the profit difference line intersects the additional fixed cost 
line H  from below; closing the foreign production plant to become a national firm 
is profitable for a multinational firm only as long as the number of national firms 
N  is below its equilibrium value.
M a r k u s e n /V e n a b le s  (1995) come to a different conclusion and find that 
for symmetric countries multinationals and local producers cannot coexist in 
equilibrium. They view the number of production facilities as constant; thus one 
multinational firm uses the plants of two local firms (N + 2M  = constant). Here 
the number of firms is held constant; thus it takes two multinationals to eliminate 
two local firms (N + M  = constant). The assumption used here implies a positive 
relationship between the share of multinationals and the toughness of competition 
in an industry that is not present in M a r k u s e n /V e n a b le s .8 The general thrust of 
the results does not depend on this specific assumption.
8 Competitiveness is used in the sense introduced by SUTTON (1991, p. 33): A market has tougher 
[price] competition if a given number of firms is mapped into a lower equilibrium market price.
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After having established the steady-state equilibrium we now turn to the 
effects of trade liberalisation to find the post-liberalisation equilibrium. We are 
especially interested in the role multinational firms play in the process of industry 
restructuring. Falling trade costs between the two countries trigger three different 
kinds of responses in the industry: first, firms can increase their profit by 
changing their type; second, firms with a fixed cost above the operating profit exit 
the industry; and third, the remaining firms reorganise by merger.
Firms change their type if after trade liberalisation the type choice 
condition (29) no longer holds. In this model trade and foreign direct investment 
are substitutes and the reason to run a multinational firm is to jump tariffs/trade 
costs. This advantage melts away with trade liberalisation and hence 
multinational firms suffer more from the reduction in trade costs. The type choice 
condition in figure n.5 is moved to the right: more firms choose to produce at 
only one location and service the other market by exports.
d n J ,f d n m(31) — ----------------- <0
dt dt
The vulnerability to a given fall in protection differs across types: trade 
liberalisation always reduces the profits of multinational firms, while the effect on 
domestic firms’ profits is either positive or negative depending on the level of 
trade costs. Domestic firms gain from liberalisation in their export markets but 
lose in their home markets. The latter effect dominates for sufficiently high levels 
of trade costs such that exports are not too important. Multinational firms lose 
profit in all markets. Some of them react by closing their foreign operations,
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concentrating all production at one location, and thus saving the plant-specific 
fixed cost H. This process continues until the type choice condition (29) holds 
again as an equality.
The exit condition is the same as in the previous section. From (27) and
(28) firms have the same profit “buffer” to weather the reduction of trade costs 
from t° to t1. Firms start to leave the industry if the reduction in profit is larger 
than the profit of the marginal firm and thus
(32) n i { t \ N , M ) - n i ( t l , N ,M ) > a- ,  j  = { h j , m ]
The process of exit and type change readjusts firm numbers such that the 
marginal firm is indifferent between types and makes no loss. These numbers are 
indicated by AT as in the previous section with a superscript j  for domestic and m 
for multinational firms and are given by the zero profit condition (33).
(33) n ^ ( K J , K ” , t ' )  = F XJ; j  = {ft,/}  
n h"(Ki , K m, t ' )  = F Km + H
In the final stage adjustment firms reorganise through merger. They face 
no immediate threat of entry because entry is unprofitable at the reduced profit 
levels. Hence when calculating cost and benefit of a merger, firms take account of 
the increase in market power.
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Two types of firms are available for merger: domestic firms located either 
in home or foreign, and multinational firms. We start with the net gains from 
buying a domestic firm. These net gains depend on the type of the buyer: a 
foreign firm buying the local producer incurs additional headquarters costs H.
(34) F h (/) + a -  n hh -  n hf -  d n hh/ d N h -  d n hf / d N h domestic buyer
(35) F h (i) + a -  7ihh -  n hf -  d n hh / d N h - d n ff / d N h multinational buyer
(36) F h(i) + a -  H -  7ihf -  n * -  d n ff / d N h -  dn*1*1 / d N f  foreign buyer
Comparing expressions (34-36) it turns out that a multinational firm 
always has the strongest incentives to outbid potential local buyers. This is a 
consequence of the differences in market power gains available to different types 
of firms. A multinational has a strong initial position in both markets and is thus 
well equipped to exploit the reduction in the number of competitors. A domestic 
firm has the same advantage in its home market but gains less on the export 
market.
But does it make sense for this merger to go ahead? A merger is profitable 
if the cost reduction is larger than the opportunity cost of closing one firm 
adjusted by market power effects.
(37) a + F  (i) >71 +  r  + ------ -
w  d N J d N J
If trade liberalisation has triggered any exit of firms the operating profit of 
the marginal survivor is equal to its fixed cost. From the remaining cost reduction 
a and additional market power gains some mergers are profitable. As more
domestic firms are bought up their fixed cost level Fh(i) falls while the profit n h 
increases. Eventually the inequality no longer holds and the merger process stops 
for domestic firms.
We now move to the net gains from buying a multinational firm that again 
depend on the buyer being a domestic (38) or a multinational (39) firm.
(38) F m(i) + a -  n jk -  n ” -  dn*  / d N J -  d n ^ / d N 1 \ j ± k
(39) F m(i) + a + H - n m - d n ji/ d N i - d n kkl d N k ; j  * k
Comparing these expressions and noting the type choice condition (29) it 
turns out that a domestic firm never has sufficient incentives to outbid potential 
multinational buyers. Again this is due to the fact that a multinational firm with a 
strong position in all markets can gain the most from a reduction in the number of 
competitors.
But does it make sense for the multinationals to merge? Comparing the
cost reduction with the opportunity cost adjusted by market power effects we get
/JA. , ,  m d n * d n *
(40) a + H  + F ( i ) > n  + - 7 —  + ——
dM dM
If trade liberalisation has triggered any exit of firms the operating profit of 
the marginal survivor is equal to its fixed cost. From the additional cost reduction 
a and the increase in market power some mergers between multinational firms are 
profitable. As more multinationals are bought up their fixed cost level F™(i) falls 
while the profit n m increases. Eventually the inequality no longer holds and the 
merger process stops for multinational firms.
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In figure n.6 we draw the post-liberalisation profit as a solid line for all 
firms where the additional plant fixed cost H is deducted for the multinational 
firm. The broken lines give the merger condition for multinationals and domestic 
firms: the two lines coincide to the left of the discontinuity of the merger 
condition but differ to the right. A merger with a multinational produces larger 
market power effects and thus the merger condition for multinational mergers is 
below the condition for domestic mergers. From figure n.6 we can read off the 
fixed cost level of the marginal multinational (41) and domestic (42) firm.
Proposition 5
Start from an initial equilibrium with trade costs t > 0 and numbers o f
(1) The absolute number and the share o f multinational firms is reduced.
(2) A  positive number o f multinationals concentrates its production in one 
location to become a domestic firm.
(3) Both multinationals and domestic firms leave the industry if  the fall in profit 
is larger than the initial profit level a .
(4) A  positive number o f mergers occurs and multinational firms are involved in 
all o f them.
(5) The marginal multinational firm has a lower total fixed cost than the 
marginal domestic firm, if trade costs are positive.
Proof: see appendix ILF
kk
(41)
(42)
firms { N f  *, N h *, M  *}solving (24-26). A reduction in trade costs implies:
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These results are consistent with the literature on multinational firms. The 
fall in the share and number of multinational firms as a response to trade 
liberalisation is also observed in the general equilibrium model of 
M a r k u se n /V en a b l e s  (1995). B r a in a r d  (1993) provides empirical data 
consistent with this prediction. Our model provides an additional insight into the 
mechanism of this adjustment: first, multinationals are prone to concentrate their 
production in one location after trade liberalisation. Second, multinationals are 
very active in the take-over market both in buying multinational competitors and 
domestic firms. This prediction of the model seems to be in line with the 
empirical observations on merger trends.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter we analyse the restructuring of an industry in response to 
trade liberalisation in the presence of a sunk entry cost and firm heterogeneity. 
Trade liberalisation affects the incentives and the feasibility of merger. We add to 
the theoretical literature by introducing entry, focusing on the adjustment process 
from an initial to a post-liberalisation equilibrium, and giving a welfare 
assessment different from the one usually obtained. We find that lower trade 
barriers allow the industry to restructure with a mix of exit, merger, and internal 
restructuring (i.e., type change). Competition selects firms with low fixed costs 
for survival and the fixed cost level of the industry drops substantially after trade 
liberalisation. The number of firms falls because depending on their cost level 
firms with high fixed costs leave the industry by either exit or merger.
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Our model provides a theoretical foundation for some of the productivity 
effects expected from the 1992 Single Market Programme.9 Even though the 
parallels between theory and practice should not be overstated it is noteworthy 
that the empirical data presented in appendix HA supports the predictions of the 
model. Mergers in the early period from 1986 to 1988 focused on cost cutting; 
this is in line with theoretical predictions of large gains by buying out high fixed 
cost firms in the early rounds of mergers. As the process continues and high cost 
firms are eliminated market power effects become the dominant motive, both in 
the model and the data. Finally, the biggest surge in merger activity in the EU 
involved cross-border mergers. In our model all mergers involve multinationals, 
but cross-border mergers might only count mergers between multinationals. The 
model predicts the adjustment process to be most active for this type of merger. 
All privately profitable merger activity is welfare increasing from the perspective 
of aggregated welfare across the liberalising countries. This is a consequence of 
the free entry assumption that creates a market enforced limit to the number of 
privately profitable mergers. The standard merger policy literature has focused on 
the external effect of mergers taking the private profitability as given 
(Farell/S hapiro  (1990)) and thus neglects the fact that due to the positive 
externality of a merger on the whole industry some private mergers are not 
undertaken, even though they would be socially profitable. Trade liberalisation 
insures that at least part of the market power effect is taken into consideration by 
firms contemplating a merger.
9 E u r o p e a n  C o m m is s io n  (1988).
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M er c em er /S chm itt  (1996) present a much gloomier outlook on welfare 
implications of trade liberalisation in the presence of sunk costs. In their one- 
period model all fixed costs are sunk, while here this is only true for the entry 
costs. Thus future fixed costs are not yet sunk; entry and merger are then welfare 
increasing in both their general and our partial equilibrium case.
B arro s/C a b r a l  (1994) extended the standard merger policy framework 
to an international setting. In their work, the distribution of profit after a cross- 
border merger determines the national welfare assessment. In our model the 
bargaining process between the merging firms has not been made explicit. The 
distribution of merger gains and profit within a multinational firm is 
undetermined but from the entry assumption all privately profitable mergers are 
welfare increasing independently of any specific assumption on the distribution of 
profit. This result suggest that anti-trust authorities should focus on studying entry 
barriers when evaluating mergers.
The role of multinationals in a world of falling trade costs is analysed in 
one of the final sections. The absolute number of multinationals is shrinking but 
they are the most active in the restructuring process. Even for horizontal mergers 
and multinationals there may be forces in the opposite direction increasing the 
share of multinationals. M a r k u se n /V e n a bl es  (1995) note that both an increase 
in market size, say as a result of economic development, and a fall in the level of 
production cost c throughout the economy, say due to technological progress, has 
this result. In the present context this can be shown from the type choice 
condition.
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Sunk entry costs introduce history dependence to the model. After a 
change in policy the characteristics of equilibrium depend on the initial number of 
firms being above or below the level solving the free-entry condition. We 
describe a trade policy experiment starting from equilibrium, such that the 
number of firms is initially above the free-entry level with lower protection. An 
empirical example for such a situation seems to be the European chemicals 
industry10.
The model can be extended in several ways. One straightforward step 
would be to allow for technological progress, modelled as a shifting support for 
the distribution of fixed costs. New entrants appear and the industrial structure 
would be more dynamic and thus better resemble the empirical facts. Another 
step could be to look at merger motives other than the ones mentioned in this 
paper. Especially investments in Central and Eastern Europe is more of a vertical 
integration type exploiting differences in factor costs. De-mergers and focusing 
on core activities are important within the OECD countries. Future work could 
thus profit from using a more detailed model of the firm allowing for multiple 
tasks and influence activities.
10 The Financial Times (1997).
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Figure II.l
Profit,
cost
Expected net present 
value of future profit
F igure  I I . l :  E n try  conditions
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Figure II.2
Profit,
cost
Profit
a-b
F igure  II.2 : The initial equilibrium
This picture is used to characterise the initial steady-state 
equilibrium. The solid line gives a linear approximation of the convex 
operating profit function. The dashed line gives the right hand side of the 
merger condition and has a discontinuity at N*. The entry condition binds 
where the upper dotted line intersects the operating profit line. The merger 
condition binds at its intersection with the ordering of firms F(i). This point 
gives the initial steady-state equilibrium. The exit condition would bind 
where the ordering of firms F(i) intersects the operating profit line. In the 
initial steady-state F(i) does not exist in that region if a > 0.
112
Figure II.3
Profit,
cost
social gain
private gain
Entry cost
N*
F igure II.3 : Private a n d  social entry decision
The private gain for an entrant is given by a measure of expected future 
operating profit. The cost is given by E. While the gain is falling with the 
number of incumbent firms, the entry cost is given by technology and is 
thus not affected.
The social gain of entry is given by the sum of changes in consumer 
surplus, changes in incumbent profit, and the entrant’s profit. The cost is 
given by the uncertainty of the entrant’s fixed cost level. While the social 
gain of entry is falling with the number of incumbent firms, the entry cost 
is given by technology and is thus unaffected.
The difference between social and private merger incentives relates to the 
difference in the gain of entry. The difference in the gain of entry is the 
sum of changes in consumer surplus and incumbents’ profit. From (11) this 
sum is negative and thus the social incentives for entry are smaller than the 
private incentives.
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Figure II.4
autarky profit
Profit,
free trade profit
► N
N*(0) L(0) K(0) N*(t)
F igure  I I .4: M oving  fr o m  autarky to fr e e  trade
The solid straight lines give profit as a function of N  for both autarky and 
free trade approximating an underlying convex function. The intersection 
of the profit function and the upper dotted line giving a measure of entry 
cost determines the number of firms N* in the initial equilibrium. The 
broken lines give merger costs as lost profit minus the cost saving a and 
minus potential market power effects b. The broken lines have a 
discontinuity at N*  because below that level market power effects are zero.
The initial equilibrium with trade cost t creates an equilibrium population 
of firms described by F(i). The removal of trade barriers shifts the profit 
function to the left. Firms above K(0) make losses and leave the industry. 
Firms between L(0) and K(0) merge. The values for L(0) and K(0) depend 
on the shape of F(i) but are constrained by .
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Figure II.5
Profit,
cost
( N , M , t ° ) - n j ( N , M , t 0)
F igure II. 5:
Type choice betw een dom estic a n d  m u ltina tiona l firm s
For a given trade cost t we keep the total number of firms N  + M  constant. 
The positive slope of the profit difference is proved in appendix II.C. Trade 
liberalisation implies a reduction of trade costs from t° to t1.
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Figure II.6
Profit,
cost
free trade profit
Entry cost
F(i)
>  N
K  N*(t°)
F igure I I .6:
F ixed  cost o f  the  m arginal f irm  a fter  trade liberalisation
To the right of the discontinuity the merger conditions for multinationals 
and domestic firms differ. In particular, the merger condition for 
multinational firms is below the one for domestic firms indicating higher 
market power effects for a merger between multinational firms.
116
Appendix II.A 
Mergers in the European Community
□  Intern*! 
■  EU
0  National
Mergers in the European Community: Absolute 
Numbers
1983 1985 1987 1989 1991
Table 1: Number of Mergers in the EU,
Source: European Commission, Report on Competition Policy, var. issues
Mergers in the European Community: Motives
□  Market Fbsitbn
■  Expansion
B  Rationalisation/ 
Synergies
Table 2: Motives for Mergers in the EU,
Source: European Commission, Report on Competition Policy, var. issues
Appendix II.B 
Convexity of the profit function in N
Here we prove the convexity of profit in the number of firms N.
(Al)
dn dqjk .. dPik
<0
.. d 2P k
q — > 0
dN* dN dN  L" J dN l dN 2
£ *  r _ , _ W V  +
^ 1XT »xr ^ 1/  1 CJ Jxr2 ^
Using the first-order condition to the firm’s problem we first show that 
output is decreasing and convex in the number of firms.
(A2)
dq [q + 'Z d4 / dN][D'+qD"]
= -qX~' < 0dN
d zq dq 
d N z ~~~dN
2D'+qD"
i d X  2
• - « x ' + q m x ' > 0
where X  =
2 D'+qD"
D'+qD"
+ N
dX
> 0 ;  >0
dN
Using the above result we show second that the price level is also 
decreasing and convex in the number of firms.
dP
(A3> m -
d P
q + N
dq
dN
dN ‘
D'= qD'Y < 0
iV j
dY
Y + qD'— > 0 
H dN
where Y = 1 - N
N  + [2 D'+qD”]/[D'+qD' ’]
dY
> 1 ; ^ < 0
Plugging (A2-3) in (Al) proves the convexity of the profit function in N.
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Appendix II.C
Proof of proposition 3
(a) Post-liberalisation equilibrium
At the pair described by (20) all three equilibrium conditions hold: no entry 
occurs because L > N  *; no merger is profitable because the left hand side of (20) 
is the merger condition; finally, by rewriting (2 0 ) we find that all firms generate a 
positive profit and hence no exit occurs.
(b) Comparison o f the initial and the post-liberalisation equilibrium
The first part of (21) is implied by expression (20). All firms generate a non­
negative profit and hence the number of firms never falls below N*(0).
For the second part of (21) to hold either exit or merger has to have occurred after 
liberalisation. Immediately after liberalisation profit levels fall from (16) and the 
entry condition is no longer binding. Hence the merger condition is shifted to the 
left and some mergers become profitable.
The first three parts of (21) relate to the three stages the industry moves through 
on F(i) from autarky to free trade. From F z («>, a) to F k (0) firms with a high 
fixed cost level exit the industry; from F k(0) to F z(0,a) additional firms 
disappear through merger. By construction of F(i) both weak inequalities apply. 
The final equality is an application of proposition 1: the equilibrium number of 
firms adjusts the effect of different trade costs such that firms’ equilibrium profit 
is independent of trade cost. The equality in (22) then follows from (11).
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Appendix II.D 
Excessive merger and the threat of entry
This appendix analyses the welfare effects of mergers after trade 
liberalisation if the number of firms is not constrained by the entry condition. The 
private and social objective functions are written as (A4) and (A5).
(A4) ^ I T  = 2n(N, t )~ ^ F l private
(A5) W = u ( q N ) - c q N - ^ F l social
Differentiating both expressions with respect to the number of firms N  and 
accounting for the possible cost reduction the decision criterion for mergers is
(A6 ) -7t (N, t )  + F n + a - d n ( N , t ) / d N  > 0 private
(A7) ~ ( p ~  c)(q‘ +q' n ) + F n +a>  0 social
For a given number of firms the private incentive to merge are weakly 
smaller than the social returns if (A8 ) holds. Inequality (A8 ) can be written as 
(A9).
(A8 ) - d n { N , t ) / d N  < - { p - c \ j ' N
(A 9)
For linear inverse demand with unit slope (A8 ) reduces to (A10) and 
further to (A ll).
(A10) J -
dq
dq
2 N - \(A ll)  1 < ---------
N  + 1
The inequality (A ll)  holds for all N  >2.  The inequality implies that in 
the absence of entry the social gains from a merger are higher than the private 
gains unless the two merging firms are the only firms on the market.
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Appendix II.E 
An interior solution for the type choice condition
Step 1: show n M( N , M , t ) -  n jk ( N , M ,r) > 0
The difference in profit between a multinational and a domestic exporter 
is due to the difference in the own cost parameter: exporters pay an additional 
trade cost t. To prove the above we show that profit is decreasing in own cost.
(A12) —  = - q ‘ + [ N - 1]— = - q ‘ - [N - 1] U q  < 0  
dc * 1 1dq‘ dq' dc' H 1 1 D'+qD"
d n 1 dq‘ 1 dq ' 2 D'+qD"
from ■ ^ T = D ' q < 0 ; —  = 1 ^ < 0 ; —  = - - 5 ^ 7 <0
d[na (N , M, t^Step 2: show      > 0
F dN dM
The profit difference between multinationals and domestic exporters is 
affected when other multinationals close plants to become domestic firms and 
thus increase their marginal production cost. The sign of the expression is 
essentially driven by the cross-product of profit differentiated by own and a 
competitor’s marginal cost. We show that this cross-product is positive if the 
convexity of the inverse demand function is not too large: [d "2 -D'  D" ’] < 0.
d 2n l dq‘ r ^dqj q 2\D"2-D'D" ' ]+D'2dqi/ d q j
<4,3> — [D.^..r <°
dq' [D'+qD"\dqJ/d c 1 
from =  ------2D'+qD" > ^ ^  ^  ^ P ^ ^ 011 to (A12)
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Appendix ILF
Proof of proposition 4
(1) and (2) follow from the shift of the type choice condition (29).
Differentiating (29) from the main text with respect to trade cost t and 
keeping the number of firms constant we get
To re-establish equilibrium the relative number of firms has to be 
adjusted. From (30) in the main text the left hand side of (FI) is decreased if 
domestic firms extend their operations to become multinational firms. A 
reduction of trade costs has the opposite effect thus proving (2 ) and the second 
part of (1).
To prove the first part of (1) we have to further establish that there is no 
entry by additional multinationals. This is an application of proposition 3 (a).
(3) follows from the discussion of the exit condition in (32).
(4) follows from the discussion of the merger conditions (34-36) and (38-39)
Deducting (34) from (35) we get (F2) to show that the multinational firm 
outbids a home firm for a merger with a home firm.
Deducting (36) from (35) we get (F3) to show that the multinational firm 
outbids a foreign firm for the merger with a home firm.
(FI)
dt dt
dn ff
>  r
dN
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Deducting (38) from (39) we get (F4) to show that the multinational firm 
outbids a domestic firm for the merger with a multinational firm. 
dn*1*1 d n ff(F4)
dNh dN
(5) follows from the comparison of the merger conditions evaluated at the 
equilibrium (41-42):
n , d n ** d n 1*
(F5) F q - F Un= n J - n m + H  + ----------  r >0
' -s ' d N J dN=o >------------- ¥------------- ,
£0
123
Chapter III
A Note on the effect of trade policy 
on the speed of Cost-cutting
1. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we analyse how the interaction of market structure and 
owners’ control of management affects firms’ incentives to invest in performance 
improving activities (i.e., restructuring) over time. What are the conditions under 
which protection helps an industry to improve its competitiveness through 
speedier cost-cutting? In the literature owners are assumed to have full control 
over their management’s actions to secure profit-maximising behaviour. Under 
this assumption we find that trade policy designed to increase profit increases the 
incentives of firms to invest in restructuring and initial differences in firm 
performance increase over time.
We also investigate the effects of trade policy on firms’ incentives to 
invest under a different assumption where owners have only limited control of 
their management’s activities and set a dividend target below the maximum level. 
Managers react by choosing a restructuring strategy that allows them to satisfy the 
dividend target but delay the next restructuring as long as possible. Managers 
want to delay restructuring because any restructuring requires them to put in 
additional effort (i.e., they incur an additional private cost) for which they are not
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compensated. Additionally, managers want their firms to survive because they 
derive control rents from their jobs. Under our set of assumptions trade policy 
induced increases in profit reduce the incentives of firms to invest in restructuring 
and reduce initial differences in firm performance.
We use a small open economy model with two home firms facing a given 
world market price. Firm owners hire a manager with the responsibility to run 
operations and make dividend payments. At each date, the firm sells on the home 
market and generates a profit that can be used to either finance dividend payments 
to the owner or to accumulate for a later investment in a cost-reducing 
restructuring. We make the assumption that a restructuring can only be financed 
internally and not through borrowing from the capital market.
If the owner controls the management he maximises the discounted value 
of the dividend stream. By choosing the dividend level the owner implicitly also 
chooses a sequence of restructuring dates at which the firm reduces cost. If the 
owner does not control the management he sets a dividend target for the firm. The 
manager satisfies this dividend target but uses all additional profit to delay 
restructuring as long as possible to avoid the private cost attached to 
restructuring. The level of protection determines the level of profit and thus the 
amount of resources available for restructuring and dividend payments. We 
undertake a trade policy experiments to study the effects of trade liberalisation on 
the timing of restructuring under the two managerial objectives.
Our model is motivated by an interest in the interactions between internal 
firm structures and international competition. A specific example of this 
interaction is the discussion on the productivity performance of German
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manufacturing firms in the late 80s/early 90s. B ailey /G e r sb a c h  (1995) claim 
that trade liberalisation played a role in the delay of performance improving 
investments by German firms. Their argument involves two steps: first, EU trade 
policies created a windfall profit for German firms with their initially favourable 
cost position. Second, the windfall profit was not re-invested but used as a 
cushion to delay otherwise necessary performance improvements. We analyse the 
consistency of this argument.
The specific German example draws attention to broader questions: how 
does trade liberalisation, for example in the context of a free trade area, affect 
heterogeneous firms? Are high-cost firms able to catch up after trade barriers are 
removed, or do they fall further behind their low-cost competitors now competing 
in an open market? These questions are raised in the context of NAFTA and the 
enlargement of the EU. The answers to these questions depend on both general- 
equilibrium and competition effects. We concentrate on the latter and 
demonstrate the importance of assumptions on owners’ control of management in 
assessing the likelihood of either catch-up or further fall-back of firms with an 
initial disadvantage.
Our work draws on the trade literature as well as on the literature on 
competition and efficiency. M iya g iw a /O h n o  (1995) present a partial equilibrium 
model with a positive link between (permanent) trade barriers and R&D 
investment. Their approach is similar in spirit to our full owner-control 
benchmark case but we add the case of management-control. The trade and 
growth literature (Gr o ssm a n /H el pm a n  (1991)) analyses linkages between 
international trade and R&D but concentrates on general equilibrium effects as
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well as knowledge spill-overs. The growth enhancing role of trade stems from 
these knowledge spill-overs, not from changes in competitive pressure on the 
product market. As F een str a  (1996) points out these international knowledge 
spill-overs are also responsible for the convergence of growth rates after trade 
liberalisation across heterogeneous countries. B aldw in /F orsklid  (1996) list at 
least six different channels through which trade liberalisation can enhance the 
growth rate of an economy. One of their experiments analyses the effects of trade 
liberalisation in the manufacturing sector and is thus comparable to our setting 
This experiment achieves an increase in the growth rate by making the final good 
an input to R&D because even though there are fewer resources available to 
spend on R&D the R&D cost is reduced due to increased competition in the input 
market. This result bears some resemblance to the lab equipment model in 
R iv e r a -B atiz/R o m er  (1991).
The literature on competition and efficiency points out the importance of 
different managerial objectives for the effects of a change in competitive 
pressure. AGfflON ET a l . (1997) and A ghion/H owttt (1998, 1997) develop a 
general equilibrium model with knowledge spill-overs as an engine of growth. A s  
in our model, they contrast profit maximisation by owners with full control over 
their management with an alternative scenario. In this alternative scenario 
managers have some leeway to pursue their own interests and delay the next 
restructuring as long as possible while securing the survival of the firm. We 
reduce their model of the economy to partial equilibrium but explore further the 
role of international competition in the absence of external effects. We broaden
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their model of the firm by allowing owners to require some dividend payments 
even when their control of the management is limited.
R a d n e r  (1995) and S ch m idt  (1997) look at the importance of the 
survival constraint on management behaviour. In their models profit is entirely a 
cushion against the consequences of risky or bad behaviour. The first paper uses a 
dynamic Brownian-motion approach, where the management of a firm controls 
the volatility and drift of the profit function. It shows that profit maximisation 
leads to a behaviour quite different from a pure survival strategy. The second 
paper is static but links competition to management behaviour. Because stronger 
competition increases the likelihood of costly bankruptcy, managers react by 
increasing their level of effort.
The structure of the remainder of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 sets 
out the model and describes the properties of the optimal restructuring strategies 
depending on who controls the firm. Section 2.1. presents the general structure of 
firms’ choice problems. Section 2.2. analyses optimal restructuring dates for 
owner control (2.2.1) and for manager control (2.2.2.). Section 3 analyses the 
effects of trade policy on these solutions. Section 3.1 examines the effect of 
changes in import protection. Section 3.2 applies these results to look at the 
effects of the creation of a custom union. Section 4 concludes.
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2. THE MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION
2.1 The general set-up
We build upon a simple model of a small open economy in partial 
equilibrium. There are two home firms facing at date x a world market price p(r) 
and a tariff level t. The home firms each have a manager in charge of setting 
output in every period and an owner with the right to demand dividend payments.
The firms are assumed to have increasing marginal cost and a fixed cost 
element A in a simple cost function given by (1). At date 0 firm i e  {l;2} starts
with an initial value for the cost parameter cl where we let c1 < c2.
(1) C  (c‘ (t)) = c‘ (t) |V  (t) + q l(r)2/ 2 ] + A with c '(0) = c*
Firm f  s flow profit in period x is given by
(2) jc‘ (t ) = [p (t ) + t]q‘( t ) ~  C‘ (c‘ (t  ),q‘ (t ))
At each date managers set the output volume in order to maximise the 
flow profit of the firm. Their optimal output choice in each period depends on the 
firm’s cost parameter cl(z) as well as on the world price p(r) and the level of 
protection t but not on the cost parameter of the other home firm.
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™  U  M  n M  A -  P(T) + ‘ - C‘(r )(3) q [c ( z ) ,p ( r ) , t j -
Having solved for the optimal output level we can now derive the 
equilibrium profit of firm i as a function of the time-dependent variables cl(r) and 
p(r) as well as the trade cost t.
./ i t  \ t \ \ [ p W + ' - c ' W ]2(4) n  (c (r), p(r), t) = i-------— ^ ------
The flow profit can be used in two different ways: first, money can be 
paid to the firm owner in the form of dividends vl(r). Second, the profit can be 
added to the accumulated profit Ft(x) to be later invested in a cost-reducing 
restructuring of the firm. Firm f  s accumulated profit at time T  is called Tt(T) 
given by (5). The first term in this expression represents the integral over profit 
and dividend payments keeping track of cost parameter changes due to 
restructuring. The second term gives the restructuring cost R times the number of 
restructuring incidences s before date T.x
(5) n ‘(T) =  f 0 [ n ‘ ( c ‘ (T ) ,  p (t), f ) - v ' ( T ) ] *  -Jt»
1 Note that for simplicity there is no discounting in this model, i.e., firms receive no interest for 
past profits. This assumption reflects the fact that there is no financial market in the model but is 
not essential for the results.
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Each restructuring reduces the cost parameter of the firm according to the 
concave function g(cl).
( 6 )  c '  ( t  + 1) =  g ( c ‘ ( t ))  a t  r e s t r u c tu r in g  d a te s
where 0  < g(c) < c and 1 > ^  - > 0  
6V 7 dc
c‘ ( r  + 1) =  c '  ( t ) a t  a l l  o th e r  d a te s
L ik e  A G fflO N  ET AL. (1997) w e  m a k e  th e  c r u c i a l  a s s u m p t io n  th a t  a  
r e s t r u c t u r in g  c a n  o n ly  b e  f in a n c e d  th r o u g h  in te r n a l  r e s o u r c e s ,  i .e . ,  t h e  f i r m  is  n o t  
a l l o w e d  to  u s e  t h e  c a p i ta l  m a r k e t  i n  o r d e r  to  f i n a n c e  th is  in v e s tm e n t .
Assumption 1: Firms are unable to obtain external credit.
The assumption is a strong version of credit models where borrowing is 
limited by the amount of available collateral and rules out models where 
borrowing is only limited by the present value of the investment. Under the 
assumption about the absence of external finance restructuring at date T  is only 
feasible if a firm has sufficient accumulated resources available to finance the 
restructuring cost R. Hence for the sequence of firm V s restructuring dates Vs the 
feasibility condition (7) has to hold.
2 Without assumption 1, owners borrow and restructure immediately s times until any further 
restructuring is no longer profitable. The equivalent of restructuring in other models is the 
purchase of new blue-prints that become available over time. In our model, all future 
restructuring is already available. Hence assumption 1 is only another way to obtain an 
equivalent constraint on the speed of cost reduction.
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(7) n ' ( r ) > «  v r e { r “}
To find the set of dates for which the feasibility condition (7) holds we 
establish the path of accumulated profit TT(r) over time. At dates without
restructuring IT ( t)  changes by the level of the flow profit ^ '( t )  reduced by 
dividend payments v1 ( t)  . At restructuring dates the additional restructuring cost 
R has to be deducted.
if no restructuring 
at restructuring dates
(8) = ^  ^ '  V' ^
= n ' (c‘ (r ). P(T). t ) - v ‘( r ) - R
For any given dividend level vYt) the sign of (8 ) depends on the evolution 
of flow profit over time. Flow profit is a function of the world market price which 
is assumed to follow a continuous downward trend over time.
dp(r)
(9) < 0
dr
From the flow profit (4) we can establish the change in flow profit at dates 
without restructuring and thus a constant cost parameter c\
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d n ' (c 'f rM * ) .* )  p (t)  + t - c ‘( t)  dpjt)  
dz  c* ( t)  dz
From the dynamic evolution of flow profit (10) the firm might not be able 
to finance the dividend payment without using some accumulated profit from 
earlier periods: n l (r) -  v‘ (r) < 0 . Firms are only active in the market if at date 0 
they generate a profit Tt(0) larger than the dividend level vl(0). At dates without 
restructuring accumulated profit is thus concave over time and has an inverted U- 
shaped form as drawn in figure DLL
(11) ^ lM  = w‘(c<(o),p(o)>j)-vi(0)>0 n
U V
d2n ‘(r) _ *r'(c'(r),p(r),f)  ^
d z 2 dz
We are now in the position to describe the set of feasible restructuring 
dates defined above in (7). From the U-shaped form of IT(T) we find that for a 
given dividend profile vl(z) there are two dates at which the constraint defined in
(7) holds as an equality.
The lower bound T  and upper bound T  of the set of feasibility 
restructuring dates (7) are defined by
(12) IT ( I )  = R and n* (c' ( l) ,  p (r))  -  v‘ ( f )  > 0 lower bound
n ' ( r j  = /?and 7r ' |c l( r j , p | r j j - v ‘(7’J < 0  upperbound
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In figure ELI we show the feasibility set as the intersection between the 
horizontal line representing the restructuring cost R and the area underneath the 
accumulated profit function Ft(r).
2.2 Finding the optimal restructuring dates
So far we have established the evolution of profit over time and the 
resulting set of feasible restructuring dates. In this section we analyse the optimal 
sequence of restructuring dates under two different assumptions. Under the first 
assumption, the owner has complete control of the management and effectively 
sets dividend levels and restructuring dates on his own. This assumption 
corresponds to the traditional case of a profit maximising firm. Under the second 
assumption, the manager is faced with a fixed dividend target which he has to 
respect in order not to lose the job generating control rents. Given this constraint 
the manager is free to set the restructuring dates 7* as he decides. This assumption 
corresponds to the more critical view of managers being able to exploit their 
position to pursue private objectives other than profit maximisation.
2.2.1 The profit maximising firm
The owner faces a trade-off between consumption today, i.e., immediate
dividend payments, and consumption tomorrow, i.e., investment in restructuring
to generate a higher profit and thus dividend potential in the future. The optimal
decision depends therefore on the owners’ rate of time preference r. Reflecting
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the stickiness of dividend levels observed empirically, we restrict the owner to set 
a constant dividend level between restructuring dates, such that vl(T )  indicates 
the dividend level of firm i between dates T '1 and T .
We start by establishing the possible combinations of dividend levels vl 
and feasible restructuring dates T . The feasibility set defined by the boundaries in
(1 2 ) depends on the level of dividend payments v1 a firm has to make in every 
period. An increase in the level of dividends shifts the boundaries of the 
feasibility set according to
(13) — ----------——r > 0 lower bound
dv' w'(c'(r),p(i))-v'(r)
d T  T
< 0  upper bound
d v ‘ 7 r ' (c '(7 ') ,p (r ) ) -v , (7j
Note that a rational owner only produces if he can generate a non-negative 
profit, i.e., n ‘ (c' (t),/?(t), f) > OVt . We use figure III.2 to present the relationship
between the level of dividends and the set of feasible restructuring dates. Note 
that figure IH.2 and figure HI. 1 differ in the vertical axis. Whereas figure IH.1 
concentrates on the level of accumulated profit, figure DI.2 focuses on the level of 
dividend payments set by the firm owner. The set of feasible restructuring dates in 
figure m.2 is thus the sum of all feasible restructuring dates from figure HL1 for 
all dividend levels vl(r). In figure IH.2 we make use of the second derivatives with 
respect to the dividend level.
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T >0 lower bound
d 2T T >0 upper bound
^ ( c ( 7 - ) , P( r ) ) - v '( r ) ] 2
There exists a maximum v* such that only one feasible restructuring date
T l remains. Note that at this date the flow profit is equal to the dividend level 
and (13) has a discontinuity. In figure EH.2 the function of flow profit over time 
intersects the frontier of the feasibility set at this maximum.
Apart from the level of dividends it is also the level of the cost parameter 
cl(t) which influences the shape of the flow profit function ii{r) and thus of the 
accumulated profit function J7(r). In particular, a firm with a lower cost 
parameter is able to generate a higher flow profit.
The advantage of operating with a lower cost parameter depends on the 
level of the world market price p(z). A higher price level increases the advantage 
of having lower cost.
d n l( t)  _ p(t )  + t - c l(t) 
dc‘( t ) 2 c ‘ ( t ) 2
[p(r) + 1 + c l ( t) ]>  0
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Using these results the effect of different cost parameters on the level (15) 
and the price responsiveness (16) of flow profit, we establish the change in the 
feasibility set in reaction to a lower cost parameter with the help of figure 111.3. 
Suppose we compare the two firms 1 and 2 with c1 < c2. Starting from the
increase its dividend level by the additional profit it generates at that date. But 
from the effect of the cost parameter on the price responsiveness of flow profit 
(16) this policy has not the exploited the full level of additional resources 
generated in earlier periods with a higher world market price level. Some flow 
profit remains available to be divided up between higher dividends and earlier 
restructuring dates.
It follows that the frontier of the feasibility set is pushed up even further. 
The maximum for firm l ’s feasibility set is on its decreasing flow profit function 
such this maximum in comparison to firm 2  is characterised by both an earlier
restructuring date f 1 < T 2 and a higher dividend level v1 > v2.
After establishing the set of combinations between feasible restructuring 
dates and dividend levels for different levels of the cost parameter cl(r) we can
maximum of the feasibility set for firm 2 at date T 2 from (15) firm 1 can afford to
dcl (t )
d n '1 (c1 ( f 2), P( f 2), r) -  d n 2(c2 ( f 2), p ( f 2), t) 
dcl ( t)
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now formulate owner Vs optimisation problem for the discounted sum of 
dividends V using the discount factor r.
r p i i  yW2 J t s
(18) Maxi V1 = fv'(r')e'"jT+ {v ‘(T i2)e~r'dz+..+ Jv'(r“)e‘"dT
such that n'(r) > r  vr e {7*}
The exact sequence of restructuring dates { T j  depends on all exogenous 
parameters including the discount factor r, the cost-cutting function g(c) and the 
time path of p(r). To understand the effect of trade liberalisation it is sufficient to 
show that the optimal combinations of restructuring dates and dividend levels are 
all on the lower bound of the feasibility set defined in (1 2 ).
Proposition 1
(a) A firm owner with full control over dividend levels and restructuring dates 
chooses an optimal combination of 7^ * and v*(7^ ) satisfying
(19) n'(r) = « n  7r'(c'(r),p(T))>v'(r) v r e {r u *}
(b) A firm owner with full control facing a lower initial cost parameter 
cl (0 ) < cJ (0 ) receives both a higher dividend level and restructures earlier.
(20) v ' ( r ) > v ' ( r )  n  T* < T J‘ if c '(0 )< c '(0 )
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Proof:
(a) Suppose the owner chooses a combination of v* and V  within the 
feasibility set but not at its lower bound. Then the owner could move the 
restructuring date forward to the lower bound keeping the dividend level constant. 
Noting the flow profit is decreasing in the cost parameter (15) the firm enjoys an 
additional profit between the new restructuring date T "  and the planned 
restructuring date T  given by
(21) Q * (* (c (r ')), p { t ) )  -  n(c{r), p (  t))]*  > 0
This additional profit can be used for an extra dividend or earlier 
restructuring dates in the future. Hence a combination of v and T  away from the 
lower bound of the feasibility set can not be optimal.
(b) Using the effect of the cost parameter on the level (15) and price 
responsiveness (16) of the flow profit we established that the maximum of the 
feasibility set shifts upwards and to the left with a lower cost parameter. The 
argument applies analogously to all points on the lower bound of the set. This 
proves (2 0 ) where the weak inequality only applies for an extremely patient 
owner (r = 0) with a policy of zero dividends and restructuring at dates T .
Proposition 1 has a number of interesting features: first, firms with full 
owner control do not delay activities to reduce their cost level until flow profit 
drops .below the dividend level. If actual firm behaviour deviates from this 
prediction we have to determine which critical assumption of the model does not 
correspond to empirical facts. Second, firms with a lower cost level both generate 
a higher dividend level and improve their performance faster than other firms. 
Over time, proposition 1 thus implies increasing differences in firms’ cost levels
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(2 2 ); firms with an initial advantage extend their lead further and further until 
finally weaker competitors exit the market.
2.2.2 Manager control over restructuring dates
In this section we compare the profit maximising firm with a firm where 
the manager has some leeway to pursue his own private objectives. The manager 
has two interests: first, he wants to keep his job in order to continue to enjoy 
control rents. Second, he wants to delay restructuring as long as possible in order 
to avoid the attached private cost of new learning and reorganising the firm.
The owner requires the payment of a constant dividend v** where we 
assume that at this dividend level there exists a non-empty set of feasible 
restructuring dates as defined in (7). The manager has not to respect a non­
negativity constraint on flow profit such that we get the adjusted feasibility set in 
figure m.4. But if the manager is unable to pay the dividend v**, be it out of the 
flow profit or the accumulated profit, he loses his job and the attached per-period 
control rent of b?
2
H o l m s t r Om  (1982 ) assum es th a t th e  cost to  the  m anager com es in term s o f  lo s t rep u ta tion  
re su ltin g  in  a low er fu tu re  w age, w here  p ro fit instead  o f  survival is the  signal o f  effort.
(22)
dT
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With every restructuring the manager incurs a private cost of k. Because 
the manager has a rate of time preference 0  < p  < he aims to delay 
restructuring dates as much as possible without losing the job. The managers 
optimisation problem for his private utility B can thus be written as
s.t. vre{r}
v( t )  >  v  * *
As in AGfflON ET AL. (1997) and AGfflON/Howm (1998) we assume that 
the manager’s discount rate p  and the private control rent b are both high enough 
such that the manager acts as if he has lexicographic preferences over 
restructuring dates, i.e., he first tries to delay the first restructuring as far as 
possible then the second restructuring and so on. Under this assumption we can in 
proposition 2  describe the properties of the optimal combination of restructuring 
dates and dividend levels for management control of restructuring dates. An 
equivalent assumption concentrates on the frequency of feasible restructurings: if 
the restructuring cost R is high relative to the flow profit n  the distance between 
restructuring dates is large such that even for a lower discount rate the manager’s 
behaviour approaches the one implied by lexicographic preferences.
(23) M axB -  [be pTdx — V ,keJt'I J M
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Proposition 2
(a) A firm manager with control over restructuring dates and an obligation to 
pay a constant dividend v** chooses an optimal sequence {Ts**} satisfying
(24) Tl(T) = R and n(c{r),p{r))< v**  V r e { r  **}
(b) If firm owners set an equal dividend target for all firms independently of 
their initial cost situation then cost parameters converge to a common level.
(25) 3 t  * * such that c' (r )  = cj ( t )  | t  > z  * *
(a) The manager has no reason to pay a dividend higher than v** because that 
would reduce his ability to finance restructuring without giving any private gain. 
The manager also has no incentive to choose an earlier restructuring date T< 7*** 
because from the assumption about his time preference the additional private cost 
from restructuring earlier outweighs any gain from restructuring later in future 
periods.
(b) Because the flow profit is decreasing in the cost parameter (15) the firm 
with an initially lower cost generates a higher flow profit. Applying the implicit 
function theorem on the definition of the feasibility set (7) we get (26): a higher 
flow profit shifts the upper bound of the feasibility set to the right.
Hence with an equal target dividend of v** the firm with a lower initial
process of later restructuring dates continues until at date t** both firms have 
reached the same cost level, hence the same flow profit and restructuring dates.
Proof:
T
>0
cost parameter cl(0) can wait longer until it invests in the first restructuring. This
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From the comparison of proposition 1 and 2 we can establish the effect of 
different assumptions on owner control over management on firm behaviour. In 
figure HI.5 we have drawn firm i’s combinations of restructuring date and 
dividend level for these two assumptions about internal control. While the 
relative level of the dividend depends on the time preference of the owner the 
restructuring dates occur always later for the case of manager control compared to 
the case of a profit-maximising firm with owner control.
A second implication of the model concerns the evolution over time: 
while owner control implies an increase in firm differences culminating in the 
exit of high-cost firms from the industry, with manager control all firms with 
equal dividend levels reach an identical cost level independently of their initial 
cost situation. The absence of owner control thus eliminates to a large extent the 
pressure of product competition on firms and their managers.
3. THE TRADE POLICY EXPERIMENT
We analyse two different trade policy experiments: in the first section, we 
look at the effect of an increase of import protection on firm restructuring 
behaviour as a function of control within the firm. In the second section, we use 
these results to look at the effects of creating a custom union when the 
participating countries previously had different rates of import protection and the 
firms located in these countries have a different initial cost levels.
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3.1 The effect of import protection
In the first trade policy experiment we analyse the effect of a change in 
import protection (a production subsidy has equivalent effects) on firm behaviour 
depending on the two different assumptions about control within the firm. We 
find that import protection has radically different implications for the timing of 
restructuring dates and thus the evolution of the firm’s cost level over time if 
manager control instead of owner control is the correct description of the internal 
structure of the firm.
Our experiment involves a permanent shift in the level of import 
protection t. Higher protection increases the level of flow profit.
d n 1 (c' (T),p(r),r) P(T) + t - c l (r)
(27) -----*-■■ ■ V' J  = > V /  >0
dt c l (t)
The upward shift of flow profit affects the evolution of accumulated profit 
through the dynamic equation (8 ). The set of feasible restructuring dates is 
extended because more resources are available. The maximum dividend for 
which restructuring is still feasible is increased and the corresponding 
restructuring date is shifted forward. To prove this result first note that the 
increase in profit due to higher protection is increasing in the world price level.
d 2n(c{T),p{r ) , t )  i
dtdp{r) c ( t )
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Because the world price level is decreasing over time (9) the stronger 
effect of protection on flow profit for higher price levels (28) implies a higher 
flow profit gain in earlier periods. Now from an argument parallel to the one 
made above in the analysis of the effect of different cost parameters we can 
establish that higher protection implies both a higher dividend level and earlier 
restructuring dates at the maximum of the set of feasible restructuring dates. For 
the graphic argument we can again use figure in.3.
3.1.1. The effect of protection on a profit-maximising firm
For the profit maximising firm, i.e., a firm owner with full control over 
restructuring dates and dividend levels, the extended feasibility set is used to 
increase both current and future consumption.
The effect of higher import protection on a firm’s profit also depends on 
the initial cost level of that firm. In particular, we find that low cost firms have a 
bigger advantage from protection than high cost firms.
dtdc1 (t) c' (t)
In proposition 3 we collect these results both for the individual firm and 
for the differential impact depending on the initial cost level.
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Proposition 3
(a) An increase in tariff protection allows a profit maximising firm to increase 
the dividend level while at the same time shifting forward the restructuring dates.
dT dv(T) f f
(30) —  < 0 ; — ^ > 0  v r e j r * }
dt dt 1 J
(b) An increase in tariff protection increases the rate at which the cost
differential between firms of different initial cost levels increases.
c/2[c '( t) -c '( t )]  -/X -/x
(31) — ----- — > 0  if c‘ (0) > c' (0)
dtdt
Proof:
(a) Because high protection increases both the level (27) and the price 
responsiveness (28) of the flow profit we can by the same argument as used in the 
proof for proposition 1 (b) show that the maximum of the feasibility set is shifted 
upwards and to the left. This argument applies, analogous to the proof of 
proposition 1 , to all points on the lower bound of the feasibility set.
(b) This is an application of (22) noting the differential impact of trade 
protection depending on initial cost levels (29).
Proposition 3(a) shows the infant-industry characteristics of the model: 
trade protection generates transfers from consumers to home firms in the form of 
higher prices which are used by home firms to make investments in cost 
reduction. This implication holds both for individual firms, i.e., each firm 
restructures faster from proposition 3 (a), and for the distribution of firms, i.e., 
low-cost firms gain more and thus eliminate high-cost competitors quicker from 
proposition 3 (b). Over time protection might become unnecessary because firms 
catch up with their world market competitors.
146
3.1.2. The effect of protection on a manager-controlled firm
For the firm with manager control over restructuring dates the effect of 
higher import protection gives the management an opportunity to delay future 
investments in cost reduction: the additional resources are used as a cushion to 
survive the effects of slower cost-cutting.
Initial cost differences have no long-term effect on the reaction of the 
manager controlled firm. Firms with an lower initial cost level enjoy a higher 
windfall gain from an increase in protection and are thus able to delay 
restructuring dates by more. After the adjustment period, however, proposition 2
(b) still applies and all firms converge towards a common cost level.
Proposition 4
(a) An increase in tariff protection allows a manager-controlled firm to delay 
all future restructuring dates.
(b) An increase in tariff protection has no long term effect on the cost 
differential between firms with initially heterogeneous cost parameters.
(33) 3 r  such that c' (r) = c j ( t)V t > r
(c) Higher protection increases the long term cost level of all firms.
(34) 3 t such that
d& (r)
>0 Vt > t
dt
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Proof:
(a) Flow profit is increasing in protection (27) at any point in time. This 
implies a higher level of accumulated profit at any point in time and thus a later 
date at which the accumulated profit function reaches the level of restructuring 
cost R from above.
(b) Higher protection increases the initial flow profit difference between firms 
with heterogeneous cost parameters (29) but proposition 2 (b) still applies.
(c) For higher protection levels firms can generate sufficient resources, i.e., 
an equal level of flow profit, to satisfy the dividend target with a higher cost level. 
Using the implicit function theorem on flow profit (4) we get
Proposition 4 has implications close to the public perception on the effect 
of trade protection: firms use an additional profit to relax in their cost cutting 
efforts. Infant-industry effects are absent and the burden of a higher home market 
price on consumers results in a direct transfer to firms without achieving an 
improvement in the industry’s long term prospectives. The opposite is true as 
from proposition 4 (c) the cost level of the home industry is even increased 
compared to a policy with lower import tariffs. Comparing proposition 3 and 4 
the model draws attention on the critical importance of the assumption made on 
the control situation within a firm when evaluating trade policies.
T
>0
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3.2 An application to the creation of a free trade area
Suppose that countries home h and foreign /  initially run different trade
policies where home sets a lower external tariff than foreign: t h < t 1 . Now let the 
two countries create a custom union with a common external tariff t  somewhere 
between the two individual levels: t h < t  < t f . How does this policy affect the 
evolution of firm cost levels over time when we assume firms to be manager- 
controlled and international shareholders demand equal dividend payments in all 
countries?
For the pre-custom union situation, i.e., all dates before enacting the 
common external tariff t at date t^ u, we can apply proposition 4(c) to establish 
that the firm in the more protected country operates with a higher cost parameter. 
Due to the higher rate of protection this firm is still able to generate sufficient 
flow profits to satisfy the dividend demands and finance a future restructuring.
(37) ch(r) < cf  ( t ) V t  < t cu
The common external tariff tcu affects the firms in two countries 
differently: firms in the home country experience an increase in protection while 
firms in the foreign country face a tougher trade policy environment. Applying 
proposition 4(b) we conclude that the home country firms relax in their cost- 
cutting efforts while the foreign country firms speed up the cost-cutting. 
Eventually all firms converge to a common cost level.
(38) 3 t  * * > r cu such that ch (r) = cf  ( t ) | t  > t  * *
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We are interested in this case because the German experience is claimed 
to be a result of such a sequence of events: first, Germany chose a low rate of 
protection such that the exposure to strong foreign competition required German 
managers to restructure quickly while satisfying the dividend demands by the 
owners. Second, easier access to other European markets after the 1992 Single 
Market initiative as well as the reunification of Germany created windfall profits 
for German firms. These profits were used to delay restructuring programs and 
thus gave competitors in other European countries an opportunity to catch up.
Unfortunately, our model is not fully equipped to investigate this 
hypothesis. In an oligopoly model we can easily construct a situation where the 
elimination of trade barriers between two countries creates a windfall gain for 
low-cost firms in one country and windfall losses for high-cost firms in the other 
countries. In a small open economy model without exports this is not possible. 
These additional results of an oligopoly model come at the cost of a significant 
complication of the model: firms compete on all stages, i.e., on the product 
market, in setting restructuring dates, and when announcing the dividend level, 
with a largely increased strategy space. In this paper we have decided to develop 
the small open economy case instead which already allows us to draw out many 
of these results.
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4. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter develops a dynamic model to analyse how the exposure of a 
national market to international pressure and owners’ control of management 
behaviour affect a firm’s incentive to invest in cost reducing restructuring. Our 
model is applied to investigate the claim that low-cost firms slow down 
restructuring when faced with windfall profit. We show how a change in trade 
policy designed to increase profit increases the incentives of firms to speed up 
restructuring when firm owners fully control their management and thus are able 
maximise the firm’s dividend payment. When, however, owners only have 
limited control of their management through a dividend target the same trade 
policy decreases the incentives of firms to speed up restructuring. This latter 
prediction seems to be much more in line with empirical observations. The model 
has also implications for the evolution of cost differences over time: for owner- 
control these cost differences increase over time while for manager-control they 
decrease until they finally disappear.
Protection translates into a specific level of profit accruing to a firm. The 
way profit affects restructuring depends on the ability of owners to appropriate 
the profit. Under the assumption of full owner control of the management, as 
standard in the trade literature, accumulated profit is used as a resource to finance 
restructuring and dividends. Under the alternative assumption of limited owner 
control via a profit target, however, accumulated profit is used as a cushion to 
ensure firm survival in the absence of cost reductions.
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The model does not allow for strategic interaction between firms and 
relies on the exogenously assumed movement of the world price. These strategic 
effects would give interesting additional insights but complicate the model 
considerably. Especially for the case of heterogeneous firms and full owner 
control the results threaten to look more drastic in a full oligopoly model: lagging 
firms not only fall further behind their stronger competitors, but the performance 
of those low-cost firms speeds up this process until the laggards have to exit the 
industry. A second worry is the assumption on the complete absence of capital 
markets. A g h io n  e t  a l . (1997) show that debt can be used as a commitment 
device to force the management to restructure at earlier dates. This is an effect of 
debt known from the finance literature. If, however, uncertainty about the level of 
flow profit is introduced the effect of this instrument is restricted and managers 
regain some leeway in setting the firm’s restructuring dates.4 Despite the 
restrictions of the model outlined above the results are robust to different market 
structures. More specifically, the results obtained from our model hold for both 
price and quantity competition for differentiated products.
In the context of our model we look at the argument that has been made 
by B a ile y /G e r s b a c h  (1995) in the context of the further integration of European 
markets as part of the 1992 Single Market. They claim that the Single Market 
gave German firms with their initial cost advantage that opportunity to slow down 
in their cost-cutting efforts because they enjoyed windfall profits. From our model 
we conjecture that their argument is logically consistent, if owners have only 
limited control about the management’s activities.
4 See Aghion/Howitt (1998), p. 215.
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Figure III .l: Feasible dates for the first restructuring given positive 
dividend level v1
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Figure III.2: The set of feasible restructuring dates for 
an owner-controlled firm
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Figure III.3: The feasibility set as a function of the cost parameter
The area between A and the dividend level v1 over the time between 0 and T2 is from (17) smaller 
than the area between the flow profit functions bewteen 0 and T2. Therefor, (A ,!2) is not the 
maximum of the feasibility set for a lower cost parametere or a higher tariff level.
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Figure III.4: The set of feasible restructuring dates for a 
manager-controlled firm
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Figure III.5: Optimal restructuring dates and dividend levels
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Chapter IV
Trade liberalisation and 
within-firm incentive contracts: 
An application to the labour market
1. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we analyse how trade liberalisation affects wage 
differentials between skill groups through the impact of international competition 
on within-firm incentive contracts for high-skill labour. We develop a free entry 
international trade model where trade liberalisation increases the incentives for 
firms to invest in performance bonuses to their high-skill managers to reduce the 
low-skill per-unit labour input requirement. The reduction of trade barriers 
reduces market power and price cost margins such that firms have to push up 
their output in order to be able to finance a fixed cost of production. With an 
expansion of firm size it becomes more valuable to switch to a technology where 
managers can be induced with an appropriate incentive contract to cut the 
marginal cost of production. Trade liberalisation increases the number of firms 
paying incentive bonuses and thus the number of high-skill managers receiving a 
higher wage: the wage differential between skill groups rises as a response to the 
reduction of trade barriers. Our model thus develops an argument based on 
competition effects while the previous literature focuses on general-equilibrium 
effects of trade. Both perspectives are complementary steps towards a better 
understanding of the link between trade and wages.
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An increase in the relative wage of high-skill labour is observed in many 
OECD countries (see the OECD Jobs Study (1994) and appendix IV.l). The 
increase is particularly noticeable in the U.S. and the U. K. whereas for 
continental European countries like Germany1 the evidence is less clear. 
Concurrent to the increase in wage differentials the OECD countries experienced 
an increase in the role of foreign trade, especially in the manufacturing sector. 
Because the increase in wage differentials and the increase in trade shares 
occurred at the same time the two phenomena could be causally linked.
In general, the increase in the relative wage of high-skill labour can be the 
result of a shift in either demand or supply. Because the relative supply of skilled 
labour appears to have gone up (even though there is some discussion in the U.S. 
about the impact of migration2) labour demand is the main candidate for 
explaining the increase in wage differentials. One possible explanation for the 
increase in relative demand for high-skill labour is the emergence of new high- 
skill intensive technologies. Another explanation is that production has shifted 
towards high-skill intensive sectors as the result of trade liberalisation driving 
countries with an abundant supply of high-skill labour, such as the OECD 
members, to concentrate on the high-skill intensive sectors where they enjoy a 
comparative advantage.3 This possible linkage is behind much of the public 
concern about “globalisation”.
1 In its Jobs Study (19 9 4 ) the OECD reports for Germany a falling relative wage of high-skill 
labour referring to work using the German Socio-economic Panel. M O ll e r  (19 9 6 ) uses the 
Labour Market Statistic and finds contrary evidence. KRUGMAN (1995) argues that with labour 
market rigidities these countries might experience an increase in relative unemployment rates 
for low-skill labour instead.
2 See B o r ja s /F r e e m a n /K a t z  (1997).
3 A g £ n o r /A iz e n m a n  (1997 ) m en tion  a  th ird  hypothesis: a  decline  in  th e  rea l co s t o f  cap ita l m ight 
h ave  induced  firm s to  substitu te  low -sk ill labour w ith cap ita l.
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The empirical work tries to test these - non-mutually exclusive - 
hypothesis. Most studies applying the Heck sch er-O h u n  framework to analyse 
the quantitative impact of the change in trade flows on the change in wage 
differentials conclude that trade accounts for less than twenty percent of the 
observed changes in the wage structure.4 There are a number of reasons why trade 
turns out to be either of small importance or no candidate at all to explain the 
wage movements when working within the Hec k sCHER-OHLIN framework. First, 
labour economists argue that the change in trade flows has been too small to 
explain the large movements in relative wages if usual estimates of labour market 
elasticities are applied. Through the factors of production incorporated in traded 
goods the change in trade flows changes the effective labour supply. But because 
trade accounts only for a fraction of total production changes in trade volumes 
tend to have a limited effect on wages. Second, L a w r en c e /S laug h ter  (1993) 
find that high-skill labour demand increased not only because high-skill intensive 
sectors gained importance but also because the demand for high-skill labour rose 
across all sectors. This observation is in contrast to the predictions of the 
H ec k sc h er -O h u n  model. Finally, R o bbin s  (1996) reports an increase in the 
relative wage of high-skill labour for some Latin-American countries. This 
observation again is in contrast to the predictions of the H eckscher-O h u n  
model if these countries are low-skill labour abundant.
We argue that this perspective neglects the importance of trade and 
international competition on the decision to adopt a new technology and thus
4 S ee  fo r e x am p le  S l a u g h t e r /S w a g e l  (1997).
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underestimates the effect of trade on wage differentials.5 Our model provides a 
framework to measure the effect of trade on wages not only by the prices of 
traded goods or the production factors incorporated in trade flows6 but also by the 
change in management structure and technology induced from international 
competition. Because a change in competition is the source of changes in 
management structure and compensation, in our model trade liberalisation even 
towards a country with identical relative factor endowments has an impact on 
relative wages.
We allow for the choice of technologies with attached compensation 
schemes for high-skill managers and imperfect competition on the product 
market. We make one critical assumption about the role of skill that differs from 
the existing literature: high-skill labour has a fixed cost property, i.e., a given 
number of k high-skill managers is able to run a firm independent of its output 
size. Low-skill labour is variable, i.e., the number of low-skill workers varies 
directly with output size. This assumption is responsible for the asymmetric 
impact of international competition on different skill groups. Differences in 
relative productivity or specificity to an industry - both assumptions that have 
been studied in the literature - are not critical in our model.
In the model, firms face decisions in three stages. In the first stage, firms 
decide to enter either a perfectly competitive sector X  or an imperfectly 
competitive sector Y. In the second stage, firms in the imperfectly competitive
5 KAPSTEIN (1996 ) m akes an  in form al a rgum en t along the sam e lines.
6 There is some discussion about prices or quantities being the appropriate indicator of the effect 
of trade on the labour market. While trade economists generally prefer the prior labour 
economists often use the latter.
sector Y choose between two technologies: one technology has given per-unit 
labour input requirements beyond the control of high-skill managers; the other 
technology allows high-skill managers to reduce per-unit labour input 
requirements when they are paid a bonus. Firms in the perfectly competitive 
sector X  face exogenously given labour input requirements. In the final stage, 
firms compete in the international product markets.
Our model draws on the industrial organisation and the new trade 
literature. The model of simultaneous technology choice in the second stage 
builds on L a i (1995) and L ew is (1996). B ea t h  et  a l . (1995) reviews the 
literature on competition in R&D expenditure that analyses conceptually very 
similar issues. F r iedm an /F u n g  (1995) analyse the effect of trade liberalisation on 
technology (in their terminology: type) choice in the presence of several 
externalities. Reitzes (1991) and C a b r a l  et  a l . (1996) compare the incentives 
to invest in R&D under tariff and quota protection. We add to this literature by 
introducing free entry and by linking competition in the product market to the 
labour market. The linkage between international competition and the labour 
market in the third stage builds on the vast literature on trade and wages. 
Overviews are given by Sla u g h ter /S w a g el  (1997), T h y g e se n  e t  a l . (1996), 
B u r tle ss  (1995), W es  (1995), and in a recent symposium of the Journal o f 
Economic Perspectives (1995). G a r c ia -Pe n a l o sa  (1996) extends the 
H e c k sc h er -O h u n  framework by introducing endogenous factor supplies. We 
add to this literature by introducing imperfect competition in the product market 
and by allowing the endogenous choice of technology and management 
compensation.
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The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In section 2 we 
analyse the three-stage model of competition. Section 2.1 solves for the product 
market equilibrium in both sectors. Section 2.2 examines the technology choice 
and thus compensation policy decision for firms in the imperfectly competitive 
sector. Section 2.3 studies firms1 entry decisions. In section 3 we add the labour 
markets for both high-skill and low-skill labour. Section 4 analyses the effect of 
multilateral trade liberalisation in the imperfectly competitive sector. Section 4.1 
solves for the change in the number of firms and in firms' technology choices. 
Section 4.2 examines the impact of the change in technologies and management 
compensation on wage differentials between skill groups. Section 5 concludes.
2. THE MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION
Firms compete in a three-stage set-up in two countries called home h and
foreign /. They employ low-skill and high-skill labour in production. In the first
stage, analysed in section 2.3, firms enter either sector X  or sector Y. Firms in the
Y sector use a production technology with increasing returns to scale (IRS) due to
the existence of fixed management costs. Both types of labour have the same 
*■»
productivity. Firms in the X  sector use a production function with constant 
returns to scale (CRS). Again, both types of labour have the same productivity.
In the second stage, analysed in section 2.2, firms in the Y sector can 
invest a fixed amount kb to decrease their marginal production cost. We think of
7 The assumption on identical labour productivity in production independently of skill simplifies 
the analysis but is not essential for our results. With a C o b b -D o u g la s production function the 
outside wage level for high-skill labour falls if competition decreases the number of total 
management jobs. With a fixed number of firms this effect is zero. With an endogenous number 
of firms this effect tends to reduce the average compensation for high-skill labour.
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b as a bonus on top of the base wage paid to k managers in order to provide them 
with the appropriate incentives for cost reduction in the sense of per-unit labour 
input requirements. Alternatively, b can be interpreted as an investment in R&D, 
the purchase of a new patent, or the acquisition of a new production technology. 
We assume that the levels of both k and b are exogenously given and only high- 
skill labour can work in management.
In the final stage, analysed in section 2.1, firms compete in the product 
market in both sectors and countries by setting quantities as their strategic 
instruments. In the perfectly competitive labour markets firms hire production 
workers and high-skill managers. As usual, the sub-game perfect equilibrium of 
the game is established by solving backwards.
2.1 The product markets
In this section we analyse the final stage competition in the 
product market first in the CRS X  sector and second in the IRS Y sector. At this 
stage the number of firms and their technologies are given in both sectors. In the 
CRS X  sector trade costs are zero, and the per-unit labour requirement is 
normalised to unity and is equal in both countries independently of the type of 
labour employed. With constant marginal and average cost in production 
competition in the X  market is perfect. Firms set the price q equal to marginal cost 
given by the wage level wL of low-skill labour.
(1) wL=q
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The Y sector drives the results in our model. The market structure in the 
sector follows an established imperfect competition trade model by 
B r a n d e r /K r u g m a n  (1983) as extended by free entry in V e n a b l e s  (1985). The 
total number of firms in sector Y is determined by a zero profit condition and 
given by n. Superscripts h and/ indicate the locations home and foreign with n = 
nh + rl. Firms can be one of two types, 1 or 0, where the per-unit labour input 
requirement for the two types differs according to c1 < c ° . The number of type 1 
firms in country j  is determined by a technology choice condition and is given by 
d  such that we have a = ah + c f .
The total cost of production for a type i firm depends on the technology 
parameter c\ the wage levels wL for low-skill and wH for high skill labour, the 
fixed number k  of managers per firm, and the size b of the bonus payment. The 
cost function in the Y sector is given by (2) where y is firm output.
(2) Cl (y) = c‘wLy + kwH + k b i; i = {0;1}
The fixed expenditure on management together with the constant marginal 
cost of production result in increasing returns to scale (IRS) and thus imperfect 
competition in the Y sector. Market demand for the output y is given by (3) where 
we assume linear demand functions to get tractable explicit solutions for the 
equilibrium levels of output and profit. We ignore income and assume 
preferences to be quasi-linear with respect to the output of industry X.
(3) p j = A j -  J )  y A is market size; j  = h,f
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Firms compete by setting output as their strategic instrument. Both the 
total number of firms and the number of type 1 firms at each location are given 
when output decisions are made. Firms pay a per-unit trade cost t when serving 
their export market and zero trade costs when serving their domestic market. 
Firms solve problem (4) separately for each market.8
(4) m axj(p|X y)- , ~ c'Hv ) /
Because marginal cost is constant and markets are segmented firms 
choose the output in each market separately. The first-order condition to the 
optimisation problem in (4) is given by (5).
(5) o
The equilibrium of the market game is defined by the vector of individual 
firms' output choices yl that simultaneously satisfy the maximisation problems (4) 
for all firms and by prices that satisfy the demand functions (3). It is useful to 
define as zl the average marginal cost of all active competitors of a type i firm. 
The value of z depends both on the total number of firms (competitors) n and 
their types as given by the number of type 1 firms cl.
\ahc l +[wA - a /,]c°] + \af c x +[nf  - a / ] c ° ] - c '
(6) z l = ---------------------------------   wL
n - 1 1
a[cl - c ° ]  + hc° - c '
“  n^i Wl
8 In appendix IV.2 we analyse the effect of a binding non-negativity constraint on output.
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The expression for competitors’ costs includes a component c depending 
on the firm’s own type. With a large number of competitors n this component 
matters increasingly less such that zl converges to an own-type independent value 
z. From (6 ) competitors’ costs z are decreasing in d , weakly increasing in n7, and 
between the limits defined by the two types: clwL < z < c°wL.
We solve explicitly for the equilibrium home firm output (7) in the home 
market and the foreign market where the superscript ij indicates the sales of a type 
i firm on market j  and z is the average marginal cost of all its competitors.
.. A + [n - 1 ]z +nf t - n c w L
(7 ) y =   Home market
n + 1
.. A f  + [n - 1 ]z' + [nh - l ] t -  r ic1 wL + r]
y'1 = ----------   — ----------    i  Export market
n + 1
We can now write down the equilibrium profit of a home firm9 as a 
function of the own type given by superscript i and the number of type 1 firms d  
determining competitors’ costs z . The maximised type-dependent profit 11' 
evaluated at the product market equilibrium before additional bonus payments kb 
is given by
(8) n , { a \ a / )  =
A h + \n - 1  ]z + n f t -  nwLc'
2 A f  + [n -  l]z + [nh -  l]r -  + 1\
n + 1
T
n + 1
-  kw.
9 We continue to concentrate on the solutions from the perspective of the home firm. Foreign 
firms’ solutions are mirror images.
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Due to the linearity of the marginal cost and demand functions profit is 
given by the sum of squared output in each market minus the fixed management 
cost. At this final stage of the market game both firms’ types and the number of 
firms in the market are taken as given. In the next two sections we analyse first 
firms’ technology choice decisions, i.e., the number of type I firms a, and second 
firms’ entry decisions, i.e., the total number of firms n.
2.2 Technology choice: Investment in high-skill management incentives
In this section we analyse firms’ choices of technology type in the second 
stage if they produce in the Y  sector. In the X  sector the technology is exogenously 
given and thus no such choice exists.
Firms in the Y sector choose between two types of technology: if firms 
choose type 0 , their per-unit input labour requirement is given by c and k 
managers are paid a wage wH each. If firms choose type 1, their per-unit input 
requirement is given by c1 < c° and k managers each get a bonus b on top of the 
wage wH. In other settings this bonus payment could be an investment in R&D or 
new production technologies. Here we treat b as a reduced form solution to give 
managers an incentive to reduce marginal cost to c1 in the presence of some 
informational friction between managers and firm owners like in chapter I.
At this second stage of the game trade costs t and the total number of 
firms n are fixed. From (7) and (8 ) the maximised type-dependent profit 11' can 
be written as a function of the endogenous number of type 1 firms a = a h + a f  
only. Firms choose their technologies and compensation policies simultaneously. 
Each firm assumes other firms not to be influenced by its own choice (C o u r n o t
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assumption). For simplicity, we look at symmetric countries ( A 1 = A j ) such that 
the country superscript j  can be dropped.
In equilibrium no firm gains from changing its type. A pure-strategy 
equilibrium satisfies condition (9a) for type 1 and condition (9b) for type 0 
simultaneously.
(9a) n l( a ) - * 6 > n ° ( a - l )
(9b) n ° ( a ) > n ‘(a + l)-&>
With a large number of firms n the two equilibrium conditions (9a,b) 
converge to the technology choice condition (1 0).
(10) n ‘(a ) - to  = n°(a)
The equilibrium condition (10) also applies for the mixed-strategy 
equilibrium where firms choose type 1 with probability a/n. We assume that the 
market conditions are such that the equilibrium n is large and we can use (1 0 ) as 
the equilibrium condition and an own-type independent z from (7).
To analyse the characteristics of the equilibrium we rewrite (10) in 
explicit form. The left and the middle parts of (11) give the difference in profit 
between the two types. This profit difference is a function of the number of type 1 
firms a through competitors’ costs z. The right hand part of (11) gives the 
additional management cost of a type 1 firm. This additional cost kb is constant.
(11) n‘(a)-n°(a) = - c '\A  + 2[n - l]z(a) - t \+nwL[ S  - c°2]] = kb
[ft + 1J
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From (11) we can show that the profit differential is decreasing in a. 
Hence with a larger number of low marginal cost, i.e., type 1, competitors the 
advantage of adopting the type 1 technology shrinks.
da JL [n + l] da [n + l] L J
In figure IV. 1 we graph the profit difference and the management cost kb. 
At the intersection of the two lines we can read off the equilibrium a*. From the 
figure we see that this equilibrium is stable: the profit difference intersects the 
management cost line from above, hence only for a < a* firms find it profitable 
to switch to type 1. For a > a* it is profitable to switch to type 0. At a = a* 
deviations to either side are unprofitable.
From figure IV. 1 we can also see that the value of a* depends on the 
exogenous size of kb. Three different scenarios are possible but we concentrate on 
the interior solution for a in case 2 .
Case 1.) kb > m ax jn1 (a)-  I I0 (a)} -» a* = 0
a
Case 2.) m ax^I1 (a)-1 1 ° (a)}> kb > m injn1 (a )-  n° (<z)}—»0 < a* < n
a a
Case 3.) kb < min-jfl1 (a)-  I I 0 (a)} —»a* = n
a
The equilibrium of this subgame is described by the unique a* solving the 
technology choice condition (1 1 ).
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2.3 Free entry in both sectors
In this section we analyse firms’ entry decisions in both sectors at the first 
stage of the game and endogenously derive the number of firms n in the Y 
industry. In the X  sector firms always make a zero profit because in section 2.1 we 
have shown that firms in this sector set price equal to marginal cost (1). In our 
model the X  sector acts only as a fallback option.
In the Y sector firms enjoy market power and price with a mark-up over 
marginal cost (5). They have, however, to cover the fixed cost of the management 
compensation. Maximised profit for each type is a function of both the total 
number of firms n and the number of type 1 firms a. In the previous section we 
have solved for a * given n. Here we look for simultaneous solutions for both a* 
and n*. In equilibrium, the profit of a type 1 firm is just sufficient to compensate 
for the additional fixed management cost kb. The profit of a type 0 firm is equal 
to zero. The free entry conditions are given by
Because of the assumptions that all firms export and countries are 
symmetric we can collapse the four dimensions of the profit function to two for 
the sum of all firms n and the sum of type 1 firms a. Symmetry implies n / 2 - n -
(13) n lj(
n 0/(
ri a s  well a s  a/ 2  = d  = d.
(14) n  '(a,n) = kb 
U°{a,n) = Q
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The free entry conditions (14) describe the zero profit contours in (a,n)- 
space. Applying the implicit function theorem on (14) the slope of these profit 
contours is given by
a  A n 11 a  'Z 2 y v d y‘J/dnd a = _ d n / d n = j, k,/   <()
dn (HV/da ^  2 y lJ dy lj /da
j=h,f
where the negative sign of (15) follows from
<10 — ^ [ C' - C']<0
da n + 1
dyli dy0i
hence 0 >
da da
<0
dy01 A h + wLcl - l z - t n / 2  — [n + l \n - l \d z /d n
dn [n + l f
dyif A f  +wLc ‘ - 2 z  + tn/2-[n  + i 1[n -l]d z /d n
dn [« + l ] 2
dyl} dy°J
hence 0 > ------> -------
dn dn
The reaction of output to a change in the number of type 1 firms is type- 
independent (16). The reaction of output to a change in the total number of firms, 
however, depends on the firm’s own type (17). Hence even though the profit 
contours are downward sloping for both types they have different slopes. In 
particular, it follows from (17) that the slope of the profit contour for a type 0 
firm is steeper.
(18) o > _ ^
d n  /da dn^/da
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In figure IV.2 we draw the profit contours at the free entry conditions in 
(<2,rc)-space as solid lines. At the intersection of the profit contours for type 0 and 
type 1 firms are both indifferent between types and entry/exit. Depending on the 
level of kb the intersection can be in different regions corresponding to the three 
cases discussed earlier. An intersection above the 45° line is technically infeasible 
(by definition a < n)  and thus all firms choose type 1. This corresponds to case 3 
and occurs for low values of kb. An intersection below a = 0 is equally infeasible 
and thus all firms choose type 0. This corresponds to case 1 and occurs for high 
values of kb. Finally all other intersections give an interior solution with a < n, 
correspond to case 2, and occur for medium values of kb. This is the situation 
drawn in figure IV.2.
Figure IV.2 also includes the technology choice condition from the 
previous section 2.2 drawn as a dotted line. The technology choice condition runs 
through the intersection of the free entry conditions because at that point both 
type of firms generate an identical profit of zero. Moving from this intersection at 
(a*, n*) to the left holding a constant we get I I 1 (a*, n ) - I I0 (a*, n) < kb Vn < n *. 
Type 0 firms profit more from a reduction in the total number of firms because 
using (15) and (17) we get
dl1° dn1(19) >o
dn dn
From (19) the technology choice condition is below the horizontal line 
through a* for n < n*. Moving from the intersection (a*, n*) downwards holding 
n constant we get Tll (a1n ) - T l 0(a,n)> kb Va <a*  because in ( 1 2 ) we have
shown that type 1 firms gain more profit from a reduction in low cost type 1 
competitors than type 0 firms. Pulling these two observations together we 
conclude that the technology choice condition runs through (a*, n*) and is 
upward sloping.
3. THE LABOUR MARKET
We now turn to the labour markets for high and low-skill labour. The 
structure of the labour markets is held very simple in order to concentrate on the 
interaction between technology and compensation policy choice and the wage 
differential between skill groups. In particular we assume perfect competition in 
both labour markets.
Low-skill labour can work in production in both sectors. If production in 
the X  sector is positive (which can always be assured by an appropriate demand 
structure) the fixed per-unit labour input requirement in this sector determines the 
wage level for low-skill labour at the price of the x  good.
(2 0 ) w [ = q  \ j - h , f
High-skill labour can work in production in both sectors at the same 
productivity as low-skill labour. In addition, high-skill labour can also work in the 
management of Y sector firms. Let the total high-skill labour force in home be 
given by i f .  Of the total high-skill labour force knh work as managers while the 
rest Hhp works in production.
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(21) Hh = knh + Hhp
The level of the high-skill wage wH assures that knj < H J. The lower 
bound of the wage for high-skill labour is given by the price q of the x  good.
(2 2 ) wJH >q ; j  = h , f
We assume that some high-skill labour work in production such that (22) 
holds as an equality. 10 Because we assume perfect competition on the labour 
market, the wage in (2 2 ) is also the wage paid to high-skill management in type 0  
firms. High-skill managers in type 1 firms, however, receive the additional bonus 
payment b. The bonus payment is assumed to be the reaction to an underlying 
(not modelled) informational friction between the management and firm owners 
and thus competition can not drive down the size of the total payment b + wJH 
without violating an underlying incentive constraint. It is critical to our results 
that in contrast to chapter I we assume b not to depend on competition. 11 The 
average wage WH of high-skill labour is therefor
(23) Wj  = w{ + a ik b / H I ; j  = h , f
10 If no high-skill labour works in production the number of firms is limited by the number of 
potential managers. The assumption above implies that this restriction is not binding. Otherwise 
entry would be limited and managers would share a fraction of the non-negative profits in the Y 
industry.
11 In particular, if competition decreases the incentive payment b that would introduce a 
countervailing effect to our model such that the overall effect would be ambiguous.
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With the wage level fixed from the X  sector technology the labour market 
equilibrium for low-skill labour determines the allocation of labour to the two 
sectors X  and Y.
Equating labour demand with labour supply we get
(24) x + a jc°[yjh(c°) + (c°)\ + [nj - a j \ y jh(cl) + y ^ (c1)]=  LJ + H jp
Equation (24) traces out the production possibility frontier of the 
economy. With a fully specified demand system this allows us to determine the 
absolute level of output in each sector.
4. MULTILATERAL TRADE LIBERALISATION
In the trade policy experiment we analyse the effects of multilateral trade 
liberalisation. Examples for such a concerted change in trade policy are the 
GATT Uruguay Round and the EU Common Market Programme. Multilateral 
trade liberalisation affects firms on two sides: firms enjoy easier access to their 
export market but they face more intense competition in their domestic market.
We proceed in two steps: first, in section 4.1 we analyse the effect of a 
reduction in trade costs t on the number of firms and the technology choice of 
firms in the Y sector. We find that the absolute (and relative) number of type 1 
firms increases. The free-entry condition magnifies this effect as the absolute 
number of firms falls in response to trade liberalisation.
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Second, in section 4.2 we highlight the implications for the labour market. 
The increase in the number of type 1 firms increases the number of high-skill 
managers that receive an additional bonus payment b. Other high-skill managers 
lose their jobs because their firms exit the industry but they are re-employed in 
production at the same wage level. The average high-skill wage increases while 
the low-skill wage is unchanged: the change in technology choice in response to 
trade liberalisation increases wage differential between skill groups.
4.1 Firms’ exit and technology change
To analyse the effect of a fall in protection t we use both the mathematical 
equilibrium conditions and the figures. In the initial equilibrium both the 
technology choice condition (11) and the zero profit conditions (14) are satisfied. 
Profit depends on the number of all firms n, the number of type 1 firms a, and the 
level of trade cost t. We refer only to the home country because the foreign 
country is a mirror image by the symmetry assumption.
The fall in the trade cost t affects both the zero profit and the technology 
choice condition. First, we analyse the impact on the technology choice condition
(11) by applying the implicit function theorem. We find that a reduction in trade 
costs t increases the profit difference between types and thus pushes up the 
number of type 1 firms a. Intuitively, the larger market increases equilibrium firm 
output and thus raises the advantage of operating with low marginal cost.
da d (n '< -nv)/d t r „ n  . r 1 
(25) - ^  = d (n '‘ -n°')/da  = wAc - c l > 0 ’ '  = (*’/ )
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Above in (12) we have already shown that the profit difference between 
types is decreasing in the number of type 1 firms a. The profit difference between 
types is also decreasing in trade costs t because profit increases more for type 0  
firms than for type 1 firms in response to an increase in t.
In figure IV.2 the sign of (25) implies an upward shift of the technology 
choice condition: for a given number of firms n a lower trade cost t implies a 
larger number of type 1 firms a in the technology choice equilibrium defined by
Second, we analyse the impact on the zero profit conditions (14). The 
effect of trade liberalisation on profit levels depends on the initial level of trade 
costs. We assume initial trade costs to be sufficiently high such that profit is 
increasing in trade costs.
We establish the movement of the zero-profit conditions (14) by applying 
the implicit function theorem. Assumption (27) assures that exports are small 
enough such that (28) has a negative sign. Intuitively, lower protection decreases 
the level of profit and firms only break even if their competitors at the same time 
operate at higher marginal costs, i.e., more of them are of type 0 .
(26)
dt
(11).
dvih . dvif 
Assumption (27) d fV /d t = 2y lh------+ 2y if------> 0
dt dt
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da dXV /dt 1 n f  y if
< 0 ; i = {0 ,1}
dt dn ‘/da wL[cl - c 0][n + l yif+yih
Expression (28) implies a south-west shift of the two zero profit lines in 
figures IV.2. The type 1 zero profit line shifts less because type 1 firms export a 
larger share of their output and thus the term in brackets is smaller for them.
In figure IV.3 we can now clearly identify the forces linking trade 
liberalisation, the number of firms, and firms’ technology choice. The pre­
liberalisation equilibrium is given at the intersection of the two pre-liberalisation 
free entry conditions at A. The post-liberalisation equilibrium is given at the new 
intersection of the post-liberalisation free entry conditions at B. Through B also 
runs the post-liberalisation technology choice condition.
Proposition 1
Let a* be the equilibrium number o f type 1 firms. A fall in protection increases 
the share and the absolute number o f type 1 firms.
Proof: See appendix IV.3
4.2 The effect of technology change on the labour m arket
Multilateral trade liberalisation affects the labour market in two ways. 
First, from proposition 1 a larger number of firms in the Y sector use the type 1 
technology. This will change the average wage of high-skill labour. Second, the
d(a */n *)
— -— L>0  
dt
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fall in protection reduces the price level p and increases total output in the Y 
sector. The increase in Y sector output changes the sectoral allocation of labour 
but because we have tied the wage level by the CRS technology in the X  sector 
the change in the allocation of labour has no effect on the wage level.
First, we analyse effect of trade liberalisation on the average wage of high- 
skill labour. Managers are affected through the change in their compensation if 
their employer changes his technology type. Using (23) the change in the average 
wage of high-skill labour is given by
dWj, daJ kb
(30) - — -  = - ----------- > 0
V '  dt dt H J
The increase in the average high-skill wage is directly proportional to the 
change in the number of type 1 firms. There is no countervailing effect from high- 
skill managers losing their jobs to work in production because wages in 
management and production in type 0  firms is equal given perfect competition in 
the labour market. The low-skill labour wage is fixed from the X  sector 
technology at the level given by (23). The real value of their wage, however, goes 
up because the price level p  in the Y  sector is falling. If consumption patterns are 
independent of skill the fall in p  does not counteract the increase in the nominal 
wage differential.
Second, we look at the sectoral allocation of low-skill labour. On the one 
hand, sector Y output increases. This increase in Y output increases production 
labour demand. On the other hand, firms with lower per-unit labour input 
requirement increase their output and capture a larger share of the total market.
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This decreases the average per-unit labour requirement in the Y sector. The net
effect of these countervailing forces depends on parameters of supply and demand
in the sector.
Proposition 2
(a) Trade liberalisation increases the wage differential between unskilled labour 
and skilled managers because a higher share o f managers receives bonus 
payments.
(b) Trade liberalisation increases the output in the Y-sector. Due to the change in 
technology the impact on the allocation o f unskilled labour is ambiguous.
Proof:
(a) follows from (30) in conjunction with proposition 1.
(b) The pricing rules given by firms’ first-order conditions on output choice (5) 
imply a positive relationship between the price p  and trade costs t. From the 
inverse demand function (3) lower prices imply higher total output in the Y 
sector but the per-unit labour demand falls, so the total effect on labour 
demand from the Y  sector is ambiguous.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter contributes to the discussion on the link between 
Globalisation and changes on the labour markets of the industrialised countries. 
We present a model in which trade liberalisation increases the relative wage of 
high-skill labour through the impact on technology choice from increased 
international competition.
In contrast to the existing literature this result does not rely on differences 
in factor endowments across countries. It therefore also applies to trade 
liberalisation between similar countries such as the member states of the 
European Union and to trade liberalisation by low-skill labour abundant 
countries.
Empirical studies that evaluate the effect of trade on wage differentials in 
might underestimate the impact of international competition. In the H eckscher- 
Oh lin  framework, to give an example, a decrease in the price of a high-skill 
product in a high-skill abundant country is evidence for an exogenous change in 
technology. In our model, the same price decrease is evidence for an increase in 
international competition that triggers a change towards a more high-skill 
intensive technology. Hence even though the observations are identical the two 
models imply different assessments of the role of trade in the change of wage 
differentials.
Our model is wider in scope than suggested in the present application and 
hence the robustness problem of many imperfectly competitive trade models is 
less severe. Both multilateral trade liberalisation in a Co u r n o t  oligopoly and the 
form of cost cutting assumed are special cases of a general problem structure. The
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conditions for our results to hold are much less restrictive: in terms of the market 
structure and policy experiment in the model any combination of government 
policies and market structure that induce an increase in individual firm output 
have the described effect on technology choice, e.g., favour the technology with 
an active role for the high-skill manager. In terms of the cost-cutting process all 
investments that substitute the marginal cost of production with the fixed cost of 
more high-skill intensive activities like R&D, training, or managerial incentive 
structures feature the described link between technology choice and relative 
wages, e.g., increase the relative wage of high-skill labour.
The model extends the literature on trade and wages, and the literature on 
technology choice. First, the model gives a role for the degree of competition in 
goods markets in the link to the labour market. We show that the degree of 
competition is a force independent of factor price considerations on the relative 
demand for different skill groups. Second, the model allows for free entry and 
links technology choice to the labour market. Free entry magnifies the effects of 
trade liberalisation on technology choice and relative wages.
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Figure IV .l
Profit
differences,
cost
region 1
region 2
region 3
Figure IV .l: Technology choice condition
The equilibrium level of a* is determined by the intersection of the profit 
difference with the level of bonus payments b to all k managers in a type 1 
firm.
• If kb is in region 1, it is independently of competitors’ decisisons never 
optimal to become a type 1 firm. The only stable equilibrium is at a* = 0.
• If kb is in region 2 as shown, it is optimal to switch to type 1 as long as the 
number of type 1 competitors is below a*-l. The stable equilibrium is 
defined by the interior value of 0 < a* <n.
• If kb is in region 3, it is independently of competitiors’ decisions always 
optimal to become a type 1 firm. The only stable equilibrium is at a* = n.
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Figure IV .2
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U l <kb
technology choice 
^  condition
total num ber 
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Figure IV.2: Free entry condition
Thetwo solid lines give the zero profit conditons for both firm types. At the 
intersection of the zero profit lines they are crossed by the upward sloping 
technology choice condition.
As drawn the equilibrium is interior, i.e., in region 2 defined in figure IV .l.
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Figure IV.3
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Figure IV.3: Equilibrium  after trade liberalisation
A: pre-liberalisation equilibrium 
B: post-liberalisation equilibrium
Figures IV.4-5
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Figure IV.5:
Technology choice for different levels o f trade cost
free
trade
intermediate 
trade cost
autarky
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Appendix IV.l 
Wage developments in the U.S. and Germany
U.S.A.
Year rei. wageb rel. unempl.c Trade/
BIP
%
Intra-Ind.
Male Female Male Female
1980 1.94a 1.78a 8.95a 8.26 a 14.47 38
1990 2.47 2.32 16.6 14.83 16.64 47
d% +27 +30 +86 +80
Source: OECD, a - 1972, 
share of unemploy
Germany
> - average wage highest skill group/average wage lowest skill group, c - 
ed from lowest skill group/share of unemployed from highest skill group.
Year rel. wage b rel. unempl.c Trade/
BIP
%
Intra-Ind.
Male Female Male Female
1980 2.00 1.77 18.83 30.06 45.8 59
1990 1.94 2.01 19.45 47.77 47.5 68
d% -3 +14 +3 +59
Source: OECD, notes: see above
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Appendix IV.2 
The effect of a binding non-negativity constraint on output
In this appendix we discuss the effect of a binding non-negativity constraint 
y > 0 on output. We find that the results of the main text all continue to apply even if 
the constraint binds. The non-negativity constraint on output in the optimisation 
problem (4) gives an additional Kuhn-Tucker condition.
For positive trade costs the non-negativity constraint is more likely to bind on 
the export market. If the non-negativity constraint is violated for some firms on the 
export market, a number of them will stop to serve that market and the marginal 
exporter is indifferent between exporting or not. For this firm both parts of the Kuhn- 
Tucker condition (Al) are zero. In figure IV.4 we draw the marginal revenue and the 
marginal cost firm as a function of the number of firms. The intersection of the two 
curves gives the number of exporters e1 and the type of the marginal exporter. We can 
use the Kuhn-Tucker condition (A l) to determine the number of home market 
exporters e? such that condition (Al) is satisfied.
(A l) y ‘[ p ( Z y ) - t - c ‘ + y y ( S y ) ]  = 0
(A2) where ce is given by the marginal home exporter
The expression for equilibrium sales (7) is modified to
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ih A h +[nh +ef - l ] z l +ef t ~[nh +ef ]c‘
(A3) y = -------------------r-----7---------------------  Home market
nh +e f + 1
A f  + [/i7 +eh -  llz' + [eh -  llt -  [nf  + ef  ][c' + 1]y lf =  L------------- J- -k —j— L----------JL------- J Export market
7  nf +ef  + 1  F
where the average competitors’ cost z (6 ) may differ between the home and the 
export market.
a \ahcl +[nh + + x ] - c l
nh +ef  - 1
[ahcl + x \  + \af c1+[nf - a f ]c°]-c l 
Z = nf  +eh - l
[ej - a J]c° for  ej > a j 
and X = r .
/o r  eJ < a J
In the technology choice part of the model (section 2.2) we distinguish 
between three regions defined by the number of exporters e1. The autarky region is 
defined by eh = ef  = 0. The intermediate trade cost region is defined by 
0 < eh = ef  < a j . The low trade cost region is defined by eh = ef  > a j . Note that the 
number of exporters is decreasing in trade costs t.
For the grapic analysis we introduce in figure IV.5 a box of size nh x nf  
instead of the line of length n used in figure IV.l. box introduced in figure IV.2. In 
this box we draw the equilibrium combinations of the total number of firms n and the 
number of type 1 firms a from the perspectives of home and foreign as a function of 
the level of the trade cost t.
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Applying the implicit function theorem on the technology choice condition 
(1 1 ) we first establish the slope of a h [af ) for the autarky region as zero (infinity) for 
the home (foreign).
(A5) —j~ Y  = o(= o o )  for home (foreign) technology choice condition
In the autarky region no trade takes place and the number of type 1 foreign 
firms has no influence on home firm profit and technology choice (13). There is only 
one point in the box drawn in figure IV.5 where both countries are simultaneously in 
equilbrium.
Applying the same procedure for the intermediate trade cost region we find 
that the slope of ah (af ) is negative but larger (smaller) than minus unity for the home 
(foreign) technology choice condition.
with i = h ,j  = f  (i = f j  = h )  for the home (foreign) technology choice condition
In the intermediate trade cost region only some of the type 1 firms export. A 
marginal change in the number of foreign type 1 firms thus has no effect on the home 
market. It does, however, affect the cost level on the foreign market. The same 
argument applies to a change in the number of home type 1 firms. The difference 
between the output of firms of type 0  and 1 on both markets is equal only if both firm 
types serve all markets. In the intermediate region this is by definition not the case. It 
follows that the slope of (A6 ) is larger (smaller) than minus unity for the home
(A6)
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(foreign) technology choice condition. In figure IV.5 there again exists only one point 
at the intersection of the two lines with negative slope where both countries are 
simultaneously in equilibrium.
Finally applying the implicit function theorem for the low trade cost region the 
different effects cancel out and the slope is given by minus unity for both countries. 
This is the result used in the main text.
Undertaking the trade policy experiment of a reduction in trade costs t 
three different reactions have to be discerned. First, the equilibrium schedule of 
technology choices in figure IV.5 is shifted up. Second, exit of firms is reducing the 
size of the box and shifting the technology choice schedule further up. Third, the slope 
of the technology choice schedules might change if the economy moves from one 
trade cost region to the other. The two first movements correspond to the effects 
analysed in section 4.1 of the main text. The adjusted analysis is not repeated here but 
is available upon request. The final movement does not affect the results presented in 
proposition 1 of the main text.
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Appendix IV.3
Proof of Proposition 1
da *
a. —~ < 0
dt
The negative relationship between t and a* can be shown from the technology 
choice condition. A reduction in trade cost shifts this condition upwards (25). The 
technology choice condition thusintersects the two free downward sloping free entry 
conditions at a higher value for a and a lower value for n.
d(a */n *)
b. - * - 7 — - < 0
dt
With a * increaing and n falling the share of a* is trivially rising.
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Appendix IV.4
Worked example to illustrate the existence of an interior solution
Profit
,5 Typ 1 profit 
Typ 0 profit
4
,5»’
3
,5»'
2
,5
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Number of type 1 firms a
Assumptions
total number of firms: n = 15 
Market size: A  = 50 
trade cost: t = 4
low marginal cost: c1 = 2 , 0  
high marginal cost: c° = 2,5
fixed cost: F = 20 
Bonus payment: b = 6
Conclusions
The chapters collected in this thesis highlight different aspects of the link 
between international competition and the efficiency of firms. In the first chapter, 
we show how the internal efficiency of firms increases in response to different 
types of trade liberalisation. In the second chapter, we analyse the elimination of 
underperforming firms by exit and merger as a consequence of multilateral trade 
liberalisation. The third chapter investigates how the owners’ control of a firm’s 
management can shape the dynamic effects of initial firm heterogeneity in the 
context of trade liberalisation. The final chapter uses the previous results to 
present a technology choice link between liberalisation of intra-industry trade and 
the observed increase in wage differentials between skill groups. The picture that 
emerges clarifies the positive impact of competition on the efficiency of firms and 
puts ambiguities in the literature into perspective, and this should help both to 
devise better empirical tests of the impact of international competition and select 
policies that avoid potential problems.
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International competition and the internal efficiency of firms
The first chapter “International competition and the internal efficiency of 
firms” looks at the precise links between trade liberalisation and the performance 
incentives given to managers.
The policy results of the paper are clear cut: Any policy reducing the level 
of profit favours the choice of a socially beneficial technology by a private owner. 
The set of policies resulting in these extra welfare gains on top of the standard 
allocational benefits includes the reduction in import tariffs and export subsidies, 
the relaxation of quotas, and the integration of segmented markets. The direction 
of technology choice is, in addition to the profit level, driven by the cost 
responsiveness of profit. Any policy increasing firm output also increases the cost 
responsiveness and favours the sophisticated technology. Policies fitting this 
description are the multilateral reduction of trade costs and the move from quota 
to tariff protection. That higher import tariffs and larger export subsidies have the 
same output increasing effect could explain some ambiguities in the theoretical as 
well as in the empirical literature that often picks up a positive correlation between 
output and total factor productivity growth (Verdoom’s law).
The chapter relates both to the contract and the trade literature. The
contract model is an application of ideas by S chm idt  (1997) and others to a set up
of technology choice. First, it endogenises the profit level effect in an adverse
selection model. Second, it demonstrates spill-over effects of informational
asymmetries to stages of the game with full information. By identifying two
separate channels of interaction between the product market and the internal
stmcture of the firm the model clarifies some ambiguities in the theoretical
literature. First, the profit level effect, which is new to the trade literature, is
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shown to be solely responsible for the additional welfare effects. This conclusion 
is derived using as a more appropriate benchmark a social planner suffering from 
the same informational limitations as the private owner. Through its impact on the 
informational rent the profit level effect acts directly on the inefficiency in the 
model. Second, the cost responsiveness of profit used in the previous trade 
literature is shown to be directly related to the change in output due to trade 
policy. Because the output response to trade policy depends very much on the 
individual setting, the ambiguity in the literature is no surprise. This ambiguity, 
however, relates only to the direction of technology choice, not the welfare 
implications as suggested elsewhere.
Trade liberalisation as facilitating merger
The second chapter ‘Trade liberalisation as facilitating merger” analyses 
merger and exit as part of an industry restructuring process in response to trade 
liberalisation.
The theoretical set-up is new to the trade literature because it checks the 
private incentives to merge before taking the social welfare perspective. This 
different set-up accounts for the surprisingly clear cut welfare result that depends 
only on the free entry assumption. The model sheds some light on the dynamics of 
an industry adjusting to trade liberalisation. Previous contributions have looked at 
the comparative statics but not at the transition to the new equilibrium. The sunk 
entry costs both introduce path dependency and provide a more balanced view 
than models treating all fixed costs either as sunk or recoverable. Sunk entry costs 
imply a larger number of firms in the post-liberalisation equilibrium but the
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merger process ensures that these firms all have low fixed costs. The welfare 
results of trade liberalisation are thus still unambiguously positive.
The policy results are more in line with political opinion than with the 
classical merger literature focusing on detrimental market power effects. All 
privately profitable mergers are welfare increasing. Mergers are an important tool 
in the restructuring of an industry, and trade liberalisation can initiate and support 
this process. The characteristics of mergers in the European Union between 1987 
and 1992 are broadly in line with the predictions made from the model: over the 
course of the merger wave market power overtakes cost synergies as the most 
important stated motive for a merger. Cross-border and domestic mergers occur in 
parallel, and cross-border mergers rise in importance at the peak of the merger 
wave.
A note on the effect of trade policy on the speed of cost-cutting
The third chapter “A note on the effect of trade policy on the speed of cost- 
cutting” analyses how trade policy affects firms’ incentives to cut cost depending 
on the control firm owners exercise over a firm’s management..
The theoretical results concern the distinction of two different roles of
profit depending on owners’ control of management. First, profit is a resource for
later investments in new technology, products or the like, if managers are perfectly
controlled by owners. Second, profit is a cushion to shelter against the
consequences of slacking if managers have some freedom to pursue their own
interest. The result of any change in the market environment, like trade policy,
through profit levels on management behaviour critically depends on which of
these two motives dominates. The chapter contributes to the work on trade
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liberalisation between heterogeneous countries. It points at the potential 
divergence of countries as a consequence of initial differences when firm owners 
have full control of firms’ management.
The policy results relate to a discussion in Germany that motivated the 
chapter: windfall profit as a result of joining a free trade area slows down cost- 
cutting efforts if owners have limited control over managers with a private interest 
in delaying restructuring. Hence we provide a theoretical basis for the claim that 
trade liberalisation lead to a slow down of cost-cutting activities by German 
companies. We also show, however, that joining a free trade area leads to the 
divergence of firm performance if firms are initially heterogeneous and owners 
have complete control over management. These results stress the ambiguous 
effects of trade policies that increase profit levels and the important role of firms’ 
governance structures.
Trade liberalisation and within-firm incentive contracts: 
An application to the labour market
The final chapter ‘Trade liberalisation and within-firm incentive contracts: 
An application to the labour market” builds on the previous chapters to address the 
effects of a trade induced change in technology on the labour market.
The policy result of the chapter relates to the trade and wages debate. We 
show that even in the absence of relative factor endowment differences trade 
liberalisation can push up wage differentials. Most trade flows are still of an intra­
industry type between countries of similar factor proportions, so this result appears 
to be highly relevant to countries like the OECD members. The model implies that
trade barriers against imports from developing countries not only reduce total
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welfare, they do not even succeed in protecting the rents of low-skilled labour as 
intended.
Empirical studies that evaluate the effect of trade on wage differentials in 
the context of the H e c k s c h e r - O h u n  framework might underestimate the 
importance of international competition. The present literature takes contrary price 
movements of high-skill intensive goods and high-skill labour as evidence for an 
exogenous shock unlinked to international trade. In our model, however, an 
increase in international competition reduces the high-skill intensive good’s price 
while at the same time driving up the demand and thus the price of the high-skill 
input. The factor price increase is a result of trade and should be treated 
accordingly in the empirical analysis of the data.
The chapter adds to the theoretical literature because it treats technology as 
endogenous instead of exogenous in addition to trade policy. Trade liberalisation 
leads to an increase in firm output and thus encourages firms to invest in order to 
reduce marginal costs. If high-skilled labour not only has a higher productivity but 
is also predominant in activities like R&D or general management, trade 
liberalisation has obvious implications for the wage structure. The chapter finally 
allows for free entry of firms. This mechanism reinforces the initial reaction and 
increases the share of firms switching to the technology using more high-skilled 
labour even further.
The four chapters add to the understanding of the link between trade
liberalisation and the efficiency of firms. The first two papers look at the response
within firms and industries to trade liberalisation: within firms, we identify the
forces driving technology choice in response to more intense international
competition. Within industries, we characterise the selection of surviving firms in
200
an exit and merger process on the adjustment path to the post-liberalisation 
equilibrium. Both the adjustments within firms and the selection within industries 
are welfare improving. The final two papers point out potential pitfalls: trade 
liberalisation can wipe-out industries or allow for periods of slack; and trade 
liberalisation can drive up the wage differentials between skill groups. Even 
though the overall welfare consequences are positive, these reactions can raise 
distributional issues with implications for the political economy of trade reform. A 
better understanding of the forces involved should help to devise rational policy 
responses to these challenges.
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